UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
12-15-2019

Ethnic Power Dominance in a Resource-Rich Sub Saharan African
State: An Analysis of Violent Conflict Accelerators and the
Mitigating Influence of Civil Society in Nigeria
Victor O. Fakoya

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the African Studies Commons, Ethnic Studies Commons, and the Race and Ethnicity
Commons

Repository Citation
Fakoya, Victor O., "Ethnic Power Dominance in a Resource-Rich Sub Saharan African State: An Analysis of
Violent Conflict Accelerators and the Mitigating Influence of Civil Society in Nigeria" (2019). UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 3798.
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/18608635

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and
Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

ETHNIC POWER DOMINANCE IN A RESOURCE-RICH SUB SAHARAN AFRICAN
STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT ACCELERATORS
AND THE MITIGATING INFLUENCE OF CIVIL
SOCIETY IN NIGERIA

By
Victor O. Fakoya
Bachelor of Science – Political Science
Ogun State University
1997
Master of Science – Political Science
University of Ibadan
1998
Master of Social Work - Social Work
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2008
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy – Political Science
Department of Political Science
College of Liberal Arts
The Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December 2019

Copyright 2019 Victor O. Fakoya
All Rights Reserved

Dissertation Approval
The Graduate College
The University of Nevada, Las Vegas

August 27, 2019

This dissertation prepared by

Victor O. Fakoya

entitled

Ethnic Power Dominance in a Resource-Rich Sub Saharan African State: An Analysis of
Violent Conflict Accelerators and the Mitigating Influence of Civil Society in Nigeria

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy – Political Science
Department of Political Science

Tiffiany Howard, Ph.D.

Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D.

Examination Committee Co-Chair

Graduate College Dean

Michele Kuenzi, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Co-Chair

John Tuman, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Member

David Damore, Ph.D.
Examination Committee Member

Satish Sharma, Ph.D.
Graduate College Faculty Representative

ii

Abstract
My dissertation research explores the impacts of ethno-regional power dominance, trust,
and violent conflict in a resources-rich multiethnic, sub-Saharan African state. This dissertation
examines the impact that ethnic power dominance has on the relationship between conflict and
civil society in a resource rich sub-Saharan African (SSA) nation examined. Relying upon intrastate case study analysis of the socio-political climate in Nigeria, I argue that distrust in the
national government, when motivated by ethno-regional cleavages has an accelerating influence
on the incidence of conflict. Using cross-national survey data in conjunction with field interview
data, this research finds that in the regions where socio-political trust is low, and civil society is
weak, there is a higher incidence of violence and tensions. However, in the regions where civil
society is active and salient, the incidence of violence is comparatively lower. The overarching
conclusion of this study is that despite the presence of ethnic power dominance in a resource rich
state, high levels of socio-political trust and an active civil society have a mitigating influence on
the incidence of civil conflict, tensions, and violence.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This research seeks to examine how causal and accelerating factors contribute to conflict,
and how the mitigating influence of civil society contributes to peace and political stability. The
beleaguered political history of African nations is fraught with a myriad of problems. Chiefly
among these problems is the prevalence1 of the protracted war that began shortly after
independence. Hitherto the epoch of colonialism, Africa consisted of different classifications of
political units, including lineage groups, villages, townships, and tribal kingdoms. Interactions
among the African nations were primarily for commercial purposes. There were no rigidly drawn
boundaries between these political entities. Hence, occasional disputes occurred between
members of different towns over issues including farm land boundaries, unresolved minor
disputes, or religion.
Between 1960 and 2000, post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa2 engaged in a significant
number of internecine conflicts that became so endemic the region earned the notoriety of
becoming the most violent among the developing regions of the world (SIPRI 1999, 20 cited in
Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 13). The literature on conflict in the region is replete with a plethora
of causal factors, with one of the focal issues in African politics being the impact of ethnicity on
the behaviors and performances of the states. Moreover, it is striking and at the same time
sobering that the incidence of violence in Africa has triggered a domino effect across the region.
In fact, during the 1990s, Africa topped the list of politically unstable and economically
impoverished regions in the world.3 The region that was once revered for its abundant natural

Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) disagree vehemently with economic studies’ disregard for the significant impact of
ethnicity on the prevalence of violence.
2 Please note that Sub-Saharan Africa, Sub-Sahara African states, and Africa are used interchangeably throughout
this research.
3 Collier and Gunning (1999) “Why has African states grown slowly?” provides an in-depth analysis of the causes
and implications on poverty in Africa.
1
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resources and a promising political future in the early 1960s has descended into a vicious cycle
of poverty and political instability of varying magnitudes.
The question is not only why, but also how has violent conflict become so prevalent in
sub-Saharan Africa? In addition to examining the accelerators and causal mechanisms, finding
workable ways of mitigating violent conflict in Africa has never been more urgent because of its
devastating consequences for the affected states. To be specific, post-war countries survive under
a tentative peace characterized by deepening crises, including distrust of rival ethnic groups or
the state, social fragmentation, economic destitution, and political unpredictability.
Unfortunately, more than five decades of earnest efforts by researchers and policy makers have
failed to transform SSA into a sustainably peaceful region; finding solutions to preventing
conflict in SSA is not yet feasible. A further question that stems from this observation is, why is
SSA still the amphitheater of violent conflict? This research seeks to answer these questions by
examining the different approaches to conflict management in Nigeria.
The debates on the role of ethnicity in violence have generated a vast amount of
literature. However, it is worth noting that ethnicity has become the most prominent concept in
conflict literature in multiethnic states. Perhaps the rise of ethnicity to prominence is the upshot
of the controversy that surrounds its ontology and epistemology on one hand, and its relevance to
categorization of violence on the other hand (Kalyvas 2003, 479). Emphasizing the roles of
ethnicity in conflict, Horowitz4 cited in Varshney 2007 that “until recently ethnicity was a
backwater of social science” (p. 276). Similarly, other studies have supported the observation
that ethnicity has not been accorded its rightful place in conflict literature. For instance,
Ismagilova (1978) notes that “many scholars seek the sources of ethnic prejudices and biases in

See Horowitz (1985) for robust discussion on the nature and dynamics of the interactions and conflict among
ethnic groups.
4
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the subjective world of the individual rather than in social relationships. However, ethnic
interrelationships become especially aggravated during an internal (national) political crisis” (pp.
82-83). Yet three decades after Horowitz made the thought-provoking statement, ethnicity still
remains a controversial concept. In view of these seeming ambivalent and lackluster stances
from opposing sides, it is justifiable to ask, “how much of the complex ethnic situation do we
really know” (Osaghae 1999, 63). In addition, to what extent have the perceptions of researchers
regarding the significance of ethnicity changed in the study of civil wars? This question demands
contextual examination of the assumption that countries that have experienced civil war tend to
be more susceptible to another outbreak of war.
Some studies have asserted that while ethnic identity may seem to be of legitimate
political concern in the multiethnic states, it is not the immediate trigger of violence in subSaharan Africa (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80; Bates 2008, 9). Furthermore, some analysts have
challenged the ontological foundation of the term ethnicity (Chandra 2006, 400). However,
irrespective of divergent perceptions of ethnicity, an irrefutable fact remains that it is a
prominent factor in the analysis of violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.
Against the backdrop of the above, this research aims to address the questions: how and
why do the risk factors cause violent conflict? It is noteworthy that these overarching questions
have not received enough attention from conflict scholars. This dissertation’s research will
examine the potential mitigating influence of civil society in sub-Saharan Africa. The underlying
assumption is that preventing the onset of conflict tends to engender an enduring peace, while
post-war reconciliation of the dispute among warring ethnic groups will only impose a
precarious peace. While the study of relationships between associational life and politics is not
new, it is notable that much of the previous analyses on the phenomenon in Africa has focused
on the context of transition to democracy and less on conflict mitigation. Therefore, this
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dissertation research will examine three ethnic regions in Nigeria to determine how ethnicity
accelerates violent conflict and how civil society can mitigate the concomitant violence in subSaharan Africa.

Background of the Study
While some analysts have questioned the ontology5 of ethnicity, the most significant
controversy lies in the role that ethnicity plays in triggering and aggravating violent conflicts.
Attempts at answering the question have generated an intense debate among social scientists.
Two contrasting models have emerged that propose different strategies for resolving violent
conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.
The first model argues that ethnicity, language, religious fractionalization, and
politicization of ethnic identity in sub-Sharan Africa constitute significant risks for the outbreak
of violence (Ismagilova 1978; Osaghae, 1999; Adedeji, 1999). The earliest perception of the
causes of conflict involving ethnic groups is the ancient hatred theory (Geertz, 1963; Rabushka
and Shepsle, 1972). Another term for ancient hatred in literature is primordialism. The term
primordialism refers to “a passionate and deeply-felt attachment to one’s own ethnic values and
identity” (Conversi 2002, 269). The perseverance of primordialism in the politics of SSA raises a
question about the rationality of primordialism and ethnic nationalism. Kaufman 2006 (37)
argues that the political entrepreneurs exploit the fear of their ethnic group members for the
purpose of accumulating and maintaining power. To explain the connections that exist between
ethnicity and violent conflict, it is imperative to trace the history of identity politics and the
implications for disruptions in social relations (Osaghae and Suberu 2005, 5).
Some studies also point out that the divisive nature of ethnic identity politics dates back
See Kalyvas (2003) for detailed discussion on ontology of political violence and the arguments surrounding the
roles of ethnicity in violence.
5
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to the colonial administrations’ administrative strategies (Nnoli 1998). Cederman, Min, and
Wimmer (2009, 2010) show that once we account for the political exclusion and competition
along ethnic lines, ethnic diversity “... in and of itself has no effect on the likelihood of civil
conflict.” It is noteworthy that a state where a powerful ethnic group dominates and excludes the
less powerful groups risks triggering violent conflict. Nevertheless, while the relationships
between ethnicity and violent conflict have long been established, some studies have argued that:
“Although polarization and fractionalization capture different aspects of ethnicity, they still seem
unable to establish a clear link between ethnic diversity and conflict” (Kovacic and Zoli, 2013,
3).
Understandably, this model stipulates that any proposition for resolving violent conflict
in Africa must include, if not begin with, addressing the problems that emanated from
ethnonationalism. The astute advocates of this proposition have yet to form a sufficient
explanatory mechanism for analyzing ethnicity-conflict phenomena. To this end, this dissertation
research seeks to determine the missing elements of social relations in conflict-ridden states and
examine the role of civil society in ameliorating the relationships between state and ethnic
groups. Perhaps a good relationship between state and ethnic groups could engender sustainable
peace and political stability in sub-Saharan African states.
In contrast, the second model contends that the relationships between ethnicity and
violent conflict are either weak or unproven. More often than not, supporters of this viewpoint
argue, “Surely, ethnic antagonism, nationalist sentiments, and grievances often motivate rebels
and their supporters. But such broad factors are too common to distinguish the cases where civil
war breaks out” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76). Similarly, resource dependence theory argues that
states that rely on resource-rent are more susceptible to experiencing high incidences of violent
conflicts than those that do not (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, 819). According to the
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institutional theory, weak or failed political institutions are the leading causes of violent conflict
because the states with such predicaments are susceptible to attack from rebellious ethnic groups
as they lack the capacity for creating and sustaining workable and equitable policies (Herbst
1990; 2000; Englebert, and Tull 2008; Arriola 2009; Howard 2012). In turn, climate theory
posits that factors including population surges, environmental change, and resource scarcity
contribute immensely to violent conflict in multiethnic states (Lawry 1990; Homer-Dixon 1994;
Bachler 1998;6 Urdal 2005; Benjaminsen 2008).
Interestingly, the theories that fail to consider ethnicity as a significant factor in conflict
analysis have not been able to provide compelling explanations to substantiate the claim that
ethnicity actually sustains peace rather than contributes to the onset of violence. However,
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000, 265) disagree with the economic theory’s notion that ethnic
diversity is not a serious threat to peace. The question is, how does ethnic diversity make Africa
safer? Perhaps Kovacic and Zoli’s (2013) position deserves more attention as they succinctly
suggest that there is not yet a broad consensus on whether or not ethnic polarization actually
causes conflict or not. Hence, there is need for in-depth studies to establish the impact of ethnic
diversity and fractionalization7 on conflict or peace (p. 12).
Moreover, some issues appear as recurrent themes across all causal explanations of the
theories mentioned above. First, various theories in conflict literature agree that at the centers of
violent conflicts in multiethnic states are conterminous issues, including lust for power and the
struggle for resource control. Additionally, each school of thought contends vigorously that the
factor it emphasizes is the decisive issue in the analysis of the causal mechanisms of violent
conflict. The inherent flaw in all the theories highlighted above is the assumption by each theory

Bachler and Spillmann (1996) demonstrate that the Malian Tuaregs perceived the controversial government
sedentarization policies designed to modernize the society as a program that is meant for marginalizing the Tuaregs.
7 See Alesina et al., (2002) for far-reaching analysis of ethnic fractionalization that elucidates the role of ethnicity on
social, economic, and political developments in multiethnic societies.
6
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that it is capable of explaining the cause of violence without cognizance of its potential
dependence on the others. Paradoxically, despite the role of ethnicity in sub-Saharan African
conflicts, these theories fail to acknowledge historical evidence and thus fail to emphasize the
mechanisms for conflict mitigation. Therefore, this dissertation research argues that although
ethnic diversity and ethnic identity politics are inherent characteristics of sub-Saharan African
states, their impact on politics have not been the same. Why does it seem as if the states in SSA
are impacted and respond differently to the problems of ethnicity? This dissertation research
assumes that these differences reflect the variations in the mitigating influences of civil society in
SSA states.

Research Questions
This dissertation research seeks to answer two questions that have not been satisfactorily
answered in the extant literature regarding the causes of violent conflict in SSA. The questions
that inspired this study are as follows:
First, how do the perceptions of citizens about government policies influence the causal
mechanism of violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich sub-Saharan African states?
Second, how does social capital influence citizens’ perceptions of government
institutions’ performance in ethnically diverse, resource-rich, sub-Saharan African states?

Data and Methodology
Case Selection
This dissertation research focuses on a single case because it affords the researcher the
opportunity to conduct field research within the limited time frame for a dissertation and the
availability of resources. Previous studies show that sub-Saharan African states have shared
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political histories and problems. However, it is important to note that political institutions at the
center of this research are not the same everywhere. Putnam (1993) pointed out that to evaluate
institutional performance we must examine “how well a political institution manages essential
internal affairs” (p.65). On that note, it is appropriate for this dissertation research to focus on a
single case.
Examining different regions within a single multiethnic and multi-regional state tends to
provide an opportunity for an in-depth understanding, which can guide similar research in other
contexts or serve as a precursor for investigating multiple cases. As Yin (2014) noted, focusing
on a single case allows for an in-depth analysis of phenomenon by comparing the perceptions of
people from the different regions. So, this research seeks to analyze a resource-rich, multiethnic
state that is organized structurally into regions and ethnically fractionalized. Thus, Nigeria is
selected as the research context because it comprises most if not all the factors that are relevant
to answering the questions this dissertation research seeks to answer.
Even though most of the SSA states are ethnically diverse and resource-rich, Nigeria is a
better choice because of its deep-rooted characteristics mentioned above. With over two hundred
and fifty ethnic groups, Nigeria is the most ethnically diverse and fractionalized sub-Saharan
African state. While another sub-Saharan African state (Botswana) is heavily dependent on
resource-revenue, it is not as ethnically diverse and fractionalized as Nigeria. Unlike Nigeria,
where ethnic groups are concentrated under geo-political regions, Botswana, with only seven
ethnic groups, is less ethnically fractionalized. Moreover, the overlapping nature of ethnic groups
and regions of settlement provides a unique opportunity for analyzing how the interwoven
characteristics of interethnic and interregional relationships influence political trust.
Some studies support the idea that the level of trust by different groups for political
institutions is influenced by many factors, chiefly among which is the cognizance of the
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externalities (Coleman 1994).8 Factors including the regional arrangement of the ethnic groups,
the inclusion or exclusion of members of the ethnic groups in the administration, the extent to
which the ethnic groups benefit from distribution of public goods and services, how the political
institutions treat members of different ethnic groups and other factors differentiate Nigeria from
Botswana or any other sub-Saharan state.
Finally, even though Nigeria was one of the first group of African states to attain
independence and was once revered as the giant of Africa, it has experienced more political
instability and violent conflict than most of the sub-Saharan African states. Thus, Nigeria is the
most ideal case or context for this analysis because it epitomizes all the characteristics that this
research considers as potential independent variables for the analysis.

Data
This research relies on data collected through interviews and survey questionnaires
administered across the geopolitical zones within the three ethno-regional divisions in Nigeria
during June, July and August 2018. The interview data was used for descriptive analysis of the
perceptions of Nigerians about the issues examined. Besides that, I also analyzed Afrobarometer
survey data (Round 7) for Nigeria, which was collected in 2017. Afrobarometer data was
collected randomly through survey exercises that captured the entire country. Furthermore, the
participants in the Afrobarometer data drew from different ethnic groups and regions, and
different socio-political, cultural, and economic spectrums. Additionally, Armed Conflict
Location and Events Data (ACLED) data on the incidence of conflict in Nigeria between 19972018 was explored for the purpose of understanding the different types of conflict incidents that
are documented during the period. The secondary sources of data include archival research
See Putnam (1993). “Making democracy work: Civic tradition in modern Italy” for an analysis of Coleman’s
theory of externalities.
8
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through libraries, government and private institutions, and non-governmental sources such as
research institutions and civil-group information outlets. This data search focuses on information
pertaining to the dynamics of ethnic power relations (Cederman and Girardin, 2014), and the
impact of accelerating factors on the causes of conflict; the political histories that explicate
conflict management; and the mitigating influence of civil society.
The respondents for my field interview were selected through the snowball sampling
method, whereby initial contacts introduce the researcher to other potential respondents (Kalton
and Anderson 1986). Because of the difficulties of time and resources that are required to engage
in an elaborate random sampling method of data collection, my initial contact began with two
people. Through these two contacts, one a senior official at the Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos, South-West, and one a senior official at the Nigerian Institute of Social
and Economic Research (NISER) Ibadan, South-West Nigeria, I was introduced to public
officials, community leaders, civic group activists, and average citizens. Of the 42 people I
contacted, I interviewed 30 individuals. While all the ethnic groups were not represented because
of the low number of interviewees, there was representation from each of the six geo-political
zones, which are sub-divisions of the three regions. Overall, I interviewed people in Abuja
(FCT), Benue state (North-Central), Delta State (South-South), Enugu State (South-East),
Kaduna State (North-West), Lagos and Oyo States (South-West), and Taraba State (North-East).
The community group leaders interviewed also include individuals from organizations including
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC); the Mdzough U Tiv (MUT); Idoma National Forum (INF); the
Omi Ny’ Igede (NY); Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB);
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP); the Arewa People’s Congress; the
Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN); Committee for the Defence
of Human Rights; Green House Resource Center; and Campaign for Democracy. Of the 30
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respondents there were 7 senior public officials, 9 community leaders, 10 members of the public
(whose statuses were not disclosed) and 4 people who described themselves as political activists.

Methods of Analysis
This analysis is based upon a single case study method. A case study method is an indepth analysis of specific context(s) for understanding a complex phenomenon. As (Yin 2014,
16) articulates, it is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the
“case”) in depth and within real-world context.” The nature of the field interview questions
outlined for this research requires an analytical and interpretative method of analysis. To this
end, I utilized data collected through the field interview for descriptive and interpretative
analysis. Afrobarometer data is also analyzed using Chi-square bivariate statistics to test for
associations between the dependent and independent variables.

Goals of Research
This dissertation research seeks to achieve two goals. First, it seeks to analyze the causal
mechanisms of violent conflicts with the view to explaining the roles of ethnicity (ethnic
dominance). Second, it seeks to explore the mitigating influence of civil society in the conflicts
in SSA. Ultimately, this dissertation research seeks to analyze the causal mechanisms of violent
conflict in Nigeria with the goal of determining why and how ethnic factors accelerate violent
conflict in SSA9 To achieve these goals, this dissertation research goes beyond the explanatory
purview of extant literature by analyzing the role of civil society in fostering social capital and
political trust that contributes to political stability. The nucleus of this theory is social trust that

See Osaghae (2001). “The role and function of research in divided societies: the case of Africa.” Researching
violently divided societies: ethical and methodological issues for more discussion on the nature, characteristics of
divided states and the implications for violent conflict.
9
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emanates from the feelings of the composite ethnic groups toward the state. The theory is fully
described in chapter four.

Relevance of Research
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most ethnically diverse region and the constituent states have
experienced vicious cycles of civil wars. With a population of nearly two hundred million and
high spate of violence, Nigeria is the best analytical referent for this dissertation research
because of the reasons mentioned above. Interestingly, despite the efforts of scholars and the
government, the region has remained one of the most volatile politically, making the choice of
this research topic, the case study and scope, significant. Moreover, violent conflict constitutes
an impediment to political stability and economic advancement in sub-Saharan Africa.
Researchers have investigated the phenomenon and proffered many recommendations for
managing the conflicts. Therefore, it is essential to reexamine why and how resourcedependence, institutional crisis, and ethnicity are still revered as causal or accelerating factors of
conflict in Africa. Moreover, the utilization of a mixed method case study method for analyzing
the dynamics of the causal mechanisms has the potential to shed light on the viability of the
theoretical framework that this research explores. Finally, this dissertation research will
contribute to the conflict literature by supporting or rejecting the accelerating roles of ethnicity in
conflict, the mitigating influence of civil society in conflict, and the essence of social trust in
facilitating sustainable peace.

Chapter Outline
Chapter One: This introductory chapter provides the foundation and background of the
study. It summarizes the statement of research problems, the conceptualization of terms, research
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questions, data and method of analysis, the goal of the research, the significance of the research,
and the outline of the study.
Chapter Two: This chapter explores the extant literature on violent conflict in Africa. It
focuses on the arguments of the different perspectives on the causal factors and management of
violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter Three: This chapter is the theoretical framework of the dissertation research. It
focuses on the causal mechanism of violence by exploring the role of political trust in the
perceptions of citizens and their reactions to government policies and performances. It addresses
the notion of trust and distrust and why and how citizens choose to trust or distrust the
government.
Chapter Four: This chapter presents the research methodology. It explains the method for
data collection using the analytical method. It also lays out the events, issues, or variables that
are explored in this dissertation research,
Chapter Five: This chapter analyzes the case study and presents the findings. It examines
the trends and dynamics in the incidence of violent conflicts in Nigeria to understand how
ethnicity and power domination occur in resource-rich multiethnic states.
Chapter Six: This chapter concludes the research. It summarizes how the research
questions were addressed. It also summarizes how the research accomplished its goals. It
concludes by proposing recommendations for future studies.
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Chapter 2: Competing Theories of the Causes and Accelerators of Violent Conflict

Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the extant literature on violent conflict with the view to
explaining why sub-Sahara African states are prone to violent conflict, how conflicts occur, and
how to mitigate these conflicts in order for Africa to experience sustainable political stability and
economic development. To this end, this chapter seeks to accomplish three goals. First, it
explores the literature on violent conflict in ethnically diverse and resource-rich states. Second, it
examines the roles of accelerating factors in the onset and escalation of conflicts. Third, it
critically assesses the mitigating influences of civil society on conflict in ethnically diverse and
resource-rich sub-Sahara African states. In conjunction, this chapter examines how literature has
analyzed violent conflict, their findings, and the areas that requires further explanation.
It is legitimate to ask why Africa is a hotspot for the study of conflict. It is striking, and at
the same time sobering, that of all the regions of the world sub-Saharan Africa presents the most
fertile ground for analyzing the causes, accelerators, dynamics, duration, and impacts of conflicts
(Horowitz 1985; Osaghae 1999 & 2001). While there is no argument that sub-Saharan Africa is
the most divided region, an important question is how relevant is ethnicity to violent conflict in
Africa? This has led analysts to focus on the effects of ethnicity as a factor of conflict.
Interestingly, analysts have come up with divergent findings, which has led to further questions
about what we really know or do not know about ethnicity.
In addition to the debate on the causal factor, another issue that has emerged as
significant to the analysis of conflict in the SSA is the role of civil society. The assumption that
civil society may have a mitigating influence on virulent conflict stems from the notion that
citizens are likely to acquiesce to an entity that bears a considerable measure of trust. The debate
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on the phenomenon of conflict in Africa has attracted different approaches for investigating the
problem and proposing options for resolutions. Among the propositions for maintaining political
stability is the role of civil society in conflict mitigation and resolution. This role must be
examined carefully to provide unambiguous explanation for how conflict erupts in developing
multiethnic states. Researchers have engaged in concerted efforts to conceptualize conflict in the
ways that explicate the objectivity of their research and at the same time increase knowledge.
The task is complex and challenging considering the difficulties associated with identifying a
coherent definition of social concepts. Literature of conflict shows that conflict has attracted a
plethora of definitions based on divergent views of nature, actors, dimensions, and the intensity
of the acts that constitute conflict. Therefore, for the purpose of clarity in this research context,
conflict refers to a disruption in the orderly process of social relations. Conflict can manifest in
different forms and levels of intensity and tends to have different magnitudes of effects. The fact
that conflict does not lend itself to a simplistic universal definition is consistent with the
challenges of concept definitions generally in the social sciences.
According to Waltz (1959), war is the physical display of the innate attributes of humans.
In a rather blunt manner Waltz writes, “Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected
aggressive impulses, from stupidity” (p. 16). Deducible from the above is the observation that
attempts at defining conflict often leads to the explanation of the causal factors, types, contexts,
and the transformation of conflict. It is worthy of note that beyond the orthodoxy of endless
preoccupation with the search for causal factors, cognizance should also be accorded to
dynamics of intergroup relationships as shaped by the expected ends that they seek to achieve.
Relationships in a social system that entail competing interests are consistent in the tendencies to
degenerate into conflict of varying magnitudes if the interests of the disparate actors are
irreconcilable (Schmidt and Kochan 1972, 359; Galtung 2009, 35).
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It is in view of the above that Thomas (1992) defines conflict as “the process which
begins when one party (ethnic group) perceives that another group has frustrated, or is about to
frustrate, some concern of its’ (p. 265). Furthermore, Thomas emphasizes the significance of
conflict process and structure (pp. 265-266). What the above suggests is that conflict may
manifest in structural or non-structural form. But what are the fundamental differences between
structured and non-structured types of conflict? Are they caused or accelerated by different
causes? According to Galtung (2009), “conflict is unstructured if it evolves from a contact
without prior interaction, while structured conflicts normally emanate from contradictions among
parties that have had previous interaction” (p. 48). Therefore, the nature and characteristics of
conflicts may vary from one context to another. First, conflict can be violent or non-violent.
Second, conflict can be structural or non-structural. Furthermore, non-violent conflict can evolve
from different types of disagreement but seldom rise to violent combat. Violent conflict,
however, involves violent physical combat and fatalities. Structural war normally stems from an
unsatisfactory hierarchical pattern of relationship. In structural relationships, the dominant group
often exploits the state’s institutions for relative advantage while suppressing or excluding rival
groups. Third, the characters of the parties involved influence the characteristics, ramifications,
and duration of the conflict. Hence, among other factors, some scholars have noted that the best
way to assess a conflict phenomenon is to examine the intensity of violence (Gurr 1969; Wright
1990). The problem with such exposition is that it assumes that all conflicts involve violence. It
is instructive to note that this research does not lump all conflicts together. Rather, it focuses on
violent conflict.
Another problematic issue for the analysis of conflict is the classification. First, why is
classification necessary? Second, what are the standards for classifying conflict? Although
classification may shed light on the specific nature of the conflict analyzed, its absence ought not
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to be misconstrued as a weakness. Similarly, if analysts cannot agree on a universal definition of
a concept, it is unfathomable to expect any imposition of generally acceptable standards for
defining or measuring a transient social concept such as conflict. For example, some scholars
classify conflict as rebellion, civil war, ethnic war, structural, or nonstructural, whereas others
disagree fervently with the idea of categorization. Other researchers reject the practice of
characterizing conflict as “ideological, ethnic, religious, or class war” (Kalyvas 2003, 476).
Furthermore, they argue that identities are not permanent at all levels of relationships. The
rationale for this argument is that people do not always think the same way as the elites who
exploit them (Kalyvas 2003, 475).
Drawing from the opposition to characterizing or labelling conflict, it is imperative to ask
whether analysts can convincingly explain the conflict in SSA without reference to germane
issues such as ethnicity. The term ethnicity refers to a descriptive term for explaining the
different cleavages among the people in a society based on identity factors including race, color,
language, and indigeneity.10 The debates about the theoretical connotation and significance of
ethnicity to violence have not been satisfactorily resolved, as analysts seem unrepentantly
divided based on their views of the value of the concept. Ethnicity is an essential concept
because the countries affected by violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are multiethnic states.
Interestingly, there is a disagreement among scholars on the relevance of the concept in the
analysis of violent conflict.
In view of the above, the trends in debate on conflict show two patterns. For one, scholars
are divided based on the analytical approaches they adopt, which includes quantitative,
qualitative, and mixed methodologies. It has been noted that the approach scholars embrace
inevitably impacts their selection of cases, conceptualization of variables, and the research

10

This research does not include religion as a factor of ethnicity but recognizes it as a form of identity variable.

22

process and findings (Ross 2004b). Another factor that tends to influence researchers is their
background (intellectual and ideological orientation, biases, the connections between analysts
and the research context or lack of it thereof). It is not surprising that analysts are impacted by
various preferences. In view of the potentially negative import of the researchers’ biases, Pondy
(1967) suggests that it is probably more prudent to refrain from assessing conflict research
findings from the premises of the analysts’ conceptualization of terms.
Meanwhile, ongoing debate on violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa has not adequately
examined the role of ethnic-related factors. It is astounding that some scholars have erroneously
depicted ethnicity as a low risk factor in the explanations of violent conflicts in multiethnic
states. Thus, it is legitimate to examine how the extant literature explains the causal mechanism
of the protracted violence in ethnically diverse states as opposed to the relative stability and
peace in less diverse11 states. Fundamentally, it has been acknowledged that a majority of the
sub-Saharan African states are ethnically diverse in nature (Bates 2008; Osaghae 1999).
However, there remains an intense debate on the role of ethnicity. Interestingly, ethnic conflict
scholars need to be more unambiguous with the operationalization of their analytical
frameworks. Specifically, there is need for clarity on the causal influence of ethnicity in conflict
in general, and as a tool for understanding the dynamics of politics in primitive and divided
states. And while there is indeed a case to be made about the vagueness of the term ethnicity
(Chandra 2006), it is also plausible that ethnic competition remains a pivotal phenomenon in any
analysis of conflict in divided societies.
Despite agreement across the schools of thought that the SSA region consists of
multiethnic states, some analysts have either expressed reservation about the extent to which we

Ideally, there are no ethnically homogenous states in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, instead of classifying the
states into heterogeneous or homogeneous states, this dissertation research conceives the ethnic compositions of
African states as highly diversified or less-diverse states.
11
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can attribute violent conflict to ethnic factors, or reject the idea that ethnicity causes conflict. For
instance, it has been argued that: “Peaking interest in academic study of civil war has coincided
with a sharp decline in the incidence of new global civil wars” (Sambanis 2002, 215). Some
scholars have wrongly rejected the term ‘ethnic’ conflict on the grounds that the depiction of its
specter as “endemic or on the rise everywhere is unproven” (Gilley 2004: 1157). The challenge
for scholars who perceive the relevance of the study of civil war indiscriminate from this
perspective fail to recognize the debilitating vulnerabilities of the SSA that persist even after the
decline in wars during the 1990s. Hence, such conjecturing is narrow-focused because it lacks
explanation of the sporadic spates in violence observed in countries like Nigeria and South
Sudan from the late 1990s until late 2014.
Conversely, it has been reported that ethnically diverse states (authoritarian or
democratic) are more susceptible to violent conflict than their homogeneous or less-ethnically
diverse counterparts (Varshney 2007, 278). To be precise, a host of other studies have argued
that ethnicity is the most significant factor in the study of violent conflicts and politics in Africa
(Haider 2014; Diamond 1987; Varshney 1987; Horowitz 1985). In a similar vein, some recent
studies have corroborated the assertion that ethnicity is a pivotal issue in the analysis of African
conflict (Carlson 2016; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Harkness 206; Janus 2016; and
Varshney 2007). Consistent with that perception, Zerfu, Zikhali, and Kabenga (2008) find “the
interaction of ethnic nepotism has a mutually reinforcing and negative effect on trust levels” (pp.
172-3). Thus, on the role of ethnicity, this dissertation research agrees with the viewpoints of
scholars who find strong relationships between ethnicity and violence in Africa. Indeed, the
nature of violent conflicts in Africa raises questions about the roles of ethnicity and ethnic
mobilization as triggering factors. Moreover, the “fluidity of ethnic boundaries and identity in
the divided states has led to a deepened controversy about the salience of ethnicity in conflict
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analysis” (Osaghae 1999, 58). Yet the purported fluidity of ethnicity does not justify Chandra’s
(2006) attempt to jettison the relevance of the term for explanation of causal mechanism of
conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, irrespective of how analysts conceptualize ethnic identity, the
irreducible fact remains that Africans have always perceived themselves as pluralistic people.
Another study asserts that “even if ethnic identities are not primordial, and inter-ethnic
animosities are absent, ethnicity may still facilitate strategic coordination and enforcement”
(Blattman and Edward 2010, 17). Another prominent scholar also questions the accuracy of the
perspectives of the dissenters in the extant literature of conflict thus: “How much of the complex
ethnic situation do we really know?” (Osaghae 1999, 63).
In sum, any suggestion that ethnicity is not a salient issue in the analysis of violent
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa seems at the very least myopic, because at the root of most of the
conflicts in divided countries is the issue of identity politics. Conflict in Africa is often broad and
protracted in nature. It is understandable that the debate on African conflict has led to the
identification of numerous causal factors. However, the schools of thought that identified these
causal factors have presented vigorous arguments to demonstrate the importance of their ideas as
opposed to others. It is noteworthy that the current literature is inadequate because of the
infatuation with finding, measuring, and describing, causal factors, which leads to a dearth of
non-econometric literature that perceive conflict as a complex phenomenon with variegated and
often interwoven components. In support of this viewpoint, Haider (2014) notes that “each of the
factors may constitute a cause, dynamic, and or impact of conflict” (p. 6). For instance, one may
ask how can we categorize the factors that led to civil war in the West African countries of
Nigeria 1967, Liberia 1989, and Sierra Leone 1991? How are these wars different from the
Ugandan 1981, Rwandan 1994, and Congolese 1988 civil wars? How can the knowledge gained
from this analysis help to shape or reshape our views and ability to construct conflict as a
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veritable causal mechanism? This research analyzes the import of each school based on its
contribution to the body of knowledge in conflict study.
The Structural Causes and Accelerators of Violent Conflict
Structural causes of war are the necessary conditions12 that motivate competing ethnic
groups to opt for war as a means of seeking for redress when they perceive the pattern and their
relationships with other groups as inimical to their group’s interests. Moreover, structural causes
of war are factors that are measurable and can be used to predict onset of war. The structural
factors refer to various political and economic factors that incite competitions among disparate
ethnic groups. These include the status of the economy, regime type, state and society relations,
access to political arena for popular participation, and ethnic composition of state (homogeneity
or heterogeneity). Although some studies have identified these factors as the causes of violence
in SSA, some studies have also argued that while they may be necessary, they are not the
sufficient causes that trigger war (Rugumamu 2002: 10; van der Maat, 2010:3). From that
standpoint, it is appropriate to question the accuracy of the conjecturing that structural factors of
conflict are necessary but not considered as sufficient for the causal processes of war.
The prominent theories in conflict literature exemplify the above observations about the
divergent perspectives on the cause of violence because while they share similar views on the
significance of causal (structural) factors, they have not yet demonstrated that the factors they
analyzed are sufficient causes of violent conflicts in multiethnic resource-rich states. The
theories reviewed in this research include institutional, economic, and environmental theoretical
frameworks. Each theory lauds its points of emphasis in addition to presenting its theory as the
best approach for predicting the likelihood while at the same time explaining the causes of

See van der Maat, Eelco. “Structural causes of civil conflict: using fs/QCA to improve civil war prediction.”
(2010:3).
12
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violence. Each of these theories also rejects the significance of social (ethnic) factors as
sufficient conditions for acceleration of conflict.
Thus, it is logical that the recommendations each of these schools proposed for resolving
violent conflict are derived from the causal factors they emphasized in their analyses. Hence, this
study assumes that because conflicts in sub-Saharan African states have spiraled into a protracted
and crippling stage despite the avalanche of proposals for peacekeeping and peace enforcing,
research focus ought to shift from contemporary strategies for resolution to potential mitigation
strategies. To this end, it is important as a precursor to analyze the prominent theories for the
causes and strategies for resolving violent conflicts.

Resource Dependence Theory
Natural resource wealth is the most cited cause of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
The question is, how do natural resources and commodity export dependence motivate conflict?
And to what extent do they affect the magnitude, duration, and impact of the conflict? A
prominent argument against natural resources is the adverse effects it bears on state that depends
on it to the detriment of other sectors of the state’s economy. A common assumption is that the
sudden discovery of natural resources in Africa is an anathema to political stability and peace in
the region. But then, how exactly do resources actually cause conflict, and what types of
conflicts are associated with it? It is important to note that there are resource-rich states like
Botswana, Norway, and Indonesia, that are politically stable and thriving economically. This
observation raises important questions whether mere dependence on resource wealth in itself
causes war. Holmberg (2008) argues that the susceptibility of a resource-rich state to conflict
centers on the management of resources and factors such as the population, migration, and
adverse climatic conditions on agriculture. Consistent with Holmberg’s postulation, Jensen and
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Wantchekon (2004, 819) contend that “the behaviors of citizens in the resource-rich states that
are heavily reliant on resources are motivated by issues concerning the distribution of resource
rents, not ideology.” It is quite remarkable that in addition to dependence on resource-wealth,
regime behavior and the opposition’s response are indisputable factors.
Therefore, “rather than asking whether resource-wealth causes war or not, analysts
should focus on how and the extent to which the two interact because some studies have argued
that they are directly related (Homer Dickson 1994). Such studies also argue that the production
of natural resources in the conflict zones is related to the number of total combat deaths” (Lujala
2009, 15). Aside from the inability of the government to consolidate resource-wealth for
developing other sectors of the economy, it also responds aggressively to the grievances
expressed by oppressed groups. Paradoxically, some patrimonial states like Qatar and Saudi
Arabia have so far been able to avoid violent conflict while countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Sudan failed. Responding to that paradox, Le Billon (2001, 580) notes, “It would be an error
to reduce armed conflict to greed-driven resources war, as political and identity factors remain
key, the control of local resources influence the agenda and strategies of the belligerents.” The
question that stems from the above assertion is why do ethnic groups engage in zero-sum
struggle for power in resource-rich states? Could effective institutional management and/or
distribution strategies have averted such struggle for relative advantage? This will be addressed
in the analysis chapter.
It seems plausible that the dependence on one source of revenue exposes a multiethnic
state to many risks, though not all analysts agree. In fact, some studies contend that oil-wealth
has neither a causal effect on regime instability, patronage, coercion, nor causes the onset of war.
For example, among those that reject resource dependence as a causal factor of violent conflict,
Smith (1999) writes about the regimes in oil-rich states thus: “First, they tend to fare better than
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others, despite the volatility of their revenue base. Second, they fared well during the oil burst of
1986 and beyond. This suggests two plausible mechanisms for regime maintenance that belie the
weak-state assumptions associated with oil wealth … Many of these regimes may have had
robust social coalitions that went much deeper than the simple purchase of legitimacy” (p. 242).
This line of argument is in stark contrast with those that find direct relationships between oil,
other natural resources, and the onset of civil war. Interestingly, in contrast to the oil-as-spoil
thesis,13 ethnic diversity, just as economic volatility,14 tends to have a significant negative impact
on civil war (p. 240).
While there is abundant evidence supporting the fact that Africa does not have a
monopoly of natural resources, the dependence on resource-wealth is a pervasive problem in the
continent. Meanwhile, the controversy over the salient role of natural resources on conflict is not
yet settled. Although it may be true that oil can fuel secessionist agitation, it is also possible that
oil provokes other types of conflicts that do not result in secessionist campaigns. Dunning (2008)
posits that what determines how natural resources will instigate violence is not necessarily the
regime type, but the system of resource control and distribution of public goods. In a different
study, Smith opines that the controversies surrounding the relationship between resource-wealth
and war evolve from how scholars have conceptualized resources (p. 243).
It is rather intriguing that while recent studies posit that natural resources cause, intensify,
and prolong civil war, it is a striking observation that there is a dearth of scholarly focus on
articulating how the causal process works (Ross 2004a). This is a crucial aspect of analysis of
conflict that deserves more scholarly attention than it currently receives. In fact, the question of

Smith (1999) does not reject the roles of resource control or looting as motivations for rebellion, rather the authors
disavow the attempt at undermining the other effects of oil such as ethnicity and grievance.
14 For more on economic volatility, refer to Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. “Economic
shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 4 (2004): 725753.
13
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how or why natural resources lead to civil war is one of the focal issues that inspired this
research. Acknowledging the significance of causal process, Ross (2004) argues, “Certain types
of natural resources — oil, gemstones, and drugs — have indeed influenced the onset and
duration of civil wars … most of the civil wars … were influenced by natural resources through
several mechanisms simultaneously, which may help account for the analytical muddle of some
earlier studies …” (p. 37-38). To further support Ross’ observation, analysts still disagree on
how natural resources and conflict are related. Paradoxically, despite his considerable effort, it is
disconcerting that Ross (2004, 50) also asserts that “grievance mechanisms are only observable
in non-separatist conflicts.” Ross’ contradictory arguments gives credence to the need for
providing unequivocal explanations for causal mechanism when presenting reports of analysis.
Furthermore, Ross (2004b) pointed out that “we still know little about the process that
ties natural resources to conflict” (p. 338).15 Ross’ statement here accentuates the observation of
this dissertation research that in spite of the plethora of analysis, there is insufficient explanation
for how natural resources actually cause war. Increasing the pressure on the campaign to support
the need for causal mechanism is the discovery that more than a decade after Ross’ emphasis on
causal mechanism, analysts are yet to fully embrace the import of causal mechanism.
Interestingly, there does not seem to be a remarkable improvement in the literature concerning
the lack of causal mechanisms. For Dunning (2008), natural resources can stimulate democracy
as well as authoritarianism, depending on the approaches of the regime to resource control and
distribution. In contrast, quite a number of scholars disagree with the liberal view on the effect of
the connections between natural resources and conflict. For instance, Tsui (2006) contends that
the discovery of natural resources may constitute a debilitating impediment to political stability
unless “well-defined property rights are established to minimize rent-seeking activities in the
For further analysis on the inadequacies of extant literature concerning the ties between natural resources and
conflict, please see Ross 2004 a; Humphreys 2003.
15
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political sector” (p. 25). This approach seems to address individual rather than group interests.
The contention that resource-wealth tends to inhibit political stability is not an unfounded
thought. However, the creation of workable policies inevitably requires the consensus of
different groups in the state which is not only difficult to achieve but is seldom pursued by some,
if not all, ethnic groups. So, irrespective of the divergent approaches to analyzing the impact of
natural resources, it is imperative to note that a country’s dependence on natural resource-wealth
is not in itself a cause of violence. By the same logic, dependence on resource-wealth can only
cause, accelerate, or prolong war if other factors are involved. This assertion draws from the
findings in the body of literature which challenged the notion that resource-wealth can
unilaterally cause political instability without the connivance of some accelerators (Elbadawi and
Sambanis 2002; DeNardo 1985; Mueller & Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Reno 1995; Fearon
& Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2003, Gylfason 2001).16 Against the backdrop of the above, it is
important to understand how resource-wealth causes violent conflict.
Sambanis (2002) submits that “With respect to conflict resolution, we need more
evidence on the condition under which different strategies are likely to succeed so that we know
when to choose territorial partition as opposed to federalism or other forms of power-sharing” (p.
239). The implication of what I refer to as Sambanis’ warning is that analysts must be openminded and consider history as relevant component of their data. Otherwise, attempts by
policymakers at reconciling the diverse ethnic groups will always result in tentative peace.
In view of the above, the underlying assumption is that highly fractionalized states are
susceptible to the risk of civil war because of inherent discontents that come with the
antagonistic nature of their intergroup relations. The assertion above is inconsistent with the
finding that there are indisputable differences between individual and group grievances (De
See Ross (2004 b: 530-351) for a detailed compilation of findings by different analysts on the relationship
between natural resources and conflict.
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Soysa 2002: 397). The question at hand is whether the relationship between group grievances
and war are real or imagined. Furthermore, they argue that power dominance is relevant only in
the states where the largest ethnic group constitutes between 45-90 percent of the entire
population. Paradoxically, there is not yet a sufficient explanation for the rationale behind the 4590 percent threshold set by the advocates of this standard as the condition to accept the relevance
of ethnic power dominance to violence, even though it is identified as a proxy for grievance. The
observable flaw in this conceptualization of dominance standard is its arbitrariness and the fact
that power dominance in multiethnic states does not always evolve from the strength.

Environmental Theory of Violent Conflict
Environment-conflict literature offers two interwoven alternatives for explaining the
effects of environment on the onset, acceleration, duration, and ramification of conflict. First, the
Malthusian scholars contend that the rapid increase in population places pressure on
environmental resources. Pressure resulting from population increase leads to scarcity, which in
turn causes conflict (Reuveny 2007). Second, resource scarcity scholars attribute conflict
phenomenon to the impact of environmental changes in conjunction with population increase on
renewable and non-renewable resources. Accordingly, unmitigated changes in the environmental
elements can cause drought, reduction and loss of agricultural produce, flood scarcity, depletion
of resources, and resource-capture. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) find that increase in “rainfalls
correlate with civil war and insurgency, as conflict outbreak is more likely in wetter years” (p.
12). Therefore, both drought and ferocious rainfall are related to outbreak of war, though in
different ways.
To this end, Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi (2012)17 assert that “environmentally induced
Bernauer, Thomas, Tobias Böhmelt, and Vally Koubi alluded to the works of other environmental scholars. For more on these
sources of environmentally induced conflict including Skaperdas 2003, 1992; Garfinkel 1994; Shurke 1993; Haavelmo 1954.
17

32

economic hardship and migration have the tendencies to cause violent conflict primarily in those
states where political institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms are either missing, have
failed, or are weak” (p. 1). Therefore, “scarcity can sharply increase the demands on key
institutions … while simultaneously reducing their capacity to meet those demands” (HomerDixon 1994, 2). Fragile states that depend overwhelmingly on resources are incapable of
addressing the attendant economic impacts equitably. Therefore, when confronted with the
enormity of resource scarcity, the predatory elites may opt for an inequitable resource-wealth
distribution formula for recruitment and mobilization. This could trigger violent reactions from
other ethnic groups (Homer-Dixon 1994, 6).
Nordås and Gleditsch (2007)18 agree that climate change may expose a state to a
precarious risk of violent conflict but note that environmental theories of conflict are flawed by
the absence of evidence to substantiate the environment-conflict arguments (p. 631).
Corroborating the skepticism noted above, Reuveny (2007)19 cited in (Gleditsch 2007) that “in a
study of 38 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 19 conflict cases show that
environmental pressure is clearly mixed with inter-ethnic violence that predates migration” (p.
362). What does this tell us about the role of environment as a pivotal factor of violent conflict?
Nevertheless, while environmentalists may have valid points about the impact of
environmental change, on resource scarcity, and the socio-economic affairs of the states, they
have not been able to successfully show how environmental factors cause violent conflict
without the input of other accompanying factors — economic, social, and political factors —
perhaps because of its inadequate explanatory mechanism. Although environment-conflict
theories may not have been able to persuasively demonstrate the connection between

Nordås and Gleditsch (2007) draw from studies that found relationships between climate change and environmental scarcity,
grievances and civil war which culminate in the reduction of states capability to mitigate attendant problems, including Barnett
and Adger (2007); Hendrix and Glaser (2007); Meier, Bond, and Bond (2007).
19 Cited in Nordås and Gleditsch (2007, 362).
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environmental change, degradation, or scarcity and violent conflict, it is conceivable that
environmental factors can trigger violent conflict if there is a vacuum of mitigating factors.
Viewed from a different perspective, is it not possible that the underlying cause of rebellion is
the accumulated effects of grievance while environmental disaster is the triggering event that
exposes the state’s lack of capacity to deal with those insurmountable grievances?
Consistent with above, Benjaminsen (2008) extrapolates from the case of the Malian
Tuaregs’ rebellion thus: “There was already a strong feeling among the nomads and Tuaregs in
Mali of being marginalized by state policies of modernization and sedentarization” (p. 832). This
viewpoint has been corroborated by other studies. For instance, Percival and Homer-Dixon
(1998) explain that “opportunities for collective action can decrease, even under conditions of
environmental scarcity, when the power of potential challenger groups is diffused by vigorous
horizontal interaction within society and vertical interaction between civil society and the state”
(pp. 281-282). In a similar vein, Urdal (2005) submits that, albeit population increase and land
scarcity could lead to an increase in the risk of violence, the effects are not strong enough to
conclude that an increase in population constitutes security risk for the state (p. 430). What these
suggest is that environmental factors may not be enough to trigger violent conflict without some
extraneous factors. So what factors usually support environmental change to stimulate conflict in
Africa? The argument against environmentally-induced violence derives from the experiences of
United States and other developed countries. These multiethnic (or multiracial) states have
experienced environmental crises like hurricanes and tornadoes, but there is no evidence that any
of those events have directly resulted in violent conflict. Therefore, some environmentalists are
beginning to modify their views on the relationships between environment and conflict. For
instance, Reuveny (2007) notes that the effects of environmental change only leads to conflict if
it coincides with the conditions or events such as “competition, ethnic tension, distrust, socio-
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economic fault lines, and overdependence on natural resources” (p. 659).
Furthermore, Salehyan (2008) argues that “the effect of climate change on armed conflict
is contingent upon a number of political and social variables” (p. 315). In a similar vein, Koubi,
Bernauer, Kalbhenn, and Spilker (2012) show that climatic variability seldom leads directly to
conflict and conclude that “climate variability measured as deviations in temperature and
precipitation from their past … does not affect violent intrastate conflict through economic
growth” (p. 124). Considering this recent trend, it is not arbitrary to suggest that the relationships
between environmental problems and conflict is weak. Presumably, a safe explanatory
mechanism for the environmentalists is that which sees conflict as the effect of aggregate factors
including population pressure, climate change, resource scarcity, and ethnonationalist factors. As
of this moment, each of the micro causal theses emphasizes a single issue that sometimes appears
deterministic and unsystematic in the sense that virtually all cases of environment-conflict
phenomena seem to have occurred where political, economic, and social decadences are
covariate factors.
If viewed from a different perspective, it is arguable that even under the circumstances of
environmental hazards, violent conflicts can and have been prevented. As Salehyan (2008) aptly
puts it: “Improving the administrative, judicial, and policing capacity of states can head off
conflicts over basic resources. Moreover, mediation, arbitration, and alternative disputeresolution mechanisms at the local and international levels can prevent conflict from arising” (p.
325). Furthermore, Nel and Righarts (2008) affirm the argument that natural disasters increase
the risk of violence, but also find that “income inequality … is an important intervening factor
that partially determines when and where natural disaster can lead to a rapid-onset of conflict.
Moreover, the risks of conflict that are attributable to natural disasters tends to be more prevalent
in states with mixed political systems than in autocracies or consolidated democracies” (p. 179).
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It follows that the impact of weak political institutions’ capability can be more
detrimental than that of environmental change when a state is bedeviled by an environmental
crisis. In such a state, the disenchanted groups may use the attendant conundrum to carry out
their grievances against the state though said grievances tend to be unrelated to the
environmental problems. What can we infer from the above? Does it imply that strong states
prevent aggrieved ethnic groups from exploiting natural disasters as excuses to launch attacks
against the state? This research assumes that the strength of the state is a peripheral factor, and
what matters most is the ability of the state to gain the trust and support of all of the constituent
ethnic groups. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that there is no immediate connection
between the form of government that a state operates and the onset of conflict prevention or
resolution. Based on that same logic, Walker (1999), referring to the cases of Malawi, South
Africa, and Mozambique contends, “There is no undeniable relationship between democracy and
natural disaster” (p. 257). But does that imply conflict occurs at the same rate in democratic and
non-democratic states?
While there may not be a mandatory relationship per se between democracy and the
management of natural disaster, it is probable that a chaotic situation that persists for too long
can call into question the ability of the government to provide relief to its citizens. Such a
scenario tends to bolster the groups’ appeal to symbolic20 sentiment of their members, especially
if the groups that control the state are able to provide some largesse in terms of relief for their
members. The above begs to question the explanatory mechanism of environmental literature
that suggests increases in population and environmental variability are direct causes of conflict.
A refutation of that supposition corroborates the idea that environmental theories are relevant
only when they are combined with other cognate factors.

20

For detailed explanation of symbolic politics see Kaufman (2006).
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Institutionalist Theory of Conflict
Institutional theory is an all-encompassing analytical construct. Like economism,21 it
explains all spectrums of the problems in a political unit from the viewpoint of the structural
framework, rules, and institutional capacities. Furthermore, institutional theory claims that a state
is likely to enjoy political stability if it possesses and maintains viable institutional structures and
sustainable rules. From that standpoint, institutional theory posits that political stability in any
state depends on the degree to which a state’s institutional structures and rules serve the interests
of the citizens across social cleavages and political affiliation. As Easterly (2001) noted,
“Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant
freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services that would
constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to another (p. 690). Indeed,
Easterly suggests that a good institution fosters peace while a weak or failed institution allows
conflict.
However, the assumption here is not in any way a suggestion that political institutions do
not play significant role in engendering political stability. In fact, the state’s institutional
structures and enforceable rules are essential ingredients of peace. Rather, it is an attempt to call
attention to the thought that certain circumstances have contributed to the eruption of conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa. And even some states with established institutions have descended into
turmoil and failed. So, why and how do states that have political institutions experience
internecine conflict? Wantchekon (2003) finds that institutions in sub-Saharan African states are
weak because of the perverse clientelist system or personal rule22 that permeates “strong

Economism as used in this dissertation derives its meaning from Merriam-Webster that defines it as a theoretical
viewpoint that emphasizes economic goals or interests.
22 See Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg (1984, 421) for full discussion on the theory of personal rule which
encapsulates all forms of non-institutional practices in sub-Saharan African politics, including coups, plots,
factionalism, purges, rehabilitations, clientelism, corruption, succession maneuvers, and similar activities.
21
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preferences of the citizens for private transfer than for public goods or projects of national
interests” (p. 399).
Certainly, neopatrimonialism, prebendalism,23 patronage, clientelist, and all other forms
of unconventional governing systems are egregious tactics that corrode the confidence of citizens
in the state and its institutions. It is therefore evident that the adoption of unconventional if
polarizing tactics by the governments of multiethnic sub-Saharan states are triggers or
accelerators of violent conflict. In an ethnically diverse society, a lack of trust for the state may
be transferred to ethnic groups that dominate and support the government. Additionally, political
polarization and a lack of trust in the national government constitute motivations for intense
ethnic competition. Furthermore, multiethnic states characterized by the features itemized above
are unlikely to enjoy sustainable political stability. Rather, such a state may exist on a precarious
platform, and the attendant fragility can transform into violent conflict whenever the potential
accelerators are triggered.
In sum, from the foregoing exploration of the literature, three protuberant shortcomings
are discernible. First, the prominent theories (institutional, resource-dependent, and
environmental theories) focus only on the structural causes for analyzing and explaining violent
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (Rugumamu 2002, 10). Second, because the mainstream theories
overemphasize micro causes, they neglect the significance of the accelerating factors.24 Third, a
remarkable body of the literature that emphasizes only structural factors also concentrate on
large N analysis with subtle disregard for case studies. Understandably, extant literature seem to
suggest that the state is a neutral actor. But to what extent can the state be an impartial arbiter in

See Richard Joseph 1991 for an analysis of prebendal politics and its effects on a fragile state.
An investigation of violent conflict in Africa ought to pay serious attention to the accelerating factors as the
triggering factors tend to be as more ominous than the cultural factors. See Rugumamu (2002) “Structural causes,
the imbalance of opportunity, or root causes, of conflict (p. 10) for a detailed analysis of the structural and
accelerating factors.
23
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Africa considering the parochial and peripheral nature of politics and the intense competition
among the ethnic groups to dominate each other?
Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on the
strategies for mitigating conflict in sub-Saharan Africa by seeking not only to analyze why but
also how the accelerating factors contribute to violent conflict. The extent to which structural
mechanisms can explicate what Rothchild and Olorunshola (1983) describe as the management
of competing state and ethnic claims without cognizance for the accelerating factors is
unfathomable. Thus, the protracted nature of violent conflicts and their endemic ramification in
sub-Saharan Africa conflict mitigation can be a more viable option than the post-war resolution
and reconstruction efforts. In other words, conflict prevention is less likely to be as costly and
prolonged as peace negotiation, enforcement, and monitoring. Therefore, prevention of the
accelerating factors from metastasizing into virulent magnitude will likely be more easily
achievable than managing the causal factors.
One of the reasons that has been attributed to the fragile nature of African states and their
eventual capitulation to violence is the precarious foundation upon which they were created
(Rothchild and Chazan, 2008). The constituent ethnic groups that were politically autonomous
prior to the advent of colonization perceived themselves as sovereign entities upon independence
and perceive the state as an umpire installed to coordinate a centripetal and centrifugal
distribution of jointly owned resources. For instance, the geo-political regions in Nigeria
negotiated a federal system under the auspices of the decolonization constitution which many
political observers regarded as a geo-political compromise for the purpose of sustaining the
colonial state. The federal system was also viewed as the most viable political strategy for
harnessing the dividends of natural resources for the benefit of all citizens. Therefore, the state
enjoys the support of the ethnic and civic groups inasmuch as it treats all of them impartially.
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Thus, a positive view of the state ought to stimulate stabilizing relationships among ethnic
groups. Conversely, when and if the relationships degenerate, the groups are likely to retreat
each to its geo-political jurisdiction as evident under Samuel Doe’s regime in Liberia and
elsewhere in SSA. The above further supports the assumption that under a polarized political
system, each ethnic group views the state as well as the groups that maintain a genial relationship
with it as potential enemies. Against the backdrop of the above, it is imperative to reiterate that
certain questions have not been satisfactorily answered. First, what circumstances cause such a
noxious and precarious relationships among the ethnic groups in resource-dependent states? Why
and how do states degenerate from underlying suspicion and fear into violent conflicts? What
efforts have been made to prevent this violence and how effective were they? Answering these
questions have never been an easy task, as they require a full understanding of the structural and
accelerating or triggering factors (Rugumamu 2002, 10)25 because of their separate but
coordinate impacts.

Ethnicity and Violent Conflict Nexus
Ethnicity epitomizes accelerating factors of violent conflict, also known as triggering
factors in multiethnic states. Accelerating factors consist of “political developments or events
that bring latent underlying tensions to the forefront of interethnic power relations, and
precipitate escalate. These may include new radical ideologies, repression of political groups,
sharp economic shocks, changes in the ethnic composition central authority, introduction of
ominous discriminatory policies” (Rugumamu 2002, 10). Accelerators of conflict are the factors
that trigger violence and that is why they are also described as sufficient conditions26 for

See Rugumamu (2002:10). For a full discussion on the nature, characteristics, and roles of structural and
accelerating or triggering factors of violent conflict.
26 See Van der Maat (2010) Structural causes of civil conflict: using fs/QCA to improve civil war prediction.
25
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outbreak of war.
The literature on ethnicity-conflict relationships shows three different theoretical variants.
First, the constructivists contend that ethnicity is a fluid concept. Thus, its fluidity casts doubt on
the arguments supporting its direct relationships with violent conflict. For instance, Chandra
(2006) argues, “ethnicity either does not matter, or has not been shown to matter in explaining
most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists” (p. 397).
Therefore, it is a descent-based ascription that people adopt for different reasons (p. 422).27
However, if Chandra’s argument holds sway, one of the most important attributes of sub-Saharan
African states is relegated to the background. What implication does that have on the study of
African politics? It seems evident that Chandra’s depiction of ethnicity does not acknowledge
how the ethnic group members in African states perceive themselves and their history.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the solution to the problem of ethnicity in Chandra’s parlance
can be likened to advocating for the elimination of tribal identities among the Native Americans.
Interestingly, though, as unpopular as this constructivist perspective may seem, Chandra is not
alone, as other prominent constructivists have endorsed the viewpoint that ethnicity is ambiguous
if not irrelevant for explaining violent conflict in Africa. To be sure, Bates (1974) notes “… the
ties that bind the members of ethnic groups are often material interests and not traditional
obligations” (p. 459). What this suggests is that idea that a manacle of natural ties exists among
the members of an ethnic group is a travesty.
Secondly, rational choice, elite predation, and symbolic politics theories adopt

Chandra’s perception relies on the definition of ethnicity as a categorization in which eligibility is based on
descent-based attributes (2006: 400). Chandra also claims that “when the Yoruba was invented in Nigerian the
nineteenth century, the parents of those categorized as Yoruba were not themselves classified as Yoruba because this
category did not exist during their lifetimes.” This assertion lacks sufficient historical evidence.
27
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instrumentalist approaches.28 Rational choice and elite predation theorists contend that ethnicity
may cause violent conflict, but only in conjunction with other covariate factors. As pointed out
by Kaufman, for instance, Rothchild and Lake (1996) have noted that the outbreak of ethnic war
is the result of security dilemma in which information failure prevents competing groups from
reaching compromise on divergent issues. So, if indeed information failure is the trigger for
ethnic groups’ engagement in violent conflict, the solution then must involve a third-party
negotiation of peace, and supervision of compliance by all parties involved in the conflict and
resolution process.29 In a similar vein, De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) assert that the
instrumentalist motives of the predatory elite is the underlying cause of interethnic fear to
instigate violence against rival ethnic groups in order to maintain power (Kaufman 2006, 46-47).
However, if the elite predation theory’s proposition is accurate the solution has to begin with a
leadership or systemic change. It is noteworthy that both security dilemma and elite predation
theses of rational choice paradigms do not adequately explain how ethnic group members are
motivated to accept the excuses or reasons provided by their leaders as justification for hostility
toward other groups.
Conversely, the symbolic politics theory opines that what causes ethnic war includes the
existence and invocation of “group myths that justify fear of extinction, a symbolic politics of
chauvinist mobilization, and hostility against enemy groups” (Kaufman 2006, 47). Hence, if the
argument of symbolic politics theory is accurate, the resolution of violent conflict will require a
broad-based change of sanctimonious orientation and the negative perception and historical
justification for violence among ethnic groups. Yet in spite of the variations in the explanatory
mechanisms of the three perspectives above, the recurrent theme among them is that ethnicity is

For a comprehensive assessment of Rational Choice; Elite Predation; and Symbolic Myth Politics, please see
Kaufman (2006) “Symbolic politics or rational choice? Testing Theories of extreme ethnic violence.” Internal
Security 30, no. 4.
29 See Kaufman (2006) Symbolic politics or rational choice?
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a viable concept that deserves attention in the analysis of violent conflicts. Although each of the
theories demonstrates different points of view, the explanatory mechanisms and resolution
strategies they propose are somewhat interrelated. To be sure, each of these theories epitomizes
the notion of ‘us’ against ‘them’ based on the prominence of each group’s distrust for the others
and the uncertainties that are associated with finding mutually acceptable compromise.
Meanwhile, one of the assumptions of this research is that the findings of qualitative and
quantitative research on the role of ethnicity in violent conflict are conspicuously different. But
why are the findings of the two approaches so different from each other? Some studies have
asked similar questions regarding the mystifying disparities in the explanations for the
phenomena of ethnicity and violent conflict in Africa. Bates (2008) notes “… Empirically
minded social scientists have sought to capture the impact of ethnicity on economic performance
of Africa’s states. Interestingly, however, they have found it difficult to uncover systematic
evidence of the relationship between measures of ethnicity and the likelihood of political
disorder” (p. 9).30 In contrast, however, other studies have found direct relationships between
ethnicity, lack of trust for the state, and violent conflict in multiethnic countries. And in addition
to the direct relationships between ethnicity and violent conflict, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti
(2013) find that the level of “trust and social capital in communities are linked with the past
history and ethnic fractionalization” (p. 7). Accordingly, lack of trust in the state that pervades
the ethnonationalist character of politics, emanated from past ethnic violence that renders the
state vulnerable to another conflict (p. 9).
Another facet of the debate is that democracy has thrived in some states where the
governments consisted in non-democratic attributes. “Countries with a large ethnopolitical

Like the other institutionalists, Bates (2008) “When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in late century Africa”
laments that he found little evidence of systematic relationship between ethnicity and political disorder. He however
states that ethnicity and violence are products of institutional failure (pp. 9-10).
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groups that are divided into identifiable ethnopolitical subgroups have sprouted third wave
democracies and sustained some of them at higher rates than other types of multiethnic societies”
(p. 854). However, these authors deemphasize the dangerous relationship between
coordination,31 and political violence. For Baker, Scarritt, and Mozaffar, large-divided-groups
(LDG) states are the ethnically fractionalized countries in which the largest ethnic group exceeds
40 percent of the total population and is further divided into nested subgroups (Baker, Scarritt,
and Mozaffar 2016, 843). So, ethnicity can be viewed first as a political instrument. Second, it
assumes that all large-divided-ethnic groups are divided internally into small nested groups.
Additionally, there has to be unambiguous evidence that the power elites deploy and rely on
predatory strategies for electoral mobilization and violence as the case may be.
Logically, the above argument and its underlying principles leads to two assumptions.
First, that small-group societies (SGS) lack the ability to organize. Second, large-undividedgroup (LUG) societies typically experience political dominance. There is a problem with these
assumptions. Against the backdrop of the above, it is important to note that rather than asking if
ethnicity causes violent conflict or not, the question ought to be: how can ethnically-induced
conflict be prevented? This chapter examines why and how ethnic issues such as power and
access to resources culminate in violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, how does
ethnicity affect the ability of the state to serve as an impartial arbiter among competing groups?
It is assumed that if for any reason(s) the state fails to discharge its responsibilities to all in an
impartial way it can resort to using unorthodox means to maintain its hold onto power. These
strategies include rewarding loyalists and punishing or weakening oppositions.
Lending credence to the above, Azam (2001) notes, [that] “ethnic capital in Africa

See Baker, Scarritt, and Mozaffar (2016:841) for the grouping of the 48 African states into four ethno-political
demographic types: (1) Homogenous societies, (2) Only Small Groups societies, (3) Large Undivided Group
Societies, and (4) large Divided Group Societies.
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guarantees the provision of the services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries such
as security and education” (p. 430). Interestingly, only a few African states can sufficiently
provide, match, or surpass the level of services that ethnic groups provide to their members.
Furthermore, states in sub-Saharan Africa seek to broadcast power32 across their territories but
are either incapable or unwilling to achieve genuine integration of the disparate primordial
groups. The question is, can be a calculated political strategy? But, how does that contribute to
violent conflict? Lake and Rothchild (1996) succinctly explain that “intense ethnic conflict is
often caused by collective fears of the future (stemming from information failure). The problem
of commitment and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state
weakens, and conflict becomes more likely” (p. 41).
The security dilemma mechanism signifies that when the chain of communication
between ethnic groups fails the sustaining trust vanishes. So, an ethnic group or a coalition of
ethnic groups will likely act preemptively to gain relative advantage over the other. This type of
approach is what has been referred to as offensive-defensive strategy. While the central aim of
literature of violent conflict is to explain the causal factors and probable strategies for
prevention, mitigation, or resolution, this chapter suggests that the leading theories have
provided a plethora of explanations but overemphasized the structural factors and neglected the
significance of triggering events for violent conflicts in ethnically diverse sub-Saharan African
states. Therefore, this dissertation research examines the roles of the accelerating factors and the
mitigating influence of civil society on violent conflicts in sub-Saharan African states.
Another theoretical perspective worth consideration stipulates that community network
plays an important role in mitigating conflict through the aggregation of trust which scholars
describe as social capital. Social trust and social capital theory explain the role of trust in the

32

See Herbst (2000). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
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relationships between the government and the governed especially in ethnically-divided states.
According to scholars who have explored the prospects and problems of trust, social capital may
bear positive impacts on the attitudes of citizens toward the political institutions. But how can
people accumulate trust of the magnitude that can affect their collective interest and as a result
the government? Scholars have investigated the connections between trust and government
performance and find a significant relationship. For instance, in the concluding remarks of his
book Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) opines that there is a connection between
building civic community and making democracy work (p. 185). The conclusion supports the
finding that there is a symbiotic relationship between social capital and sustainability of
democracy. Other scholars have supported the idea that social capital can enhance the
performance of political institutions (Rothstein 2000).
However, there is a dearth of literature on the potential impact of ethnicity or regional
segregation on the process of building the type of social community and the consequences on
attitude toward the government which may enhance political stability or lead to conflict. This
viewpoint is supported by Kuenzi (2008) thus: “Until recently … the influence of ethnic identity
has often been neglected in studies of social capital” (p. 2). It is important to note that Kuenzi’s
observation is supported by other studies that have either found negative or no significant
relationships between social capital and democracy (Fukuyama 1999; Newton 1999; Norris
2000; Putnam 2000). Therefore, it can be deduced from the above that the relationships between
social trust, generalized trust, political capital, and political trust is multidimensional. For
instance, Kuenzi observed that ethnicity has significant effects on the dimensions of social
capital and political trust …” (2008, 1). This dissertation research explores social capital and
political trust to examine how the roles of ethnicity can shape civil society’s efforts and the
potential consequences on political stability in a resource-rich multiethnic society.
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Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is to review the existing literature of violent conflict in
multiethnic states in general and sub-Sahara Africa in specific. In sum, this literature review
shows that the extant theories of violent conflict explain the phenomenon as events rather than
processes. These theories emphasize the causal factors and focus significantly on measuring the
extent of their effects on the states cross-nationally. Another important observation is that the
extant literature rejects the notion that the prevalence of ethnicity is a sufficient condition for
violent conflict in multiethnic states. Interestingly, there are still ongoing debates about the
effects of the causal factors that extant literature embraces in terms of their risk levels. Therefore,
this literature review suggests that by emphasizing structural causal factors and explaining
violent conflicts as episodes, the existing literature runs the risk of excluding the accelerators that
tend to precipitate violence. To this end, in any analysis of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa
it is imperative to acknowledge the totality of the potential causal factors along with the culpable
accelerators. This is important because of two sets of factors, namely that latent structural factors
are necessary but insufficient to ignite violent conflict without the contemporaneous influence of
accelerating triggers. Hence, with specific reference to the analysis of violent conflict in subSahara, ethnicity is a complex accelerator whose role cannot be relegated to the background.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to show theoretically the causal mechanism of violence in a
resource-rich and multiethnic state. This chapter describes the impacts of the relationships of
political trust and political stability in a resource-rich multiethnic state. As mentioned in the
previous chapters, scholars have proposed different factors as the causes of violent conflict but
fail to explain how the factors cause conflict. The purpose of introducing the role of political
trust is to analyze how the varying perceptions of the people from different ethnic regions in a
resource-rich, multiethnic state about government policies and performances engender political
stability or violence. It is also critical to note that by emphasizing the causal factors the
conventional theories of conflict treat all cases as if they are the same. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, multiethnic states that are heavily dependent on resources-wealth also face the
problem of ethnic grievances, and in some cases, rebellion. So, what are the explanations for the
causal mechanisms of the degeneration of the relationships between disparate ethnic groups and
the government? To understand the reasons for the breakdown in the relationships between some
ethnic groups and the national government it is beneficial to understand how the ethnic groups
perceive the potential impacts of government policies and implementation on their members.
Therefore, this dissertation research adopts social capital theory to examine the relationship
between the ethno-regional groups and the government in Nigeria.

Political Trust
Political trust refers to the evaluative orientation of citizens toward the government
(Stokes 1962). The evaluation of political trust in a regime is often based on concerns and
expectations of different groups or individual citizens (Miller 1974). These expectations and
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concerns upon which people judge a regime may include ethical comportment, policies, and
performances of the regime (Hetherington 1998). There is a plethora of support for the idea that
political trust is connected with political stability (Levi and Stoker 2000; Mishler and Rose
2001). There is empirical support in literature of democracy and political stability for the
importance of trust in regimes and the important role of civil society (Ostrom 1990; Putnam
1993; Fukuyama 1995). Some studies have debated whether the success or failure of a regime
depends on the confidence that citizens have in the political institutions (Newton and Norris
1999; Seligman 1997; Giddens 1990). Furthermore, Newton and Norris (1999) noted that “If
social trust helps build social capital, and social capital, in turn, helps strengthen political
institutions then governmental performance may improve, inspiring citizens’ confidence” (p.78).
In their study of race and political trust Howell and Fagan (1988) found that there is a
direct relationship between how government treats different groups and in retrospect, the level of
trust between different races. Scholars have reported that there is a steady decline in the level of
political trust. The decline is evident in a low level of trust or diffused support for government.
When a state experiences decline in political trust its legitimacy may be challenged
(Hetherington 1998). However, some scholars have also argued that some level of distrust is
necessary if the government must be held accountable (Barber 1983; Levi and Stoker 2000;
Tarrow 2000). The idea behind the debate is that social capital is vital to institutional
performance because it helps to build social trust and motivates political trust in the government
institutions. As Putnam (1993) puts it, social capital refers to “features of social organization,
such as trust, norms, and networks, tends to be self-reinforcing and cumulative (p.167).
Given Putnam’s definition it seems that the absence of the virtues of civil community
tends to pave the way to perpetrate distrust for political institutions. Against the backdrop of the
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above, I examined the Nigerian political arena to understand how different ethnic regional
groups relate with the government and the impact on violent conflict. Rothstein and Stolle (2002)
argue that there are relationships between generalized trust and institutional performance (p. 2).33
The rationale is that trust in government tends to facilitates political stability thus: “The
impartiality and efficiency of these institutions influences citizens’ institutional trust and more
specifically (1) how they experience feelings of safety and protection; (2) how citizens make
inferences from the system and public officials to other citizens; (3) how citizens observe the
behavior of fellow citizens; and (4) how they experience discrimination against themselves or
others” (p. 27). In recognition of the potential role of social capital in maintaining political
stability, it has been observed that “Dense network of voluntary associations and citizens’
organizations help to sustain civil society … trust and cooperation between citizens and a high
level of civic engagement and therefore they create the condition for social integration, public
awareness and action, and democratic stability” (Newton 2001, 201). It must be emphasized that
in a symbiotic relationship, the behavior and performance of government tend to affect how
ethnic groups behave. That is because as some scholars have observed, government policies are
seldom viewed the same way by different ethnic groups.
While some may view the policies as beneficial, other groups may perceive the policies
as the sources of grievances. For example, Easterly (2001) finds that “Institutional factors
interact with ethnic diversity. Good institutions lower the risk of wars and genocide that might
otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization” (p. 703). Other studies have also corroborated
Easterly’s viewpoint on how negative perception of government institutions can foster conflict.
That exposition raises a significant question about the efficacy of political institutions and the

Rothstein and Stolle’s (2002) “generalized theory” derive from Putnam (1993) “Theory of social capital.”
Accordingly, social capital has been defined and measured as generalized trust, norms and reciprocity and network.
The significance of the theory of social capital lies in the role it plays in inter-group relations in ethnically diverse
states.
33
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implications for how they are perceived by different ethnic groups or geo-political regions in
sub-Saharan Africa. This dissertation research assumes that the bedrock of political stability is
the trust in political institutions, not the mere existence of the structures. Civil society can
accumulate social capital to foster cooperation and buttress political trust. But if ethnic groups
lack trust in the political institutions, they tend to perceive government policies and
performances negatively, and such negative perceptions can precipitate rebellion.

Social Capital
What is social capital and where does it come from? Social capital comes from the civic
community network of associational life through which the citizens support the government to
develop and maintain political trust. Sullivan and Transue (1999) define social capital as
“features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 644). There is a debate about the
strength of the association between social capital and political trust. In his study of five public
institutions, Newton (2001a) finds that there are strong associations between social capital and
four of the five government institutions, namely the police, “the legal system, the parliament, and
civil service at the national level” (p.12). However, Newton differentiated between social trust
among citizens and social trust for government institutions. Accordingly, social trust among
citizens seldom influences political trust; what influences political trust is the social capital that
develops from the aggregate of social trust from diverse members of the social network. In
another study, Newton (2001b) noted that “social trust tends to be expressed by different kinds of
people for different sorts of reasons” (p.204). Similarly, in absence of social capital, political
trust may be expressed by different groups for different reasons.
The distrust for institutions reflects the level of distrust among the ethnic groups. As
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citizens across different socio-cultural cleavages develop mutual trust, it becomes challenging for
political institutions to shield themselves from the wave of mutual trust that encapsulates the
divergent ethnic groups. But how do ethnic groups develop tolerance for each other and political
institutions? Indeed, the level of tolerance that the disparate ethnic groups demonstrate toward
each other and political institutions depends on factors including the groups’ perception of threat
and the amount of available negative information each group has about other groups (Sullivan
and Transue 1999). Furthermore, there is the patent display of ethnocentrism by allowing the
majority groups certain privileges that are not granted to the groups perceived by members of the
majority ethnic group as extreme or unpopular political rivals (pp. 632 & 635).
Regarding the mechanism of social capital development, Sullivan and Transue (1999,
645) stipulate, “Horizontally organized associations build social capital. Vertically organized
associations do not build social capital and may in fact undermine it” (Sullivan and Transue
1999, 645).34 Nevertheless, despite what we now know about social trust, ethnic cooperation, and
political stability, not all scholars agree with the notion that social and political capital are
interrelated. For those scholars who express skepticism, “Social trust is expressed by people who
feel that they are generally surrounded by trustworthy people, and political trust is expressed by
people who feel that their political system and its politicians generally perform satisfactorily”
(Sullivan and Transue 1999, 211). These scholars also mention Scandinavian countries as
analytical references for political trust. By so doing, they neglect the role of economic status and
ethnocentrism in SSA states and other developing countries. Such a viewpoint suggests that the
state and people are disjointed. If that is the case, then it is logical to assume that the influence of
social trust that permeates disparate ethnic groups and engenders cooperation rather than
chauvinistic ethnocentrism does not amount to transformation of the behavior of the people who
Horizontally organized associations refer to those associations in which members are recognized as equal
participants, while vertical associations are those that ascribe hierarchical power to different categories of members.
34
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run the affairs of the political institution. The same transformation process that influences social
trust among divergent ethnic groups can also dissuade politicians from all the vices that cause
distrust for political institutions.
It is noteworthy that socially trusting and politically trusting are not necessarily the same,
and that performance is the kernel of political trust. However, social trust creates social capital
and political trust, which in turn stimulates confidence in political institutions (Kenneth and
Norris 1999, 11-12). Thus, the argument that social trust does not translate into political trust is
faulty because it relies on specious premises and seems to suggest that the associational life is
alienated from political institutions. The assumption above seems to ignore the fact that social
institutions and political institutions are entwined within the ambit of society. Moreover, political
institutions’ legitimacy come from the same people who identify first and foremost as members
of ethnic groups. Hence, the question for the critics is how can government perform satisfactorily
if it is bogged down in ethnocentrism? The point to note here is that social trust is a foundation
of political trust. Moreover, social capital is the offshoot of social trust which reduces uncertainty
in socio-political relations and imbues political trust in all spectrums of the political arena. This
implies that the reduction in uncertainty facilitates political stability and thus stimulates
satisfactory performance in political institutions.
The discussion of the positive impact of social capital on national cohesion and political
stability has been recognized generally by social scientists and behaviorists alike. Trust is an
essential precondition for political development because it tends to reduce the fear of uncertainty
that affects the behavior of citizens and socio-political groups (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 2).
Why is the role of trust in reducing fear so important to analysis of conflict mechanism? Perhaps
it is because a state that is confronted by political uncertainty tends to experience socio-economic
and political problems relating to the constant threat of disintegration (Inglehart 1990).

60

Moreover, when citizens view the state as unreliable, they turn inward to their groups for
protection from the potential effects of the state’s decadence. They do that by building social
capital through participation and the gradual development and consolidation of trust across
different groups (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 15).
However, it is important to point out that civil society does not always work toward
supporting the government. In fact, part of the role of civil society is to hold political institutions
accountable (Rothstein 2000). For instance, Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan (1994) note,
“Grassroots movements have risen in nearly every sub-Saharan country to remove autocratic,
repressive governments” (p. 1). Similarly, successful grassroots movements that led to the
ousting of dictators in Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe,
and elsewhere in Africa show that civil society can indeed act as a conduit of peace in
multiethnic societies. The question is how does civil society play this role? Ekeh (1992) noted
that analysts must make attempts to understand first, the context from which they operate;
second, the ends they seek to advance; and third, the resources and means they supply in their
operations” (p. 201). Moreover, we must pay attention to the relationships between members’
interests, and the public interest, the nature of the political space. To this end, Kuenzi (2008)
pointed out that there is a relationship between ethnic group size and involvement of the
members in voluntary organizations (p.1). So, it is important to understand how different regions
in Nigeria feel about participation in civil society and how that mitigates violent conflict.

Civil Society
Civil society connotes, “The space of uncoerced human association and/or the set of
relational networks” (Walzer 1991, 1). By virtue of its nature, civil society is “the third or nonprofit sector consisting of all associations and networks between the family and the state”
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(Edwards 2009, 20). It represents the network of associational life that facilitates civic culture
and seeks to bridge the gap between the state and the people. In other words, civil society is an
uncoerced association of citizens that permits free entry and exit. It acts as a “voluntary,
independent sector representing the balance between the rights granted to individuals in ‘free
society’ and the responsibilities required of citizens to maintain those rights” (O’Connell and
Gardner 1999, 19-11). Furthermore, Almond and Verba (2003) noted, “If a citizen belongs to a
voluntary organization, he is involved in a broader social world but is less dependent upon it and
is less controlled by the political system” (pp. 173-174).
Ekeh (1992) categorizes civil societies into two broad types, demystifying the nature and
characteristics of political terrain they occupy (p. 203). These political spaces are the civic and
primordial publics. The civic public is comprised of two main groups: civic public, such as
political parties, trade unions, and religious associations; and the deviant civic associations,
including traditional and ritualistic associations. The primordial public consists of tribal social
associations, primordial public associations, and indigenous development associations. Ekeh’s
description shows that civil society can be inward-focused or public-focused. However, the
inevitability of collective agenda aims at achieving a unity of purpose tends to create a broadbased and resilient civil society. As a network of associations that occupies the realm between
the state and the family, it consists of different layers of organizations including community
associations and broad-based civil groups whose interests and goals transcend ethno-communal
interests and different categories of groups and associations operating at a variety of levels
within the political arena. Some of the groups that constitute civil society networks include
professional or commercial associations; cultural associations; development-oriented
associations; informational, educational, or mobilization associations; issues-oriented
associations; and civic-public organizations that monitor and pursue issues of national interest
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(Diamond 1994; Nnoli 1978; Bratton 1989).
However, Diamond (1994) pointed out that an excessive confrontation of the state by
civil society could be counterproductive if the impact of its activities culminated in
delegitimizing the state. Conversely, Ihonvbere (2002) offers a persuasive argument to
demonstrate the civil society organizations have helped in shaping and or reforming Nigerian
and African political systems. Accordingly, civil society helped resist colonial rule, run the
various trade unions, professional associations, non-governmental organizations, student unions,
community development associations, and other grassroots forces. They also helped with
building the coalitions and networks that have sustained and supported the millions of brutalized
and marginalized Africans, organized the pro-democracy movements, fought one-man or noparty rule, opposed wicked military juntas … and changed the content of political discourse in
Africa” (Ihonvbere 2002, 9).35
Therefore, if the civil society network is well organized and committed to a nationalistic
rather than particularistic goals, or ethno-regional agenda, it tends to serve as an agent of
political trust and political stability. As a scholar observes, “Civil society constitutes an essential
element in creating a more effective and accountable state” (Udogu 2007, 128). However, if the
relationships are based on ethnic power dominance, the regime and political institutions tend to
focus more on a chauvinistic agenda and less on issues that foster national cohesion, and
purportedly disloyal ethnic groups are deemed as enemies of the state. Based on such a divisive
perception, the policies emanating from political institutions will likely be skewed toward the
interests of the majority ethnic group without consideration for the minority groups. Hence, some
of the minority ethnic groups are likely to be marginalized. Even under an oppressive or
ethnically biased government, civil society has the ability to foster political cooperation and

35

The citation on Ihonvbere’s defense of the civil-society’s challenge to the state is derived from Udogu (2007).
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trust, though the mere existence of civil society alone does not necessarily translate into political
stability (Kew 2016, p. 263), because it can also foment violence if the members decide to use it
to pursue ethnocentric goals. Despite the fact that civil society can play important conflict
mitigation roles in Africa, it faces some challenges that sometimes hamper its ability to perform
that responsibility.

Challenges for Civil Society
Certain factors such as lack of accountability and separation between the regional sectors
of the civil society influence the donors on the agenda and modes of operations of the civil
society. Moreover, ambiguities in the state civil society relations have impacted the activities and
credibility of civil society (Jega 1997).36 It is indisputable that civil society faces copious
challenges in the ongoing political debacles. For instance, some of the civil society organizations
are weak because of their financial insolvency at the time when external interests in financial
support is waning (Makumbe 1998, 315). Thus, they become vulnerable and pander to the
sectional interests of their domestic financiers. It is conceivable that no matter how
encompassing, some aggrieved ethnic groups will still not believe the neutrality of civil society.
Yet in spite of the enormous challenges facing the civil society it remains the only entity that is
trusted across different sections of the society as capable of mitigating conflict objectively just as
it did in the popular struggle for democratization in Africa in the 1990s.
Closely related to the ability of the civil society to perform its fundamental function is the
problem of a Machiavellian state’s strategy of raison d’état that beset African elites. For
instance, Ake (1991) noted that long after colonialism, and even after many African states
claimed to have transformed into democratic republics, they continued to hang on tenaciously to
See Udogu (2007, 130-142) for more on Jega and other analysts’ perspectives on the role of civil society in
stabilizing the state and making the state accountable to the people.
36
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the colonial idea of the might is right. Meanwhile, the overarching center is hotly contested, and
the winner often claims ownership of the state power and control over its resources. Ake’s
statement demonstrates the inherent danger of incompetence of the state coinciding with zerosum ethno-regional competition for dominance. Fundamentally, it is assumed that the composite
ethnic groups in the resource-rich sub-Saharan states are apt to place group interests over
national interests. To be sure, it has been observed that “many wars in Africa are related to the
control of resource-riches including diamonds, oil, drugs…” (Hugon 2000, p. 4). Therefore, this
research views the aggregate of the events that are involved in the struggle for access to power
and resources as a panoramic precursor for violent conflict. Similarly, Young (1994) noted that
the states in Africa seem to have adopted Machiavellian’s raison d’état inspired by the ultimate
purpose of accumulating and maintaining power perpetually. As the state seeks to perpetrate its
supremacy rather than legitimacy over the society through self-reproduction, it systematically
circumscribed the civil society being an occupant in what has been described as the state’s
territorial grid of the state (pp. 16-18). Under the domain of the state, the civil society is often
subjected to exploitation and constriction by the ethnically-dominated government.
Although a fragile state may seek to curtail its activities37 civil society still occupies an
influential realm in the political arena. And as long as civil society maintains its influential
position within the political arena, its role as a mitigating agent remains significant. Furthermore,
civil society remains salient in the conflict mitigation process because when the state, its political
parties, and sectionalist interest groups fail and are rejected by the grassroots organizations,
attention will be shifted to the social movements because of their people-centric characteristics
that have earned them popular support and trust (Jesse and Williams 2010, p. 41). So, while the
role of civil society in conflict mitigation is still controversial, the space it occupies remains of
See Osaghae (2007) “Fragile states.” Development in Practice17, for the conditions under which the post-colonial
sub-Saharan states are categorized as fragile.
37
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significant interest in the analysis of conflict. In fact, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argue that the
more the citizens in multiethnic states embrace a sense of communal solidarity, the higher the
likelihood of intensified ethnic competition (p. 66).

Perception Variants and Propensity for Violent Conflict
The degeneration of state-ethnic groups relationship comes from a deficit of trust, which
has the most adverse effect on a political system. Both the dominant and minority ethnic group(s)
have expected incentives in supporting civil society’s mitigating influence, as opposed to
incendiary and unending zero-sum competition for power. However, given the precarious
nature38 of the state stemming from information scarcity, fear of annihilation, and the potential
benefits of seizing the state’s power, it seems logical that any ethnic groups would seek to
achieve dominance to avoid being vanquished by the others. This theory perceives the state,
dominant ethnic groups, and domestic or foreign conflict mitigating agents (civil society) as
actors whose relationships with each other can lead to a negative or positive outcome. As
mentioned above, social trust and social capital constitute significant ingredients for creating and
maintaining a sustainable political order. Hence, it is expedient to attempt a brief discussion on
the meaning of the concept of social trust and social capital and their contributions to political
order in the state.
Rose, Munro, and Mishler (2004) noted that “economic satisfaction and low expectation
of political change together encourages ‘resigned acceptance’ of an imperfectly democratic
regime” (2004, 197). Hence, when a state is biased in favor of some ethnic groups, it is likely to
become a vehicle of power dominance for those ethnic groups. Moreover, if political institutions
in a multiethnic state become a mechanism for perpetration of ethnic dominance, it tends to lose
See Rothchild, Donald S., and Naomi H. Chazan, eds. The Precarious Balance: state and society in Africa.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
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legitimacy and weaken. However, whether it is the impact of political capital39 that political
institutions have accumulated or the buildup of social capital40 that the civil society successfully
inculcated into the state, or lack of formidable challenge to the regime, a weak state that is not
beholden to any ethnic group or region may not experience violence. In some cases, some ethnic
groups will cooperate with civil society in its agitation for democratic reform in the political
arena. For instance, Kuenzi (2008) pointed out that “Ethnicity has significant effects on the
dimensions of social capital and political trust in Nigeria” (p.1).
The degeneration of political institutions provides the opportunity for a belligerent ethnic
group to seize control of the political arena, restructure the power distribution, and establish firm
control over resources and public goods distribution. So, a powerful41 strategic domination under
this political environment is when the most powerful among the ethnic groups seeks to dominate
the political arena. The goal is to alter the strategic alignment and calculate withdrawal from
bilateral cooperation with civil society. The ultimate goal of the most powerful ethnic group is to
take control of the state. The most powerful ethnic group will likely change the pattern of
communication. Subsequently, a new system of triangulated relational pattern will replace the
existing bilateral relationship between the ethnic groups and civil society. As the influence of the
majority ethnic group grows, the state institutions are weakened. Upon capturing the power of
the state, the majority ethnic group tends to modify the socio-economic and political landscapes

Political capital is the legitimacy and performance of a regime and its institutions. Political capital comes from
accumulated trust the expression of confidence in the political institutions by citizens. The said confidence could be
directed to the entire regime or specific institutions. For more on the concepts of political trust and political capital
see Mishler and Rose (2001) “What is the origin of political trust? Testing institutional, and cultural theories in postcommunist societies.”
40 Social capital is the positive impact of the social network of civic association on the socio-economic and political
spheres of a society. It is derived from deep-rooted and extensive social trust that permeates all socio-cultural
cleavages in the society. For more on the conception of social capital see Putnam (2002) Democracies in Flux: The
evolution of the social capital in contemporary society. Putnam (1993) Making democracy work: civic tradition in
modern Italy.
41 The powerful ethnic group does not necessarily equate the majority because in some instances a small ethnic
group may be stronger than larger ethnic groups and possess the needed resources to assert its influence over them.
39
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of the country. That transformation could result in portentous structural deficiencies. As
mentioned in the previous chapters, structural issues tend to foster underlying grievances among
excluded minority group(s).
Consequently, the injection of radical and discriminatory policies may trigger the
accelerators of violence. As the ethnically motivated government continues to consolidate its
power, it is likely the government will ignore the grievances of minorities, there will be growing
petitions for a change and increasing tensions among the ethnic groups across different geopolitical regions. But an analysis of conflict in the SSA shows that the states are not bystanders
in the ethno-political conflicts. Because of their weaknesses and lackluster attitudes toward the
civil society, the African states are culpable in the events that stimulate ethnic wars (Bratton
1989, 10). In many cases SSA states aggravate rather than mitigate interethnic conflicts. More
often than not, the situation is exacerbated by the reluctance of the states to see the civil society
as partner in progress.
Indeed, ethnic groups that strive for power domination in the political space can be
delayed or halted by a formidable challenge that comes from the civil society. This can be
achieved only if the civil society has enough social capital to win the public trust across all
ethno-religious cleavages. With that ability civil society will eventually restore the state to ideal
spatial equilibria through an innocuous campaign and the infusion of political capital into
national political institutions. Therefore, suffice it to say that if well-organized and resourceful, it
can proactively launch preventative counter-measures to abate the propensity for the onset of
violence. To achieve that goal, the civil society must be able to conduct itself as a trustworthy
umpire among the ethnic groups, and between the state and the ethnic groups. Plus, there is an
incentive for the state and the ethnic groups’ cooperation with the civil society because conflict
prevention costs a lot less than conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction.
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In sum, the essential ingredients of conflict mitigation and collaboration are social capital
and political trust.42 They are important because of their role in developing and sustaining the
relationships that foster cooperation. For Simmel (1950), “Social trust is one of the most
important synthetic forces within the society” (p. 326). This suggests that social trust infuses
positive thoughts and stimulates cooperation among groups. Therefore, on one hand states with
effervescent civil societies have a reservoir of trust and tend to enjoy political stability and peace.
On the other hand, states without vibrant civil societies are likely to experience more incidences
of violent conflict. The underlying assumption here is that in a state where social and political
trusts are ingrained, political institutions tend to enjoy popular support and legitimacy both
internally and externally.
States that are ethnically heterogeneous, highly polarized, and bedeviled by considerable
income inequality among the ethnic groups will likely experience less social trust (Knack and
Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1999; Delhey and Newton 2003). How does interethnic power relations
degenerate into violence? According to Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), states where a
horizontal power relationship exists experience political stability, while states where ethnic
groups relate vertically or hierarchically are prone to civil war. The question that follows is, how
does social trust affect the dynamics of relationships among the ethnic groups in the political
arena?
In a society where the competing ethnic groups perceive each other as dangerous enemies
cannot accomplish a sustainable national integration? Similarly, is it plausible that wherever
there is disintegration, the polity can only at best experience tentative and precarious peace?
Social trust theory has generated tremendous literature. Further review of other theories of social
trust indicate that social trust derives from the perceptions that people know about social and
The concepts of social and political trust are sometimes referred to as generalize trust. Thus, this dissertation
research uses social, political, or generalized trust as deemed appropriate throughout the rest of the analyses.
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political institutions based on their experiences from the social environment. Accordingly, the
factors that determine social trust includes “societal conditions of conflict and safety; people who
feel membership of informal social network; and success or well-being” (Delhey and Newton
2003, 112-113). So, one can safely interpret Delhey and Newton’s perspective as follows: First, a
group that perceives the state as being under an anarchic condition tends to have low social trust
in the state and other ethnic groups because of fear that the state is unable to resolve conflict and
vice versa. Second, people in an informal social network tend to have more trust in their
association and any other groups that their association is affiliated with. Third, a group whose
members perceive the political economy as favorable to them will likely have a higher degree of
trust in the state than those who do not share the same perception.
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Chapter 4: Data and Methodology

Goals and Purpose of Research
This chapter explains the methodological framework I employed in conducting the
research on why and how the latent and accelerating factors cause violence on one hand, and
how civil society mitigates violence on the other hand. It is instructive to reiterate in this chapter
that the extant conflict literature emphasizes the latent factors that motivate and enable ethnic
groups’ insurrection (Öberg 2002, 9).43 These quantitative approaches, namely objectivity and
measurability, constitute some impediments to in-depth analysis of the role of ethnicity on
violent conflict in SSA (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).
Thus, this research adopts a mixed-method approach including quantitative and
qualitative methods. The quantitative method utilized is chi-square analysis. The chi-square (𝑥 2)
method is used to test the existence of statistical relationships between two variables. This
method is appropriate for analyzing the nature and focus of the research questions that are
addressed in the study. Therefore, rather than being embedded in measuring the factors or
predicting the outcomes, this mixed-method research aims at analyzing the causal process by
focusing on the question: why and how latent factors motivate ethnic war in multiethnic
societies. In other words, it seeks to explain the connection between the causal factors and the
outcomes given the assumption that while the causal factors are relevant, they are insufficient for
explaining the degeneration of inter-ethnic relationship into violent conflict. It also seeks to
explain why and how civil society is being considered as a probable agent of conflict mitigation
that can facilitate sustainable peace in multiethnic states. This chapter consists of research

The analysis, of ethnic violent conflict from the premises of the motivational and enabling factors has been
documented in prominent studies including: Tilly 1978; Brown 1997; Gurr 2000; Sambanis 2001.
43
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context, conceptual clarification, and an operational definition of concepts.
Further, this research adopts a holistic multiple-case design analytical method (Yin 2014,
50). The focus of this dissertation research allows the inclusion of the causal factors that the
qualitative scholars emphasize and the proximate accelerators that trigger civil war. There are
two rationales for this strategy. First, this dissertation research recognizes the fact that the causal
factors emphasized in the extant literature of conflict are relevant to the analysis of ethnic violent
conflict (Brown 1997; Rothchild 1997; Zartman 1989). In addition, it observes that there is not
yet any evidence that any or a combination of these factors can cause conflict without an
interplay of ethnocentric accelerator(s).

Research Setting/Context
I selected Nigeria for this dissertation research. In selecting this case for my research
analysis, the most important determining factor are the questions this dissertation research seeks
to answer. Based on the types of questions posed, it is important to consider factors such as the
nature and characteristics of the ethnic configuration of the state; the extent of resourcedependence; and nature, characteristics, and performance of the civil society in this state.

The Variables
Dependent Variables:
The dependent variables are Nigerians’ perceptions of government institutions, government
performance, and issues related to national integration and Nigerian’s civic participation. More
specifically, this study uses Afrobarometer data and the data collected during in-depth face-toface interviews to examine citizens’ evaluations of government performance in areas related to
the management of conflict, corruption, natural resources, and elections as well as their level of
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trust in a range of government institutions. My interviews also examine the perceptions of the
role of civil society by exploring the views of citizens from the three regions about the mitigating
influence of civil society, and the likelihood that they would participate in civic community
activities, protests, and demonstrations. (Please see Appendix A for a list of the Afrobarometer
questions used in this study and the questions asked in the qualitative interviews.)
Independent Variables: The independent variables of interest are the regional affiliations of the
Nigerians interviewed. This is very important because it is assumed that the perceptions of
citizens about government in resource-rich multiethnic states tend to be influenced by their
ethno-regional affiliations. There are three regions, the North, South-Eastern, and SouthWestern.
On that note, it is relevant to ask how different ethnic groups and state institutions are
persuaded to cooperate in order to prevent violent conflict. In other words, what mechanisms
should be deployed to mitigate violence, and by who? To address that question, I argue that the
active involvement of a vibrant civil society in conflict mitigation tends to minimize the
transformation of latent factors of ethnic discontent into full-blown large-scale war. This
argument receives credence from many African political scholars who have argued for the role of
civil society in engendering an inclusive, stable, and accountable political system (Bratton 1989;
Diamond 1994; Ihonvbere 2002; Ikelegbe 2001a; 2001b; Nnoli 1978; Osaghae1998).

Research Questions
First, how do the perceptions of citizens about government policies influence causal
mechanism of violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich sub-Saharan African states?
Second, how does social capital influence citizens’ perceptions of government
institutions’ performance in ethnically diverse, resource-rich, sub-Saharan African states?
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Hypotheses
H1: Ethnic groups whose region benefit more from the national government than others
are more likely to trust and support the national government than those whose regions do not.
H2 Ethnic groups from regions with high participation in civil society are more likely to
hold national government accountable than those from regions with low participation.
Based on the above, this dissertation research argues that when the government policy
changes, different ethnic groups react based on the consequent impacts of the policy changes.
Thus, while the groups that believe the changes will create positive impacts tend to embrace it,
those that feel otherwise are likely to perceive it as a form of discriminatory or exclusionary
tactics and are likely to rebel. However, if the civil society is vibrant it tends to reduce the risk of
violence even when the government embarks on policy change.

Data Collection
For this dissertation research, I collected data from primary and secondary sources (Mills
2014, 258). Supplemental data came from archival search gathered during my fieldwork in
Nigeria. The interview process includes structured and unstructured methods. These methods of
interview allow a combination of direct answers and oral history form of responses in which an
interviewee can respond to questions posed by the interviewer (Warren and Karner 2005, 115116). I began my archival search at the Lied Library of the University of Nevada Las Vegas
where I gathered materials (books and journal articles). The field ethnographic research44 was
carried out in relevant institutions and archival sources, specifically in Nigeria. The method of
data collection includes observations of ethnic and civil society groups’ meetings, interview of
groups leaders, and collection of archival materials. Throughout the process, I took notes of the
See Warren and Karner (2005, 49-50) Discovering Qualitative Methods: Field Research, Interviews and Analysis,
for detail explanation on ethnographic research.
44
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cogent information with the permission of the groups’ leaders.
My fieldwork for this dissertation research was carried out in Nigeria. The institutions I
visited include the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos, Nigeria and the
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) in Ibadan, Nigeria, where I
gathered relevant archival materials and interviewed a few senior public officials. Then I visited
six states and interviewed eighteen people from different backgrounds. These interviews took
places in Abuja (FCT), Benue state (North-Central), Delta State (South-South), Enugu State
(South-East), Kaduna State (North-West), Lagos and Oyo States (South-West), and Taraba State
(North-East). The ethnic group leaders interviewed come from activist organizations including
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC); the Mdzough U Tiv (MUT); Idoma National Forum (INF); the
Omi Ny’ Igede (NY); Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB);
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP); the Arewa People’s Congress; the
Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN); Committee for the Defence
of Human Rights; Green House Resource Center; and Campaign for Democracy.
The information accessed covers a wide array of issues including latent factors and
triggering accelerators, development of civil society response to government behavior and
performances, and citizens perceptions about government’s policies and performance.
Additionally, the interviews also explored the views and roles of the groups on the causes of
conflict, workable mitigation, and resolution strategies. Subsequently, I compared the data
obtained from the fieldwork with that which I obtained from Afrobarometer 2017. Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data was analyzed to show the different
types of conflicts that occurred in Nigeria between 1997-2018.
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Method of Analysis
Chi-square
Data from the Afrobarometer 2017 project in Nigeria are analyzed using chi-square
statistics. These ordinal level data are measured using the Likert scale (Pevalin and Pevalin
2009). The ACLED data was explored to show the different incidences of conflict in Nigeria
between 1997-2018. The interview data are analyzed using descriptive tables and Afrobarometer
data are analyzed using the chi-square test of statistical relationship method. Chi-square statistics
(𝑥 2) test the statistical relationship between two variables (Acock 2014).
To reiterate, the purpose of this research is to explain causal mechanism processes of
violent conflict and the mitigating influence of civil society. Causal processes ought to be the
pivotal point of social research (Mahoney 2003, 134). This heuristic approach is presumed to
allow descriptive analysis of the connections between the putative causal factors, intervening
events, and the outcomes. The cascading trends in the development of conflict emanated from
interactions among the ethnic groups, civil society, and state. According to the mainstream
literature of conflict, these issues represent factors for negative relationships among the disparate
ethnic groups that inhabit a state (Laitin and Fearon 2003). It is noteworthy that though the latent
structural factors are necessary for the onset of conflict, such conflicts are usually non-violent in
nature.
Historical narrative focuses on analyzing the histories and perspectives of the actors
within the case context or comparing the histories, sequences, and outcome of events from
different contexts to ascertain why there are variations or similarities in the sequences and
outcomes from these disparate contexts. This approach is more amenable to research contexts
where there are limitations of observable events. For instance, Büthe (2002) stipulates,
“Historical narrative approach is appropriate for presenting information about the causal
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processes because it contextualizes the steps in ways that make the entire process visible rather
than leaving it fragmented into analytical stages.” (p. 486). However, analysts must pay close
attention to and avoid the potential pitfalls of historical narratives. First, analysts must allow
narratives to impose a beginning and end onto historical record. Second, it is important to set a
time limit for the independent (but not dependent) variables. Third, analysts must be guided
about the hermeneutics of narrative. Thus, rather than claiming that points in a narrative are right
or true, analysts should use words such as plausible, persuasive, and compelling. Fourth,
researchers must endeavor to search for alternative explanations before drawing conclusions (pp487-489). In essence, there is hardly any temporal phenomena that has not been previously
observed.

Ethical Consideration
In this research there are two areas of ethical concern. First is the ethical consideration for
data collection and handling of confidential information collected during the field work. I am
committed to ensuring that the identities and personal information of the individuals willing to
respond to my questions45 are treated with utmost confidentiality. I also ensure that information
collected during the field work is only used for this dissertation research only.

Potential Bias
As a researcher with a natural connection to a major ethnic group from one of the
countries under study (Nigeria), I must be conscious of my potential bias. When conducting a
field study in Nigeria, I must be objective-minded and refrain from interjecting my personal
experience or feelings into the data analysis for this dissertation research. Moreover, I understand
See Merriam (2009) for the unstructured and informal interview which allows interviewing to narrate his or her
story in detail
45
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that African states have a myriad of cultural differences. I will work with the domestic contacts
to ensure that I understand and abide by the basic transactional cultures and values that guarantee
the success of my field work in those countries. Hence, I will allow the rules of fieldwork
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005) to guide the conduct of this research.

Limitation
This mixed-method research derives its data from primary and secondary sources
including interview, Afrobarometer dataset, and archival materials, and adopts the chi-square
statistical for analyzing the data. Field research that incorporates interviews and observations are
desirable, but unfortunately, they are often difficult to accomplish because of several constraints.
Chiefly among the constraints is the long and difficult negotiations with foreign entities for
assistance arranging the fieldwork. Aside from the huddles associated with fieldwork, this
research strives to achieve internal and external validity. Given this observation, scholars must
be careful about generalizing the findings of this research indiscriminately. Before the findings
can be applied beyond sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to conduct more single and multiple
case studies because it will be inappropriate to make any sorts of generalization from the
findings of a single case study.
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Findings

Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the field interview and Afrobarometer survey data on violent
conflicts in Nigeria. This analysis adopts Nigeria as its analytical referent because of its
multiethnic characteristics and availability of abundant resources. The goal is to determine
whether the causal mechanisms of violent conflict in the country corroborate or refute the
hypotheses of my research. Thus, it seeks to find on one hand how the interactions between the
variables — resources and ethnic discrimination without the interaction of the civil society —
contribute to violence.46 On the other hand, it examines how the involvement of civil society
mitigates violent conflict. The two hypotheses tested in this chapter are:
H1: Ethnic groups whose region benefit more from the national government than others
are more likely to trust and support the national government than those whose regions do not.
H2 Ethnic groups from regions with high participation in civil society are more likely to
hold national government accountable than those from regions with low participation.
To determine the causal process of violence, this research analyzes the attitudes of
Nigerians toward the government and its handling of issues that revolve around the discourse of
national integration.47 The debates on national integration in Nigeria focus on issues such as geostructural imbalance, oil revenue allocation, and power-sharing. These issues are captured by the
interview questions in alignment with the explanatory variables. Other related questions were
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For a detailed discussion on ethnic domination, see Montalvo, José García, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2002). Why
ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, ethnic conflict and growth; Collier (2000). Economic causes of civil conflict
and their implications for policy.
47 The questions center around how the constituent ethnic groups can integrate as a nation. The most controversial
aspect of the national questions revolves around matters of national character of the country. The questions are:
First, should the country remain a federal state with a strong center? Second, should the country adopt a confederal
system with a weak center? Three, should the country disintegrate along regional lines so that each sovereign region
can then determine its future relationships with the others.
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asked to get a broader understanding of the feelings of the different ethnic groups on how
government is handling certain salient issues by region.
It is well documented that the country now known as Nigeria is an amalgam of many
nations brought together by Britain in 1914 (Ezera 1964, Coleman 1963). Previously, the north
had been organized under the Sokoto Caliphate after the success of Uthman dan Foldio’s jihad
that brought the Karmen Borno empire and all the native (pagan) Hausa states under the
harmonized Islamic religio-political dictatorship. The centralized caliphate system made the
indirect rule-colonial policy of the British colonial administration easily achievable. The Yoruba
land, on the other hand, consisted of many kingdoms that made this indirect rule-colonial policy
challenging for the colonialists in the Western region. The Ibo of the eastern part of Nigeria were
scattered all over the area between the Delta River and Southern Cameroon because of their
acephalous Village Republics system (Post 1973, Ola 1996).
The geographical imbalance created by the 1946 partitioning of the country into three
asymmetrical regions was the first hurdle against national integration. This observation is
consistent with the finding of Ezera (1964). Since independence there have been several episodes
of ethnic disputes over the geo-political structure, power sharing, and the revenue allocation
formula. This research seeks to analyze the role of resource-dependence in the conflicts and the
conflict mitigation influence of the civil society. To achieve the goal of this chapter, the analysis
is divided into three components based on the three geo-regional structures (Northern, Western,
and Eastern regions).
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Comparative Cross-Regional Analysis of Nigeria and the Relationship between Conflict,

Resources, and Civil Society
The in-depth interviews I conducted for this research targeted respondents from the three
regions of Nigeria (See Figure 5.1). The participants were public officials from the three ethnogeographic48 regions of the country (Akinola 1996). Overall, 42 people were contacted for the
interview but only 30 agreed to participate. The interview adopted both closed-ended and openended questions that sought to examine the views and feelings of the respondents on many issues
relating to the focus of the research. The questions are divided into four segments, namely
conflict and causal mechanism, trust in government, ethnic dominance, and the mitigating
influence of civil society and national integration). It is noteworthy that the sample was
determined by availability of time and resources needed to cover the three regions. The results of
the interviews are comprised of two components. The closed-ended questions capture the views
of the interviewees on specific salient issues, while the second part consists of the respondents’
narrative that reflects the rationales for their views on the questions posed by the interviewer.49
The questions focus on whether there are regional differences or unanimity among the Nigerians
on the causal mechanisms of violent conflicts and the mitigating influence of civil society.

See Akinola presents for a detailed explanation on the development of geo-political regions and zones in Nigeria.
For demographic distribution of respondents, please see Appendix A for the list of the questions posed to the
respondents by the interviewer.
48
49
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Figure 5.1: Nigerian Map Showing the Three Regions of Analysis.50

Source: http://www.waado.org/nigerian scholars/archive/pubs/wilberimap1.html

The issues raised in the interview questions include the types of conflicts that concern
Nigerians; their assumptions about the causal factors or processes of conflict; their feelings about
government performance; their feelings about ethnic power relations, resource allocation, and
justice; their aspirations about the future of national integration; and their views about the
conflict mitigation role of civil society.

Violent Conflicts and Roles of Civil Society in Nigeria
Table 5.1. Incidences of Conflict in Nigeria 1997-2018

Incidences of conflicts in Nigeria 1997-2018
PROTEST
BOKO HARAM UNIDENTIFIED FULANI ETHNIC POLICE
VIGILANTE PARTY COMMUNAL CULTISM GOVERNMENT TOTAL
4403
3117
2230 921 665
617 293 219
156
37
5 12663
34.77
24.62
17.61 7.27 5.25
4.87 2.31 1.73
1.23 0.29
0.04 100.00
Source: https://www.acleddata.com/data/

The date Nigeria was divided into three regions remains controversial because analysts disagree on whether to
adopt 1946, the date the constitution which created the region was passed or 1954, the date the law went into effect.
50
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According to Table 5.1, there were approximately 12,663 incidences of conflict in
Nigeria between 1997 and 2018. The types of the conflict are determined by the actors or
perpetrators. As shown above, aside from unidentified conflicts, Protest =24.62% is the largest
type documented, followed by Boko Haram terrorism =24.62%, Fulani herdsmen violence
against farmers and villagers = 7.27%, and ethnic violence = 5.25%. Others are less than 5%
(See Table 5.1). It must be noted that the unidentified being so high in proportion may have
changed the above distribution significantly were the actors and the contexts of the conflict
categorized as unidentified available. However, the table demonstrate that the types of conflict
with the highest percentages are the most significant. Protest reflects the reactions of civil society
to government policies and institutional behavior or performances, and Boko Haram, Fulani
herdsmen, and ethnic violence according to ACLED, are the most troubling for Nigeria.
The history of violent conflict in Nigeria can be traced to struggle for power among the
major ethnic groups dating back to the pre-independence period (Walter 1972; Tidy and
Leeming 1981; Nwabueze 1982; Ezera 1964).51 Because of frustrations that stem from above
problems, Awolowo (1968) observed that “Nigeria is not a nation, but a mere geographical
expression” (pp-47-48). Awolowo’s expression about the artificiality of Nigeria has been shared
by Balewa that “since 1914 Nigeria has existed as one country only in the paper” (Coleman
1958; Roberts 1998). The gathering political storm was further exacerbated by the western
region crisis, Balewa’s intervention and politicization of the military. Dissatisfied with the
political development, civil society groups including the labor unions, farmers’ cooperative
association, youth movement organizations, students, age-grade, and a few professional
associations protested against the federal government. The protest became violent, roads and
bridges were blocked, and government properties were destroyed. Hence, the first week of
For a robust discussion on the nature and impacts of ethnicity on Nigerian political development, see Awolowo
(1947) Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber & Faber.
51
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January 1966 was a precarious period because while the northern region continued give its
unalloyed support, the southern regions openly resented the national government (Sklar 1963;
Ezera 1964; Nwabueze 1982).
The grievances of the south east and south west regions against the successive
administrations in Nigeria revolve around the issue of geographical imbalance and its effects on
ethno-regional power relations and resources revenue allocation. Because the northern region has
over Seventy-percent of the geographical landmass, it has more seats in the federal legislature.
Subsequently, since Obasanjo increased the number of states from twelve created by Gowon to
nineteen, the north recaptured its dominance not only in the federal legislature but also in the
election of president. Similarly, because of the number of states in its jurisdiction, the northern
region benefited more from the national resources’-revenue sharing formula than the south
western region where the oil wells are located, and the south west through which crude oil is
shipped abroad. Thus, the south east region maintains that it produces the wealth of Nigeria yet
suffers from the injustices of the sharing formula. One common concern of both the south east
and south west regions is the seeming systematic plan by the northern Nigeria to dominate power
perpetually and control resources allocation as well (Okoli 1980).
Some scholars have pointed out that, because of the vacuum that the renegade officers
created as a result of violent coup d’état in January 15, 1966, General Ironsi, the GOC of the
Nigerian Army assumed power as the Head of State and changed the government from federal to
a unitary system. Consequently, in what has been described as a revenge for perceived ethnicized
coup perpetrated against Hausa-Fulani leaders, the northern officers overthrew Aguiyi Ironsi in a
more violent coup d’état assassinating him along with many Igbo politicians, most senior Ibo and
a few Yoruba military officers. However, to mitigate the fear of the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic
groups would take to perpetrate its hegemony, Hausa-Fulani hegemony, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon
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A minority Ngas ethnic from the Middle-Belt Nigerian took over as the military head of state
(Post and Vickers 1973; Potholm 1988). When Gowon was deposed in a bloodless military coup
in February 1975, General Murtala stated that the most significant reasons for toppling Gowon
was his administration’s failure to implement the nine-point six-years program that was designed
to return Nigeria to a civilian rule in October 1976. Unfortunately, Murtala was assassinated in
February 1976 by some aggrieved middle-belt military officers, namely Lieutenant Colonel Buka
Suka Dimka and Brigadier Illya Bisalla, who alleged that Murtala had planned to perpetrate
Hausa-Fulani hegemonic agenda during the transition.52
Murtala’s successor, General Obasanjo, managed the transition that ended in the
inauguration of Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria as the second democratically
elected president of Nigeria on October 1, 1979. It must be mentioned that the pro-democracy
movements led by the Nigerian Bar Association mobilized the trader’s union, teachers’ union,
national union of road transport workers union, and higher institution students in the south west
and south east mounted pressure from 1976 until 1979 for an immediate transfer of power to the
democratically elected government. The south-west region soon became disenchanted with the
administration of President Shehu Shagari, a Fulani from the Sokoto state northern region, and
descendant of Usman dan Foldio, from Sokoto northern Nigeria. The prelude to the 1983
elections indicated that Nigerian elites would stop at nothing to win the election (Joseph 1991). It
is arguable that the purpose of the arbitrary schedule change was to weaken the morale of the
opposition parties. Such argument is plausible given the assumption that if the small political
parties lost the presidential election, they tended to lose interest in mobilizing their supporters for
subsequent elections. The challenges for the government started immediately after the election of
1979 when the southern politicians and some at the leadership cadre of the labor union openly
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See Sunday Champion, April 30, 2006.
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criticized Shehu Shagari’s administration as illegitimate due to the allegations of massive
electoral fraud (Osaghae 1999). Rather than addressing the concerns of the citizens, the
administration deployed Anti-riot Mobile Police Force to suppress widespread anti-government
protests and some violent riots in the south eastern and south western regions. In addition,
government institutions were alleged to have engaged in asymmetrical treatment of the three
regions in its policy of public goods distribution and exclusion from power. The elites from the
south west regions gradually withdrew their support and loyalties to the administration. The
retreat to ethno-regional enclave and open contentment for Shagari administration gave impetus
to a new wave of protests leading to precariousness.53
Some scholars believe that the booming oil revenue was a bane of national integration
and political stability in Nigeria. As it has been observed, the northern region allegedly coveted
oil revenue to perpetrate neopatrimonialism. The NPN states received disproportionally high
financial support from the fund allocated for development by the federal government. In contrast,
the non-NPN only received statutory allocation based on austerity measures. The state governors
and local government officials of NPN states were not held accountable. Unlike the broad
coalition of civil society groups that protested against military occupation and fought for
democratic transition in the mid 1970s, the civil movements were divided in its response to
allegations of ineptness, wanton systematic merger of party and government perpetration of
partisanship, and neopatrimonialism against Shagari administrations’.54 That period marked the
lowest point for civil society because of flagrant ethnicization of the groups that had hitherto
fought in unity to hold the government accountable (Joseph 1991). Notable members of
professional associations and leaders of various civic community groups in the northern region
were recruited to the Kaduna Mafia. Those who were not coopted were embraced by the political
53
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See Daily Times, July 23, 2001.
See Jibril Aminu (2000). “Who wants a true federalism.”
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parties. This type of embeddedness weakened civil society in northern Nigeria. The case was
different in the south.55
Nigerians again clamored openly for the military to overthrow a democratically elected
government because of its purported institutional degeneration. In December 1983 when it
seemed that Nigeria was at the brink of disaster similar to the last quarter of 1965, the military
struck once again, terminating the elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari. General
Muhammadu Buhari, another northern Fulani man from Katsina, became the military head of
state. The Buhari military administration promulgated some draconian decrees, such as decree
‘2’ that permits arrest without due process; decree ‘4,’ prohibition of fundamental human rights,
freedom of the press, and decrees ‘5 and 22,’ the death penalty for illegal drug possession or
trafficking, and oil bunkering offences. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime clamped down on the
associations that constitute civil society so severely that they all went underground (Amuwo
1992). The despair allegedly suffered by Nigerians led to another bloodless coup d’état on
August 27, 1985 that brought General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida to power. After several
years of inconsistencies, Babangida allowed Nigerians to vote in a general election June 12,
1993, but annulled the result of the election that unofficial results indicated that Abiola, a
Southerner from Ogun state, won overwhelmingly.56 Even though Babangida eventually ‘stepped
aside’ from power under intense pressure and handed over to the Interim National Government
(ING) headed by Earnest Shonekan from Ogun state, south west region, that substitution failed to
placate the south western Yorubas. To the utter surprise of the anxious citizens, especially
southerners, General Abacha (Chief of Defense staff of the ING) overthrew the ING.
Aside from its totalitarian governing style, the Abacha regime’s anti-south policies
reinvigorated civil society coalitions in the south west and south east regions while the
55
56

See The Guardian, June 8, 1994.
See appendix for the result of the unofficial result of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election.
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administration was viewed favorably in the northern Nigeria. Furious about the increasing
activities of groups including pan-Yoruba in the south west, pan-Ibo in the south east, and
several other movements of Niger-Delta areas, the administration unleashed its State Secret
Service (SSS) operatives to arrest and detain members of civil society groups without due
process. Some were even assassinated.57 The affected groups were the National Democratic
Coalition (NADECO) and other pro-democracy and human rights groups such as the campaign
for Democracy (CD); Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR); and Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP); and numerous other networks. Because of the
maltreatment of the pro-democracy civic network, militant groups from south east and south
west regions took it upon themselves to challenge the government’s use of brute force to
suppress civil associations. The first notable militant group was the Oodua People’s Republic
(OPC), a pan-Yoruba group that sought to defend the interest of the Yorubas even if it required
violence.58 Other groups include the Niger Delta and Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and
Arewa Consultative Forum/Arewa Peoples’ Congress.
After ruling Nigeria with an iron first for about five years Abacha died on June 8, 1998.
General Abdulsalami Abubakar succeeded Abacha and served as a transitional head of state for
one year before handing over to the democratically elected government in May 1999.59
The pro-democracy advocate groups including NADECO, CDHR, and CD mass
mobilization efforts aimed at involving as many as possible civic community associations across
Nigeria against military dictatorship was impeded by two factors. First, the clandestine campaign
by Abacha’s administration was aimed at neutralizing the effectiveness of the groups’ strategy.

See The Guardian, November 6, 2015.
See National Concord, February 16, 2010.
59 See National Concord, September 22, 2000.
57
58
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Second, Arewa Consultative Forum’s aggressive campaign in the northern region on behalf of
the Abacha regime, and the militant wing of the Arewa People’s Congress allegedly worked
earnestly to sabotage the pro-democracy network. In reaction the militant wings of the southern
groups intensified violent tactics demanding that the winner of the June 12, 1993 election be
installed as the legitimate president. When General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over as head of
state after Abacha’s death he understood that the southern militant groups would not relent in
their efforts to get justice. In less than one year the transition was completed and handed over to
a duly elected president of the Republic in May of 1999.60
The election of Obasanjo a Yoruba from South West region triggered a backlash from the
core Hausa Fulani states in northern Nigeria. Zamfara’s state governor led the crusade for the
extension of Sharia law from civil matters to criminal offences starting in January 2000. The
Zamfara model was immediately adopted by more states in the northern region including Kano,
Kebbi, Sokoto, Niger, Katsina, Jigawa, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, and Gombe. That
decision provoked violent reactions from the militant groups in the southern region some of
which have been awaiting opportunity to perpetrate violence. The country therefore descended
into a protracted ethno-regional conflict. The phenomena of unseemly religious sectarianism in
the north and unsettling ethnic vigilantism in the south opened a new wave of aberrant
parochialism. In sum, it seems as if Nigeria was a failing state.
As Howard (2014) succinctly noted: “There is an insidious pattern of deprivation within
the failing and failed states that drives ordinary citizens to support use of political violence, and
in several specific cases, terrorism against the state” (p. 17). Since May 1999 when the Nigeria
returned to democratic rule, intraethnic, interethnic, conflicts and terrorism have increased
significantly. Meanwhile, the civic associations having accomplished its goal of seeing the

60
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country returned to democracy, have retreated to the background springing up sporadically when
necessary. The militant groups that remain visible and active in its space have all become
ethnocentric and violent. The reasons for the surge in ethnic or communal militant violence
includes marginalization, discrimination, exclusion, inequity in resources management,
environmental pollution. For Boko Haram, it is the evils of modernization and contemporary
government system. Archival records show hundreds of violent clashes between the government
and militants from south east and south west Nigeria.61

The Ibo (Biafra) Movements of the Ibo South East
Since 1989, contemporary Ibo ethnic resistance groups such as the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Biafra Independent Movement
(BIM), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and the Biafra Zionist Federation (BZF)62 have
demanded independence for the south east and south-south people. Their request for
renegotiation has not attracted much interest until around late 2013 when they escalated their
protests.63 The grievances of the Ibo people include what they describe as deliberate neglect,
unfair allocation of resources revenue northern domination of power and marginalization. The
Ohaneze Ndigbo is therefore demanding dialog with the federal government to address the
problems mentioned above. The frustration of the Igbo has been expressed in different tones.
Moreover, they believe that since Nigeria has successfully taken control of their natural
resources (oil) and balkanized the Biafra people, it does not care about the economic and
environmental effects of oil exploitation on the people of eastern region. The grievances of the
Ibos are against the northern region and the federal government, while violent reactions of the

See This Day, October 3, 2004.
See Nigerian Tribune (September 29, 2015, 32) for more on the different movements for actualizing the demand
of the south-east people for independence from Nigeria.
63 See Vanguard December 7, 2015, 15; Tribune December 10, 2015; Vanguard November 7, 2015, 11.
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eastern region’s militant groups were directed toward the government. After so many protests,
riots, and some instances of violence against the government and expatriate oil companies’
installations, on December 2015 the federal government finally held a meeting with the Ohaneze
Ndigbo in Enugu where the two parties agreed to ease the tension rather than continue in violent
confrontation. The agreement was however not implemented by the federal government.64
Therefore, the Ibos remain skeptical of the federal government and are seriously considering the
best strategy to secede from Nigeria. The tactics of the south east region militants include
launching attacks against government and foreign company installations, organizing mass
protests, and in some cases violent riots against the government.65

The Oodua People Congress (OPC) of Yoruba in South West
The indigenous Yoruba people formed a grand cultural alliance named the Oodua People
Republic (OPC) after General Babangida annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election that
was won by Moshood Abiola — a Yoruba man — from the Ogun state south west. The
grievance of the Yorubas are the annulment of the 1993 the election, targeted arrest, unlawful
detention, and assassination of many Yoruba leaders and democracy activists, and perpetration of
Hausa-Fulani agenda in Nigeria.66 Thus, it is safe to say that the Yoruba’s were brutally punished
for rallying against Abacha regime which is tantamount to attempting to wrestling power from
what the Yoruba’s called the northern oligarchy. However, after Obasanjo was elected president
in 1999, the Arewa People Congress positioned itself as the vigilante against potential overreach
of the administration.67 In retaliation, the OPC vowed to continue its vigilante activities in the
Yoruba land. Though the OPC’s grievances were against the Hausa-Fulani elites that are

See Guardian, February 23, 2016, 10.
See Guardian, November 15, 2015, 20 & October 25, 2015, 60; Guardian December 9, 2015, 17
66 See The Nation, September 23, 2012.
67 See Nigerian Tribune, April 27, 2004.
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believed to have perpetrated a northern military oligarchy which has been used to suppress
southerners for many decades, it was not the intention of the group to attack a group or entity
that has no affiliation with the federal government. Unfortunately, however, evidence shows to
the contrary that there were several incidences of violent clashes between the OPC and Arewa
People Congress militants in the south west region.68 Overall, the government considered the
OPC to be a very violent militant group with a record of thousands of violent clashes with the
Nigerian security forces. Surprisingly, no administration has deemed it worthy to categorize APC
as a violent ethnic militant group in spite of its numerous violent clashes with OPC. Its activities
went down after the election of Obasanjo, but the organization remains active and is prepared to
launch attack whenever it is provoked.69 It is worthy of note that while the ethnic militant groups
were embroiled in violent conflicts, the civic community groups including NADECO, Afenifere,
CD, and CDHR, with the financial support from international agencies like Human Rights
International, United Nations, and United States Aid Agency, successfully organized numerous
conflict mitigation training seminars. Through that intervention, they were able to train many
groups and community leaders the strategies of mitigation and mediation among the members of
different ethnic and communal groups within their villages and towns.

Movements for the Emancipation of Niger Delta & the Survival of Ogoni People (MEND)
Oil wells are in the south-south region of Nigeria, known as the Niger Delta. Since the
first crude oil production in the region in 1957, the natives of Oloibiri and Ogoni have
complained about the adverse effects of the crude oil production on their lands and rivers, but to
no avail.70 After four decades of neglect, the youths of the Niger-Delta area formed different

The violent clashes between the OPC and APC in the south west especially in Lagos during the 1990s through
early 2000s were reported to have been provoked by the groups suspicion for each other.
69 See National Concord, September 22, 2000.
70 See National Tribune, November 30, 1995.
68
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militant organizations to defend their lands from the foreign oil companies and the Nigerian
federal government. The militant groups included the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Creek Warriors, the Niger Delta Avengers, the Ijaw youths,
the Egbesu Boys, Delta Marine Force, and several others.71 Their initial goal was to secure some
compensation from the government and the foreign oil companies for the adverse environmental
effects of oil exploration in their lands. The complaint against the effect of oil exploration dates
back to January 1966 when a militant group by Army Major Isaac Adaka Boro, Samuel
Timinipre Owonaru, and others formed a guerrilla group that declared independence for the
Niger-Delta area and held the country hostage for 12 days paralyzing the oil business during that
short revolutionary period. Many decades after Boro’s revolution, the problems are not only
persistent, they are worse.72 The Niger-Delta militant groups sometimes turn against each other;
hence, intracommunal clashes account for substantial part of the violence that have embroiled the
area for many decades after the discovery of oil. Unfortunately, except for Yaradua
administration, the approaches adopted by all other administrations only embolden the militants
and their leaders to perpetrate more violence.73 However, after the expiration of the deal signed
with the militia which guaranteed employment, and financial compensation expired, many other
groups sprang up. The Niger Delta area remains the second most violent place in Nigeria because
of the increase in violence against expatriate companies and federal government personnel and
equipment.

The Boko Haram Violence

See The Punch, January 25, 1996.
See The Vanguard July 24, 2007.
73 See The Punch, November 17, 1995.
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The original goal of Boko Haram was to carry out a jihad in Nigeria because of the
disdain of the terrorist group for western education and modern lifestyle. Boko Haram started as
Sahaba group in 1995 from the orthodox teaching of fundamentalist groups like the Al-Qaida,
Taliban, and Muslim Brotherhood. By 2002, Boko Haram warned Nigerians to disavow western
lifestyle or face its wrath.74 Like Jama’at Islamiyyat in Egypt, Indonesia, Algeria, Mauritanian,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan, Boko Haram was determined to terrorize anyone or
any groups in Nigeria that refused to accept and practice Islam in their own fashion. Facing a
reprisal attack from the Nigerian Forces, Boko Haram fled from its Sambisa forest and embarked
on a full-scale guerrilla warfare against Christians, government installations, and educational
institutions.75 It is astounding that most of the menacing guerrilla attacks that Boko Haram
waged against the secular democratic government and its western paraphernalia even during the
administration of southern Christian presidents Obasanjo and Goodluck were confined to
Maiduguri, Bauchi, Yobe, Kano, and Katsina. Muslim scholars from different Islamic sects have
concluded that going by its murderous activities, the Boko Haram group is not an Islamic but
simply a terrorist organization.76 However, since the Buhari administration came to power, Boko
Haram has intensified its operation and vows to bring the country down.77 Furthermore, Boko
Haram is strengthened by the free entry and exit treaty between west African countries that
makes it possible for the group to spread and move freely under the radar. Moreover, the rise in
global terrorism and the support received from organizations such as ISIS and other Wahhabist
groups that provide financial and material support emboldens Boko Haram.78 In spite of the

See This Day August 31, 2011, 55; The Guardian August 1, 2009, 3.
See Nigerian Tribune January 5, 2017, 13; Vanguard May 22, 2017, 5.
76 The Punch, January 17, 2017.
77 The Guardian, August 1, 2009.
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government’s military pressure, Boko Haram is still able to bomb strategic targets in the north
east area.

The Fulani Herdsmen Violence
Like Boko Haram, the Fulani herders have been terrorizing Nigerians since 1999.
However, since 2015 the group seems to have become more brazen in the way it invades private
and public properties with impunity. As the incidences of Fulani herders’ encroachment into
arable farms escalates, the government’s response has been weak and ineffective.79 The herders
violence, which entails indiscriminate killing and destruction of properties, has been described as
ethnic violence by the northern elite against the south western and south eastern region because
unlike Boko Haram, Fulani herders’ attacks are concentrated on the middle-belt states of Plateau,
Adamawa, Benue and the south west, south east and mid-west states as a Fulani-sponsored
campaign of terror.80 Another account stipulates that some elements of the northern elites are
exploiting the Fulani herders’ violence to instigate another military intervention which
historically has been spearheaded by and benefited the northern region. It has also been pointed
out by the south east and south west that the ongoing Fulani violence is part of a broader plan in
the 1989 Abuja Declaration about the Hausa-Fulani goal of Islamizing Nigeria. As the debates
continue, the lackluster attitude of the Buhari Administration in addressing the menace of the
Fulani herdsmen seems as a passive endorsement of the virulent attacks they are unleashing
against the southerners.81 In defense of the Fulani herdsmen the Miyetti Allah and the National
Council of Fulani-Kawtal Fulbe82 explained that the marauders disguising as Fulani herders may

See the Punch May 7, 2016, pg. 14.
See the Guardian December 2, 2016, pg. 15. Guardian, January 30, 2016. 50.
81 See This Day, October 26, 2015.
82 See the Guardian July 6, 2017, pg. 1 for the perspective of the Kawtal-Fulbe-Nigeria on the national discourse on
the herdsmen-farmer violence.
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be Boko Haram militants who escaped from the Sambisa forest and want to continue to kill
Nigerians under the guise of herdsmen.83

Civil Society and Conflict
To explain the role of the civil society in conflict mitigation it is important to explain the
nature of civil society in Nigeria. Civil society that originated in the early history of the Africans
“concerns the non-monopolistic society, and the non-private political organizations that operate
in it” (Ekeh 1992, 190). The oldest form of civil society in Nigeria was the traditional
associations that acted as the watchdogs against the excesses of the traditional and religious
rulers.84 However, the modern form of civil society combines primordial values with
contemporary goals. It must be emphasized that the composition of civil society that forced the
military back to the barracks in the 1990s consists in a nexus of pro-democracy, human rights,
socio-cultural, religious, and professional associations. How did civil society force the military to
hand over power? The network of civil society demonstrated its relevance in the 1990s when it
responded spontaneously to the deepening crisis in Nigeria by mobilizing numerous groups in
the 1990s that can organize itself and play its mitigation role whenever the clarion calls even if it
must have sought resources internationally to pursue its goals (Guyer 1994, 217).
On the issue of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election, the northern region
supported the annulment, but the south east and south west condemned the annulment. Having
been invigorated by the incessant military oppression topped by the annulment, the groups
distributed leaflets throughout the country, and took out media advertisements advising workers
of all categories (public and private) to boycott work indefinitely. The state governors and local

See Punch, May 17, 2016 pg. 23. Daily Champion June 29, 2011.
See Ekeh 1992 (189) “The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics.” In Caron, Bernard, Alex
Gboyega, and Eghosa E. Osaghae. Democratic transition in Africa. CREDU, Nigeria, 1992.
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government administrators across the country reported crippling effects of the boycott within the
first 24 hours. Capitalizing on the initial success, the civil society network heightened the
strategies of civil disobedience. Gradually different categories of civil society joined the
movement calling for the military to hand over power to the winner of the presidential election.85
The failure to honor the demand of the civil society network led to intensification of its civil
disobedience and boycott of work which brought the Nigerian economy to a standstill and united
the southern region against the military and northern elites. For a short period of time there was a
looming fear of a north-south war.86
Remarkably, the government was weakened, and it succumbed partially after several
weeks of communication, transportation, trade, education, business, manufacturing, and
government institutions’ standstill. In light of intensified civil society pressure, General
Babangida ceremoniously announced that he was stepping aside and handing over power to an
Interim National Government (ING) on August 27, 1993. The ING had a southerner Earnest
Shonekan as the head of government, and Abacha as the parallel military head, being the chief of
national defense council (Diamond and Kirk-Greene 1997). Then on November 17, 1993 the
military struck one more time by overthrowing the ING. When General Sani Abacha took over
as the new military head of state his justification was the crippling effects of the civil unrest on
the economy and the inability of the ING to guarantee security of life and property.
Nevertheless, rather than retreating, the civil society adopted a shift in strategy. The
effects of Abacha’s totalitarianism were felt mostly in the southern regions. On May 15, 1994 the
National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) mobilized the rest of the civil society network and
demanded that General Sani Abacha step down and hand over power to MKO Abiola, the winner
of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election. In reaction, Abacha arrested most of the
85
86

See This Day, July 8, 2016.
See Daily champion, August 29, 2011.
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members of the known civil society groups, Abiola, retired General Musa Yaradua, and General
Obasanjo and their sympathizes became ‘persona non-grata’ in their own country. With the
steady support of Amnesty International and other international supporters, civil society
intensified its civil disobedience campaign. What is remarkable is that the administration spent
most of its time fighting the civil society groups rather than governing. 87
The data presented in the following tables (5.1-5.14) compare the divergent perspectives
of citizens on a wide range of issues by region. These variations are significant indicators that
tend to illuminate the causal processes and the dynamics of conflict onset and transformation in
Nigeria. The next section of this chapter analyzes the data on the northerners’ responses and
explanations for the causal process of conflict, as well as the mitigating role of civil society.
Section two analyzes the responses of the (South) eastern respondents. The third section entails
the analysis of the views of the participants from the (South) western region.

Analysis I: The Northern Region (Hausa-Fulani)
The northern region is a conglomerate of a diverse group of people (Akinsanya 2005). In
contrast to the common description of the northern Nigeria as the Hausa-Fulani north,88 the
northern region consists of several other ethnic groups including Idoma, Yauri, Kwanchi, Ngas,
Tiv, Zarma, Yungur, Teshena, Shuwa, Bachama, Baya, Gwa, Dakarkari, Gade, Banda, Jukun,
Kafanchan, Charma, Kwanchi, Birom, Nupe, Gwari, Kanuri, Angas, and several others
(Akinyemi, Cole, and Ofonagoro 1979, p. 207).
While it may be difficult to determine the exact number of ethnic groups in northern

See The Punch, June 2, 2016.
It is noteworthy that though the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are the largest in the northern region, many other
ethnic groups are in the northern hemisphere of the country. Besides, the ethnic groups in the middle belt do not
appreciate being described as northerners, even though the geopolitical framework of Nigeria perceives them as
such.
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Nigeria it is fair to stipulate that there are one hundred ethnic groups spread across the northern
region of Nigeria. Among these ethnic groups the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups forged an
alliance through Islamic religious affiliation creating a dominant mélange named Hausa-Fulani
(Akinyemi, Cole, and Ofonagoro 1979, 190-212).

Table 5.2: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents
Northern region
Demographic factors
Total
Percent

Gender
Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam
Others Total Percent
2
9
5
6
3
8
0
11
37
18 82
45
55
27
73
0 100

Among the thirty people interviewed for this research eleven, or 37 percent, of them are
northerners. Of the eleven respondents from the northern region there are two females and nine
males (See Table 5.2). The difference in the numbers of male and female northern participants
seems to reflect the patriarchal nature of northern Nigeria. It is understandable that the
ambivalence of the northern female population of political issues are related to Islamic religion,
culture, and tradition that relegates females, the majority of whom are uneducated, to the
background while men, whether educated or otherwise, represent the community’s political
interests and views. Furthermore, it is clear from Table 5.2 that there are more Muslim
participants than Christians and people of other religious backgrounds in the northern region.
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Table 5.3: Types of Conflicts that Respondents Indicated They Were Most Afraid of an
Outbreak
Types of conflicts

Gender
Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
Female Male H S
Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Intraethnic conflict
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
9
Civil disobedience
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
9
Armed robbery and kidnapping
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Police and security forces brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Violent protests
1
2
2
2
1
2
0
3
27
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram
1
1
1
1
0
3
0
3
27
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
18
Ethnic Militants Violence
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
9
Civil war
2
3
21
4
3
2
0
5
45

On the question regarding the types of conflicts that citizens are most afraid of, 45
percent of the northerners share the fear that an outbreak of another civil war as the most
concerning (See Table 5.3). Subsequently, 27 percent of the northerners surveyed identified
violent protest and the military counter-offensive against Boko Haram as next on their list of
potentially debilitating conflicts before the growing menace of Boko Haram and the Fulani
(Fulbe-Miyeti Allah) Herdsmen against the Christian farmers in the north and the entire southern
part of the country (See Table 5.3).89 Interestingly, only northerners perceive intra-ethnic
disputes and civil disobedience as violence that threaten the political stability in the country (See
Table 5.3). The northern participants do not consider the surging wave of armed robbery,
kidnaping, and the police and security operatives’ brutality against civilians as a cause of conflict
(See Table 5.3).

89

See (Weeraratne 2017) for in-depth discussion on the menace of Boko Haram
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Table 5.4: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents
Factors

Gender
Female

Democracy
Modernization
Civil society
Governement weakness
Land
Housing
Poor or lack of infrastructure
Climatic issues-Drought
Military rule
Illiteracy
Poverty
Unemployment
Water
Environmental pollution
Fear of Islamization / Jihad
Electoral malpractices
Power Sharing
Corruption
Ethnic discrimination
Resources revenue allocation

Male
1
0
1
1
0
2
2
2
1
2
2
0
2
0
1
1
1
2
1
1

2
3
6
0
1
3
1
6
0
1
3
5
5
1
1
4
1
2
2
3

Educational
High School Degree
2
2
3
0
1
1
0
4
0
3
1
2
3
1
1
3
2
3
0
2

1
1
4
1
0
4
3
4
1
0
4
3
4
0
1
2
0
1
3
2

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
0
1
1
0
3
1
3
1
2
2
3
3
1
2
3
2
3
3
3

Others
3
3
6
0
1
2
2
5
0
1
3
2
4
0
0
2
0
1
0
1

Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Percent
3
3
7
1
1
5
3
8
1
3
5
5
7
1
2
5
2
4
3
4

27
27
64
9
9
45
27
73
9
27
45
45
64
9
18
45
18
36
27
36

Then I asked participants to name the causal factors of violent conflict in the country. The
most concerning factors identified, as shown in Table 5.4, reflect the unique challenges that the
northern people face. This is glaring because more than 70 percent of the northern respondents
believe that a climatic problem (drought) or desertification is the leading cause of violence (See
Table 5.4). Similarly, 63 percent of northern respondents named water scarcity as an underlying
cause of conflict (See Table 5.4). Subsequently, northerners ranked poverty, housing,
unemployment, and electoral malpractices as very urgent problems that tend to accelerate
violence. Each of these factors are emphasized by 45 percent of the northern respondents (See
Table 5.4). Other factors on the list, including religious sectarianism, power sharing, resource
distribution, corruption, government institution weakness, and ethnic discrimination, received
less than 40 percent attention from the northern respondents (See Table 5.4). Next, I posed
questions to the respondents on each of the issues that are salient and sufficient causal factors of
conflict, and how well the government is working toward addressing these issues. The first set of
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questions related to the level of confidence or trust in the ability of the central or national
government to discharge its responsibilities efficiently. The indexes for measuring citizens’ view
on performance of government and its impacts on the diverse ethnic groups include
government’s handling of the economy, corruption, elections, and violence (See Tables 5.5, 5.6,
5.7, and 5.8).

Table 5.5: Government Management of the Economy
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
2
0
0
0

4
2
2
1

Educational
High School Degree
3
1
0
1

3
1
2
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
0
0
1

Others
4
2
2
0

0
0
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
6
2
2
1

55
18
18
9

On the management of economy, interviewees were asked to indicate their level of
satisfaction with government’s handling of the economy. In response, 73 percent of the
northerners were satisfied with the way the government was managing the economy. Only 18
percent were dissatisfied, and 9 percent were unsure. Furthermore, the northern participants
argued that the Buhari administration was the best among the post 1999 administrations. It is
interesting that the northerners would rather focus on four administrations since 1999 rather than
all the post-independence administration. Their argument rested on the impacts of the
government economic policy on the common people. Some of the reasons for the norther
participants favorable view toward the government included price control, increase and timely
payment of government workers’ salaries, subsidies for farm supplies, and many others. Given
these points of reference, it is not surprising that the northern respondents showed favorable
views to the government’s handling of the economy, because they enjoyed more economic
reliefs under the Buhari administration than the four preceding administrations. But how did the
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other regions react to the questions?

Table 5.6: Government Management of Corruption
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

6
0
2
1

Educational
High School Degree
3
1
1
0

4
0
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
0
1
0

Total
Total

Others
5
1
1
1

0
0
0
0

Percent
7
1
2
1

64
9
18
9

The next questions explored citizens’ level of confidence in the ability of government to
manage corruption in its institutions and agencies. The northern respondents showed confidence
in the government at the same level as the management of the economy. The participants
explained that the government’s campaign against corruption was going in the right direction
amidst the criticism from the other regions that the war against corruption was prejudiced against
the opposition parties and ethnic groups, most of which are based in the south. Based on the
above, it is not surprising that the implementation of the government’s economic and anticorruption programs tends to have significant impacts on the equilibrium of the relationships
between the government and the ethno-regional groups. That supposition seems consistent with
Olukoshi’s (2000) argument that corruption has become institutionalized in Nigeria. If it is true
that the anti-corruption program is implemented in a tribalized manner the outcome may
perpetuate divisiveness rather than rekindle collective trust in the government.
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Table 5.7: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

6
1
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
2
1
1
1

5
1
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
0

Total
Total

Others
6
1
0
1

0
0
0
0

Percent
7
2
1
1

64
18
9
9

One of the most divisive issues in Nigeria is the difficulty of conducting free and fair
elections amidst the ethno-regional nature of politicking. Therefore, I asked the participants to
rate their confidence in the ability of government to conduct free and fair elections. The
respondents showed a positive view of government’s ability. Eighty-two percent of the
respondents said they had confidence in the government. Nine percent did not have confidence,
and 9 percent said they were unsure (See Table 5.7). Explaining the reasons for their confidence,
the participants contended that the northern elites have worked earnestly to keep Nigeria united
and secure, but the southern elites have done everything to thwart that efforts. So, the reluctance
to support the Buhari administration is based on the ethnocentric nature of Nigerian politics. The
northerners have certain advantages over the rest of the country. Hence, it is not surprising that
they have confidence in the government. In contrast, those who did not have confidence in the
government explained that elections in Nigeria have become mere symbolism because the
winners are often pre-determined. It seems plausible that unless the country develops a system
that allows minorities to participate equally, the government will continue to struggle with
legitimacy among the minorities, especially in the southern regions.

114

Table 5.8: Abilities of Government Institutions to Protect Citizens and Distribute Justice
Equitably
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

5
2
2
0

Educational
High School Degree
2
1
2
0

4
2
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
0

Total
Total

Others
5
2
1
0

0
0
0
0

6
3
2
0

Percentage
55
27
18
0

To address the concern of citizens on the issue of equal treatment of ethnic groups I asked
the interviewees about their level of confidence in the ability of government institutions to
protect citizens and distribute justice among the ethnic groups equitably. Their responses showed
that the northerners agreed with the way the government handles distribution of justice despite
the grievances that citizens from other regions harbored against the government on the same
matter. To be sure, 82 percent were confident that the federal government could protect citizens
equitably despite their ethnic affiliation and region of origin. Eighteen percent disagreed.
Moreover, those who had confidence in the government’s ability defended their opinion by
asserting that those who complained against the government were not patriots. The argument is
supported with the example of southern and middle-belt state’s opposition to the federal
government’s grazing route and reserve bill that was designed to mitigate the herders versus
farmers’ violence. Besides, they stipulated that the problem of the antagonists of the bill was
their lack of compromise.
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Table 5.9: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly approve
Somewhat approve
Do not approve
Not sure

Male
0
1
1
0

6
1
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
3
1
1
0

3
1
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
0
2
0

Total
Total

Others
5
2
0
1

0
0
0
0

Percent
6
2
2
1

55
18
18
9

Concerning the spate of violence in the country, the interviewees were asked to rate their
approval of government’s handling of the violence unleashed by the Boko Haram group. The
northern interviewees support the Buhari government’s reliance on military counter-offensives
against the group, which successfully displaced the terrorist organization from the Sambisa
forest. They also support the Buhari government’s grazing routes and reserve settlements across
the country.90 Their rationale is that the longtime droughts and loss of grazing fields in the
northern hemisphere of the country naturally demand that the federal government should
intervene so that the Fulani herdsmen can travel to other parts of Nigeria safely through the
routes to the reservation where they can live a normal life instead of nomadism. How would the
rest of Nigerians in the southern regions receive this plan? That question is still unanswered at
this juncture. Therefore, rather than uniting the military onslaught against Boko Haram in the
north, the National Grazing Route and Reserve (NGRR) bill appears to be tearing the citizens
apart because of the adverse effects on different regions. This tends to have negative impacts on
interethnic relationships.

See HB.11.10.13 (2011). “The National Grazing Route and Reserve Act.” This bill was introduced in the House
of Representatives in response to the emergence of the violence that the Herders perpetrated predominantly against
the Christian among the minority ethnic groups starting from the northern region, and later concentrated on the
different ethnic groups in the middle-belt zone, and the southern regions in Nigeria.
90
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Table 5.10: Government’s Management of Natural Resources
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

4
1
3
1

Educational
High School Degree
2
2
0
1

3
0
3
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
0
2
0

Total
Total

Others
4
2
1
1

0
0
0
0

5
2
3
1

Percentage
45
18
27
9

Revenue sharing formula is one of the most divisive issues in the so-called national
integration debate. I asked the northern participants to rate their level of satisfaction with
government’s management of natural resources as it affects interethnic relationships. Sixty-three
percent were satisfied with government’s cabinet appointments, but 27 percent were unsatisfied.
Only 9 percent indicated that they were unsure (See Table 5.10). Furthermore, the northerners
contend that because Nigeria is a federal republic, the federal government possesses a monopoly
of control over the natural resources endowed to the country, irrespective of where they are
located. Therefore, in their view, the resource-revenue allocation ought to be controlled by the
federal government and shared based on the needs of each region. It is important to note that the
northern region, which covers more than 50 percent of the state, supports the revenue-sharing
formula that is amenable to their region even if it is detrimental to the interests of other regions.
Apparently, based on the perspective of the northerners, the federal government distribution
formula is justifiable. The question is what impacts does the purportedly asymmetric revenue
sharing formula have on the equilibrium of relationships among the constituent groups in the
Nigerian political arena that benefits the north more than the rest of the country? Evidently,
revenue sharing formula has been at the center of every national debate in Nigeria and continues
to dominate the discourse on the causes of ethnic dominance, discrimination, and violence that
threaten national integration in the country.
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Table 5.11: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

5
2
2
0

Educational
High School Degree
2
1
2
0

4
2
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
0

Total
Total

Others
5
2
1
0

0
0
0
0

6
3
2
0

Percentage
55
27
18
0

The northern participants were also asked about their level of confidence in the ability of
the government to protect all ethnic groups equally. On this issue, 82 percent indicated they had
confidence in the government while 18 percent showed they were not confident. Only 9 percent
stated they were unsure. Responding to a probing question, the northerners explained that the
types of conflict that threaten the unity of the federation are different from sectarian violence that
religious zealots like Boko Haram foisted against citizens of any ethnic background. Instead,
they emphasized that it is the baseless complaints by some power-zealot minority groups that
tend to destabilize the economic and political fabrics of the country. Remarkably, it is notable
that most of the key positions under Buhari administration are held by people of Hausa-Fulani
and Kanuri descents. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of the northerners have favorable
views of the government.

Table 5.12: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

Educational
High School Degree
5
3
1
1
2
1
1
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
3
0
0
0
1
2
1
1

Total
Total

Others
6
2
0
0

0
0
0
0

Percent
6
2
2
1

55
18
18
9

Since independence, interethnic power relations have been and continued to be a focal
issue that shapes the dynamics of political stability in the country. When the northern
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participants were asked to rate their levels of satisfaction with government’s power sharing and
inclusion, 73 percent said they were satisfied, and 18 percent indicated they were dissatisfied.
But 9 percent were not sure. Based on the high satisfaction rate the northerners accorded the
government on the issue, it is important to examine the basis for the northern support. In
response to a probing question, those who expressed satisfaction argued that the government had
organized a series of national constitutional conferences and constituent assemblies to address
the purported grievances of the minorities dubbed ‘the minority questions’.91 Consequently,
several measures have been adopted including a quota system and region and state creations.
Moreover, the main political parties have adopted the compromising principles of zoning and
rotational presidency to ensure that minorities can have a fair share of power. In contrast, those
who expressed dissatisfaction argued that the idea of one north, one people is a mere appellation
adopted by the Hausa and Fulani coalition to deny minority groups across the country and nonMuslims the access to power and resource control.
Furthermore, considering that the northern region has three of the six geo-political zones,
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims continue to dominate power in Nigeria. And whenever the presidency
falls to the northern Hausa-Fulani groups, all the principal cabinets positions are reserved for the
core Hausa-Fulani states. However, southern presidents are known to have assigned cabinet
positions fairly among Still, the north has enjoyed more than its fair share of access to power
under every administration, whether headed by a northerner or a southerner; thus the feelings of
northerners on the government is generally favorable. This observation is consistent with
Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) finding that the feeling of diverse groups of people in a
country about inclusion and exclusion depend heavily on the history of how they have been
treated by the government.
See Akindele (1997) for detail analysis of the role of constituent assembly in Nigerian constitutionalism, its
successes, and failures, and impacts on the federal character and national questions of Nigeria.
91
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Table 5.13: Confidence in Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
0

Educational
High School Degree
2
2
1
1
4
2
2
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
1
2
0
2
1

Total
Total

Others
2
1
4
1

0
0
0
0

Percent
3
2
4
2

27
18
36
18

One of the arguments of this research is that the mitigating influence of civil society
tends to reduce the risk of violence in multiethnic resource-rich states. Therefore, the participants
were asked to rate their levels of confidence in the ability of civil society to mitigate violence in
Nigeria. On that issue, only 45 percent of northern participants were confident. Surprisingly, 36
percent were not confident, and eighteen percent were unsure (See Table 5.13). It is noteworthy
that the 45 percent positive response for the role of civil society in conflict mitigation is the
smallest compared to the responses for all the indicators analyzed. Considering the 54 percent
combination of those who lacked confidence and those who were unsure, it is logical to infer that
most of northern Nigerians do not appreciate the vital role of civil society in conflict mitigation.
It is also important to note that most of the northern respondents who expressed lack of
confidence in the conflict-mitigating role of civil society are Muslims. According to the
narratives of the northern participants who expressed lack of confidence in civil society the
participants explained that the northern Muslims understanding of civil society is different from
the southerners and non-Muslim citizens.
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Table 5.14: Civil Society Membership
Responses

Gender
Female

Very active
Somewhat active
Not at all
Not sure

Male
1
0
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
2
1
2
1
3
2
2
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
2
1
1
2
0
1
0

Others
1
1
4
2

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2

27
18
36
18

The strength of civil society lies in its ability to operate effectively across the entire
spectrum of the political arena. Therefore, following the views of the northern participants on the
role of civil society, I asked them about the level of their involvement in community or voluntary
associations’ activities. Their responses reflected a similar pattern to their opinions about the role
of civil society. Forty-five percent of the respondents indicated that they belonged to some form
of civil society and community associations. Among this group 27 percent were actively
involved, while 18 percent were somewhat involved (See Table 5.14). It is also intriguing that a
whopping 36 percent of northerners did not belong to any community or civil society
associations (See Table 5.14). And the same number of northerners did not believe civil society
can mitigate conflict among Nigerian ethnic groups, while 18 percent were unsure of the
potential significance of civil society in the conflict mitigation process (See Tables 5.13 and
5.14). It is noteworthy that the number of the people from this region who were unsure, whether
they held membership either in a community or civil society group, was consistent with the
percentage of those who were unsure of the conflict mitigation role of civil society.
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Table 5.15: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration
Responses

Gender
Female

Very confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
0
0
1

Educational
Religious Affiliation
High School Degree Christianity Islam
7
3
5
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1

Total
Total

Others
6
0
1
1

0
0
0
0

Percent
8
0
1
2

73
0
9
18

At the center of all the questions addressed above is the implication for the country’s
national integration. The question is, what do the diverse opinions of the interviewees show
about the feelings of the citizens on the issues relating to national unity? I asked the participants
how much confidence they had in the prospects for interethnic integration. In response, 74
percent of northern interviewees believed unwaveringly in the unity of Nigeria. It is important to
note that those who expressed confidence in the prospects of national integration did so
unequivocally. However, 9 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not have
confidence in the prospects of national integration, while 18 percent of the northern participants
were unsure whether the composite ethnic groups in Nigeria could accomplish a successful
interethnic compromise to attain national integration (See Table 14). Nevertheless, the
distribution of the responses by the northern participants seems to suggest that most of the
northern respondents were optimistic about the preservation of the multiethnic state and the
prospects for national cohesion. This assertion is consistent with the findings of previous studies
(Horowitz 1985; Omotoso 2018).

Discussion of the Findings of Analysis I-The Northern Region
In sum, it is conceivable that the northern participants trust the government and are
satisfied by its performances on various issues. Moreover, they approved of the government’s
management of the economy, fighting corruption, and handling the violence perpetrated by Boko
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Haram and the Herders (See Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.8). It is noteworthy that the northern approval
ratings for the government may be higher than the national average for each of these indicators.
And, considering such positive feedback on government performance, it is not arbitrary to
suggest that a high level of trust in the government implies that northerners are also more likely
to support the government’s policies. In this African context, a symbiotic positive relationship
would be expected between the state and the northern region. Additionally, based on the fact that
the distribution of responses on the role of civil society reflects their involvement in community
and civil society activities, it seems plausible that the northern respondents are almost evenly
polarized on the mitigating influence of civil society in conflict. The observations above tend to
guide further analysis on the relationships between the northern region and the other regions.
Drawing on the trends in the responses of the northerners (See Tables 5.11-5.14), it is notable
that there are dissimilarities between the perceptions of the Muslims — who form the majority
Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups — and the Christians, who are predominantly northern minority
ethnic groups. Northern women seldom participate publicly in political events. The few who
participate are more likely to support their spouses. Consequently, for everyone Christian or
female supporter of the government policies there are likely to be three Muslim male supporters.

Analysis II: The (South) Eastern Region
There are many groups in the (south) eastern region of Nigeria, which consists of Ibos and nonIbo ethnic groups. It is important to note that while the Ibos have demonstrated formidable
solidarity on issues that affect them as a collective, they are not a monolithic ethnic group. The
Ibos are indeed multiethnic. Prominent among the Ibo groups are the Wawa, Ngbo, Ohaozara,
Ehugbo (Afikpo), Abakaliki, Nsukka, Ezillo, Izzi, Ijekebe, Ntezi, and Ohofia. The non-Ibo ethnic
groups in the eastern region include Efik, Ijaw, Ibibio, and many others (Ibeanu and Onu
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2001).92 However, within the context of intraregional politics, unlike the other ethnic groups, the
Ibos are not acquiescent to a centralized political system such as state, kingdom, empire, or
sultanate (Keller 2014, 54; Suberu 1996; Smock 1971; Horowitz 1985).
Interestingly, the perception of the Ibo ethnic groups by outsiders is seldom consistent
with how Ibo ethnic groups characterize the relationships among themselves. However, there are
issues of common interests to all easterners that serve to explain the misconceptions, not only of
the Ibos but all easterners as a monolithic group. For instance, recently the Ohaneze Ndigbo and
other civil movement groups in the south-eastern region have been extremely critical of the
Nigerian federal government.93 Moreover, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign
State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) have renewed the call
for the secession of the eastern region from Nigeria, while the Movement for the Survival of
Ogoni people (MOSOP) emphasizes the need to return to derivative principles as a way of
preventing disintegration.94 The questions is, why does the eastern region continue to agitate for
secession almost five decades after the end of the civil (Biafran) war? Against this background, a
valid question to ask is what the responses of the eastern region’s interviewees (See Tables 5.155.28) show about their feelings toward the Nigerian government, the causal mechanisms that
facilitate violent conflicts, and the future of the state.

It is pertinent to note that the two words Ibo and Ibo are synonymous and are used interchangeably throughout this
analysis.
93 The Ohaneze Ndigbo refers to the Pan-Ibo nationalist leadership coalition that was formed to harmonize the
divergent interests of the Ibos groups. Because of the recent call for secession, the IPOB, MASSOB, and other proIbo movement factions seems to be undermining the role of Ohaneze Ndigbo as the intermediary between the state
and the Ibo groups.
94 See Iyana (2018), and Ademoyega (1981) for a robust analysis of socio-economic, and political issues that
culminated in the incessant agitations for secession by the eastern region.
92
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Table 5.16: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents
Eastern region
Demographic factors
Total
Percent

Gender
Female

Male
8
67

Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
High School Degree
Christianity Islam
Others
Total
4
3
9
7
3
2
33
25
75
58
25
17

Percent
12
100

40

According to the demographic distribution table of the eastern participants (Table 5.16),
40 percent of the respondents are from the eastern region, 75 percent are college educated, and
58 percent are Christians. On the gender distribution, it is noteworthy that among the eastern
region respondents, 67 percent are female, and 33 percent are male (See Table 5.16). It has been
observed that while males from the eastern region dominate representation and hold more offices
than females, when it comes to political debate or discourse generally the females are more
visible and outspoken than their male counterparts. Moreover, college educated Ibos are more
likely to participate in politics than non-college educated Ibos. And as Christianity is the
dominant religious affiliation in the eastern region, it is understandable that there are more
Christian participants than Muslims and people of other religious backgrounds.
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Table 5.17: Types of Conflicts Respondents Indicated They Were Most Afraid of an
Outbreak
Types of conflicts

Gender
Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
Female Male H S
Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Intraethnic conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Civil disobedience
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Armed robbery and kidnapping
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
8
Police and security forces brutality
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
17
Violent protests
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
8
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram
0
2
2
0
0
1
1
2
17
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen
2
2
1
3
3
0
1
4
33
Ethnic Militants Violence
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
8
Civil war
3
2
1
4
3
1
1
5
42

The first question posed to the participants was to identify the types of conflicts that
Nigerians were most afraid of an outbreak. The responses demonstrate that despite the existence
of common pivotal issues, there were instances in which people of the eastern region had
different concerns. Hence, the participants reacted differently to each of the conflict types. In
fact, it is surprising that not a single one type of conflict attracted the interest of 50 percent of the
eastern interviewees. Even civil war, which garnered the highest attention, only received 42
percent. The next on the order of concern was Islamic sectarian violence that is fomented by
Boko Haram, and the Fulbe cattle Herdsmen. On that note, 33 percent believed the fear of
Islamic sectarian violence was a significant threat to political stability. Moreover, 17 percent
indicated they were worried mostly about police and security force brutality and military
offensives against Boko Haram. Only 8 percent of the respondents emphasized ethnic militant
violence, armed robbery, and kidnapping, and violent protest as types of violence that frightened
them the most. The concern about police crackdown echoes the fear of the IPOB, MASSOB, and
MOSOP movement protesters (The Guardian, April 10; 17, 2016).
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Table 5.18: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents
Factors

Gender
Female

Democracy
Modernization
Civil society
Governement weakness
Land
Housing
Poor or lack of infrastructure
Climatic issues-Drought
Military rule
Illiteracy
Poverty
Water
Environmental pollution
Fear of Islamization / Jihad
Electoral malpractices
Power Sharing
Corruption
Ethnic discrimination
Resources revenue allocation

Male
0
0
0
3
0
1
1
0
2
1
2
1
5
3
4
8
6
8
8

0
0
0
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
4

Educational
High School Degree
0
0
0
0
3
1
2
0
1
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
3

0
0
0
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
6
4
5
9
8
9
9

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
0
0
1
2
1
3
3
2
1
1
1
6
5
4
7
7
7
7

Total
Total

Others
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
2
1
0
2
3
1
3
3

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2

Percent
0
0
0
3
4
2
4
3
3
3
4
4
9
7
7
12
10
12
12

0
0
0
25
33
17
33
25
25
25
33
33
75
58
58
100
83
100
100

Subsequently, the participants were asked about the factors they believed were the causes
of violent conflict. Evidently, the ethnic groups in Nigeria have diverse opinions about the causes
of conflict. One hundred percent of the eastern region participants believed that power sharing,
ethnic discrimination, and resource revenue allocation were the three most debilitating conflictinducing factors. In addition, 83 percent believed that corruption was a major causal factor of
conflict, and 75 percent opined that environmental pollution was a major trigger of violence.
Furthermore, 58 percent indicated that fear of Islamization / jihad and electoral malpractice were
risk factors. However, less than 40 percent of the participants viewed government weakness,
land, housing, poor or lack of infrastructures, climatic issues/drought, military rule, illiteracy,
poverty, and water as significant causes (See Table 5.18). As expected, the eastern participants
did not believe that democracy, modernization, and civil society contributed to violence in
Nigeria. Given the above, it is not surprising that the five conflict-inducing factors the eastern
participants considered as the leading threats to political stability were related to power
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dominance and resources.95
Furthermore, most of the eastern participants (including the Ibos and non-Ibos) who
emphasized power sharing, ethnic discrimination, resource revenue allocation, and
environmental pollution as the most perilous conflict inducing factors also indicated that their
main concerns were the survival and justice for their ethnic groups. For the Ibos, the national
question discourses have been myopic because they often treated the eastern region’s interests
and grievances as secondary and relegated to the background. The discontent with the lackluster
approaches of successive administrations have been widely reported.96 Furthermore, as members
of the Nigerian oil producing states, the easterners believed that the factors they emphasized
were the most detrimental and that the northern dominated government has deliberately ignored
them for too long. Therefore, the renewed clamoring for secession stemmed from the
excruciating effects of oil exploration policy and the neglect of the adverse effects on the oil
producing areas like the Ogoni and numerous Niger Delta areas, which are further exacerbated
by the stringent revenue-sharing principle that replaced derivation with need-based principle.
The discontent expressed by the participants is consistent with the finding by Omitola (2005).97
Regarding government performance on various issues such as management of the economy,
corruption, election, justice, and security, the eastern region participants demonstrated mixed
reactions (See Tables 5.18; 5.19; 5.20; 5.21; 5.22).
To understand the feelings of the eastern region’s respondents on the divisive issues that
often trigger and/or accelerate violent conflicts in Nigeria, I introduced questions on indicators
such as management of the handling of violence, power sharing, resource management, equal

See Guardian (February 23, 2016) for the explanation of some instances in which the oil producing states of
eastern region are united in their views against the federal government.
96 See Source (November 23, 2015) for the grievances of the Ibo people and the reactions of the government to the
approaches that are adopted by the easterners.
97
See Omitola (2005) Revenue Allocation, Resource Control and the Nigerian Political
Economy.”
95
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treatment of all ethnic groups, and power sharing among Nigerians from diverse ethnic groups
(See Tables 5.23; 5.24; 5.25). It is surprising that a total of 42 percent of eastern respondents
indicated they were satisfied with the way that government was managing natural resources. This
group includes 25 percent who were highly satisfied and seventeen percent who showed they
were somewhat satisfied. However, 50 percent of the eastern region interviewees said they were
dissatisfied, while 8 percent were unsure (See Table 5.23).

Table 5.19: Government Management of the Economy
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
0
2
6
0

0
0
3
1

Educational
High School Degree
0
0
2
1

0
2
7
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
1
6
0

Total
Total

Others
0
1
2
0

0
0
1
1

Percent
0
2
9
1

0
17
75
8

The economy is the hallmark of state-society and interethnic relationships. The
participants were asked to show how satisfied they were with government’s management of the
economy. Astoundingly, only 17 percent of (south) eastern participants were satisfied, 75 percent
were not satisfied, and 8 percent were unsure (See Table 5.19). Although it was expected that the
eastern participants would not extol the government’s management of the economy, it is
shocking that less than 20 percent of the (south) easterners believed that the government’s
management of the economy was going in the right direction. Moreover, 75 percent nonsatisfactory rating is the highest negative score for the government so far. The eastern region has
consistently alleged that the government distribution of revenue creates rapidly growing
economic disparity among the regions. According to the participants, the presidents prior to 1999
and since 2015 focused more on resources revenue transfer from the oil-producing states of the
south to develop the northern region. Furthermore, while the south (eastern) participants were
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not indiscriminately opposed to some types of wealth transfer, they argued that it should not be
done perpetually to the detriment of the resource-producing states which is the current trend in
the management of the economy.

Table 5.20: Government Management of Corruption
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
2
4
1

1
1
0
2

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
0

1
2
3
3

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
2
3
1

Total
Total

Others
1
0
1
1

0
1
0
1

percent
2
3
4
3

17
25
33
25

Despite Nigeria’s enormous wealth the country remains impoverished as a direct
consequence of endemic corruption that pervades all spheres of politics and economy. So, to
understand the opinions of the participants I asked them to rate their confidence in the ability of
the government to manage corruption in its institutions and agencies. The responses were much
more diverse than expected based on the negative feelings of the easterners toward the
government on many other issues. Forty-two percent were confident, 33 percent were not
confident, and 25 percent were unsure (See Table 5.20). It is surprising that the responses of
eastern region participants on the management of corruption is significantly different from their
feelings toward the government on the management of the economy. As shown in Table 5.20 the
high number of those who were unsure makes the number of the those who were confident and
those who were not confident seem awfully close. It is plausible that the divergent opinions of
the south-eastern participants on this issue are reactions to how the current Buhari administration
is combating corruption.
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Table 5.21: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
2
1
4
1

2
0
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
2
0

3
1
3
2

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
1
3
1

Total
Total

Others
1
0
1
1

1
0
1
0

Percent
4
1
5
2

33
8
42
17

Despite the vast population gaps among the regions, south-eastern Nigerans believe it is
untenable for the northern region to dominate power indefinitely because of its population
advantage. To learn more about the feelings of the south easterners on this issue, I asked the
participants to rate their confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and fair
elections. Forty-one percent were confident that the government is capable of conducting free
and fair elections. Among this group 33 percent expressed high confidence, while 8 percent were
somewhat confident. However, 42 percent of the eastern region participants expressed lack of
confidence in the government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections. At the same time, 17
percent of the respondents were unable to specify whether they had confidence in the
government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections or not. Hence, it is appropriate to ask why
the eastern respondents are sharply divided. Could this outcome have stemmed from the Ibos’
mixed feelings about the current (Buhari) administration, or a cumulation of retrospective
experiences from previous administrations?

131

Table 5.22: Abilities of Government Institutions to Protect Citizens and Distribute Justice
Equitably
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
5
1

0
1
3
0

Educational
High School Degree
0
1
1
1

1
1
7
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
5
0

Total
Total

Others
0
0
2
1

0
1
1
0

Percent
1
2
8
1

8
17
67
8

On the issue of national security and political stability the successive post-independent
administrations have tried and failed. I asked the respondents to rate their confidence in the
ability of the government to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably. Only 25 percent of
the eastern interviewees had confidence in the abilities of the government institutions to protect
Nigerian citizens and distribute justice equitably. Sixty-seven percent did not have confidence,
and 8 percent were not sure whether government institutions could protect them or distribute
justice equitably (See Table 5.22). Further, I asked the participants to explain the reasons for
their opinions. The rationale for the mixed reactions derived from the failure of the constitutional
assemblies and national constitutional conferences that have been empaneled by successive
administrations with the mandate to produce comprehensive recommendations that address
federal character and national integration questions (Adesote and Falowo 2016). Remarkably,
these organized efforts to the tenacious security problems have consistently produced stop-gap
measures which have proven insufficient. The implication of lack of confidence in the ability of
government to protect all ethnic groups equally is that certain ethnic groups may turn inward to
find protection from their primordial affiliates.
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Table 5.23: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly approve
Somewhat approve
Do not approve
Not sure

Male
1
1
6
0

1
0
3
0

Educational
High School Degree
0
0
3
0

2
1
6
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
0
6
0

Total
Total

Others
1
0
2
0

0
1
1
0

Percent
2
1
9
0

17
8
75
0

Continuing with the above, I asked the participants to rate their approval of the
government’s handling of Boko Haram and Herders versus farmers violence. The majority of
eastern region participants — 75 percent — disapproved of how the government has handled the
precariousness created by the menaces of Boko Haram terrorism and Fulani (Fulbe) Herdsmen’s
rampages. Hence, only 25 percent (17 percent strongly and 8 percent somewhat) approved
government performance on handling violent extremism and mitigating the disproportionate
killing of minority ethnic groups and Christians in the north, and indiscriminate killings in the
south. Accordingly, the virulent behavior of Boko Haram and the Fulbe Herders (Miyetti Allah)
culminated in northern Hausa/Fulani killings while the government has been either indecisive or
foot-dragging. The eastern participants faulted the government for weak or inappropriate
responses that seemed to be emboldening the Boko Haram crusaders and marauding herders.
This is one of the few indicators in which the citizens expressed their views unequivocally
(Tables 5.23 and 5.24). Although the south-eastern region has not been affected directly by Boko
Haram violence, the entire country — especially the south — is enduring the brunt of the
herders’ rampage. The impacts of the herders’ violence and the federal government response
have led the south-eastern people to lose confidence in the government. The overall impression
is that the federal government is more interested in appeasing the Fulani herders than applying
the force of justice to deter the perpetrators of violence. Hence, the majority of south-eastern
citizens believe that their region has reasonable justifications to secede from Nigeria.
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Table 5.24: Government’s Management of Natural Resources
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
2
1
4
1

1
1
2
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
0

2
1
5
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
1
4
0

Total
Total

Others
0
1
1
1

1
0
1
0

Percent
3
2
6
1

25
17
50
8

Among all the issues that strained interethnic relationships in Nigeria, the most
incendiary for the south-eastern people was the government’s management of natural resources.
To capture their feeling on this issue, I asked the participants to rate their level of satisfaction. In
response, 42 percent of the participants had confidence, 50 percent did not have confidence, and
8 percent were unsure. Given that result, it is clear that most of the eastern region respondents
were not satisfied with the government’s management of natural resources. Moreover, in
response to further probing, the respondents explained that the injustices surrounding the issue of
the revenue-sharing formula was one of the most important reasons why they could never trust
any administration headed by a northerner of Hausa/Fulani origin98. In their opinion, the northern
elites captured power with the intentions of controlling resources and entrenching a revenuesharing formula that placates the greed of the northern elites and their loyal ethnic groups.
Interestingly, analysts have observed that one of the most controversial issues in the 1995
transition constitution initiated under the Abacha military administration was the elimination of
the derivation principle that gives a portion of the accrued mining revenue back to the resourceproducing states on the basis of the proportion of derivation, and the imposition of the principle
of equality (Phillips and Nyemutu 1998).99

See The Punch (January 25, 1996), Guardian (September 13, 1998), and National Concord (October 2, 1998) for
detailed discussion on the plights of the eastern region oil producing areas, and how the grievances further led to
alienation which triggered the onset of violence of different magnitudes.
99 See Omitola (2005) for more on the dynamics of revenue allocation debates in Nigeria.
98
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Table 5.25: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
0
1
6
1

1
0
3
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
2
0

0
1
7
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
0
6
0

Total
East

Others
0
0
2
1

0
1
1
0

Percent
1
1
9
1

8
8
75
8

Table 5.25 shows the divergent views of the south-eastern region on equal treatment of
divergent ethnic groups. The participants were asked to rate their confidence in the ability of the
government to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally. Responding to the question, 16 percent
said they were confident — including those who were highly confident and those who were
somewhat confident. In contrast, 75 percent of the participants indicated unambiguously that
they had no confidence in the government’s ability to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally.
However, 8 percent were unsure whether or not the government could protect and treat all ethnic
groups equally. Given the fact that most participants had no confidence in the government, the
criticism coming from the south-eastern region is understandable. Those who expressed
unequivocal lack of confidence in the government explain that the Nigerian state is a captive of
the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups and their southern collaborators. Based on that notion,
they argue that the government is either incapable of protecting and treating all ethnic groups
equally or is deliberately allowing the status-quo because it is consistent with its political
calculus designed to entrench Hausa/Fulani power dominance.100 It follows that the messages the
government sends through its actions and inactions tend to have long-lasting impact on the
behavior of the various ethnic groups and regions.

100

See The Vanguard August 12, 3013 and This Day October 26, 2015.
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Table 5.26: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
2
0
5
1

0
1
2
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
1
1

1
1
6
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
0
6
1

Total
Total

Others
1
1
0
1

1
0
1
0

Percent
2
1
7
2

17
8
58
17

On the issue of power sharing and inclusion, the participants were asked about their level
of satisfaction with government power sharing and inclusion. Fifty-eight percent of the
respondents expressed dissatisfaction. Only 25 percent were satisfied, and 17 percent indicated
they were not sure (See Table 5.26). How does the composition of government cabinet affect the
views of the Ibos and other ethnic groups in the eastern region? As expected, those who were not
satisfied with the government’s power-sharing formula argue that the successful Nigerian
governments, except Obasanjo, Yaradua, and Goodluck administrations, have deliberately
marginalized the easterners.101 Apparently, the reasons for the ostensible rancor between the
Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos dates back to the events of the pre-colonial era. It is fair to suggest
that the incessant marginalization of the Ibo people is reminiscent of events such as the indelible
coup d’état of January 1966 that was master-minded by the eastern army officers, and the utter
disregard by the northern-dominated government for the adverse effects of oil extraction in the
eastern region on the citizens.102 Overall, not only do the south easterners resent the dominance
of the northern region, but they also despise their own alienation from power.

101
102

See The Nation November 15, 2015 and Nigerian Tribune June 6, 2016.
See The Guardian (April 10, 2016) for the debate on “The Ibo question: What Ndigbo want in Nigeria.”
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Table 5.27: Confidence in Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
3
3
1
1

2
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
0

4
2
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
3
3
1
0

total
Total

Others
1
0
1
1

1
1
0
0

Percent
5
4
2
1

42
33
17
8

The persistent threat of civil war in Nigeria lends credence to the need for an impartial
mitigating arbiter. Thus far, the government approaches and efforts to mitigate violence have
exacerbated rather than reduced conflict. So, turning to the mitigating role of civil society, two
questions were asked. The questions were whether the participants were confident that civil
society could mitigate violence, and if they were active participants in community and civil
society activities (See Tables 5.27 and 5.28). To a great extent, the eastern participants
demonstrated confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. Nevertheless, the type of
organizations that constitute civil society in the eastern region are a mixture of pan-Ibo
movements and militant groups sharing similar goals but different approaches.103 It is clear that
the main reason why most of the south-eastern citizens are actively engaged in community and
voluntary associations is because of their grievances against the federal government for being
neglected. The problem of many of the south-eastern regional associations is that after several
years of frustration with the government’s highhandedness they have resorted to an incessant
demand for secession. Because neither party is showing the political will to compromise, the
brewing tension tends to inspire violence which could trigger another civil war.

While the elder forum and the title holders among the Ohaneze Ndigbo rely on peaceful approaches including
petition and negotiation to address the grievances of the south-eastern region, the youth forum prefers
confrontational approach and seeks to secede from the country rather than negotiating with the federal government.
103
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Table 5.28: Civil Society Membership
Responses

Gender
Female

Very active
Somewhat active
Not at all
Not sure

Male
2
3
1
2

2
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
1
1

3
4
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
2
1
2

Others
1
1
1
0

1
1
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
4
4
2
2

33
33
17
17

As for membership of civil society, I asked the participants to rate their levels of
involvement in community or voluntary organizations. Interestingly, 66 percent of south-eastern
participants were involved in some form of community and voluntary organizations’ activities.
These include 3 percent who were very actively involved, and 33 percent were somewhat active.
Those who indicated they were not involved in either community or civil society group
activities, and those who were not sure whether they are involved or not were each 17 percent
(See Table 5.28). However, while most of the eastern region citizens tend to have more
confidence in civil society than the central government for conflict-mitigation, their active
participation in civil society activities beyond the enclave of their communities has been
hampered by the unorthodox crackdown by the government.104 For instance, while acting under
the auspices of the chieftain organization component of civil society, “Chiefs have been shot and
killed, as when the police attacked a village in Imo State that tried to protest the neglect of its
needs by the oil companies” (Guyer 1994, 220).105 It can be deduced from the above that the
reason why the south-eastern region has been unsuccessful in the agitation for compensation and
some control of the resources revenue is because of the sectionalist approaches adopted by the

See Guardian (October 25, 2015). While the South-East Governors’ Forum (SEGF) caution the various pro-Ibo
movements against violent confrontation against Nigerian government, they agree unequivocally with the groups
that the despite the no victor no vanquished declaration at the end of the 30 months civil war in 1970, and various
constitutional conferences and constituent assemblies, the successive governments had continued to deliberately
marginalize the eastern region.
105 See African Concord (1990) for detail explanation for the scenarios under which the government coopted some
groups and coerced others into submission.
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groups championing the fight for resolution of their grievances.

Table 5.29: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration
Responses

Gender
Female

Very confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
2
1
4
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
1
2
1
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
2
1
0
5
5
1
0

Others
0
1
1
1

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
1
3
25
1
2
17
0
6
50
0
1
8

Pertaining to the question of the prospect for interethnic integration, the eastern
participants were equally divided.106 Only 25 percent indicated they were very confident.
Seventeen percent were confident. However, 50 percent signified they were not confident that
the ethnic groups could integrate. The responses to the probing question that followed shows that
the 50 percent who expressed lack of confidence in the possibility for interethnic identified
themselves as Ibos. That is understandable given the fact that the Ibos have consistently agitated
for secession from Nigeria. Consequently, among the ethnic groups (including in the southeastern region) the Ibos are the most alienated ethnic groups in Nigeria. It must be mentioned
that the reason the Ibos continue to experience greater marginalization than any other ethnic
group in Nigeria is their inability to forge alliance with other ethnic groups, though other ethnic
groups in the south-eastern region have not shown willingness to embrace the Ibos secession
plan. Hence, if all the ethnic groups in the south-eastern region cannot unite because of the fear
of Ibo domination, it is difficult to expect the rest of the country (especially Hausa-Fulani
groups) to form a cohesive alliance with the Ibo ethnic groups without reservation.

See Vanguard (November 7, 2015) Source (November 9, 2015) for the divisions among the Ibo elites on how to
the elites, Ojukwu, Kanu-Nwazuruike, Ezeife, and Okorocha, factions of IPOB and MASSOB perceive the
grievances of the Ibos and whether the solution lies in the demand for revival and secession of the defunct Biafra
from Nigeria.
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Discussion of the Findings of Analysis II-the (South) Eastern Region
In light of the above, it is not surprising that most of the eastern region interviewees were
not concerned about the negative impacts of intraethnic violence and civil disobedience because
of their adaptation to an inherently acephalous political system (See Table 5.16). A myriad of
possible events may account for the inconsistent views of the eastern region participants on some
issues even though they agree on the salient issues. It is important to note that not all the ethnic
groups in the eastern region support the current clamoring for secession from Nigeria. Perhaps
one reason for that lack of consensus among the eastern ethnic groups can be traced to the
argument that even though the name for the proposed country comes from the bight of Biafra or
Bonny, the Kalabaris, Ijaws, Ogonis, and Ikwere/Etchie have different interests and preferences
for the process of achieving them.107
It follows from the above analysis that the interviewees from the south-eastern region
disapprove of the ways that the government is handling a wide variety of issues. Notable among
the areas of disagreement are management of the economy, protection of citizens and distribution
of justice equitably, handling Boko Haram and Herders violence, management of natural
resources, power-sharing and inclusion.108 Among all of these, the two that affects the easterners
directly the most are the management of resources and power-sharing and inclusion. The
majority of the ethnic groups in the eastern region contend that while the government derives
approximately 90 percent of its foreign earnings from the region, the government neglects the
negative impacts of oil exploration process on their environment, economy, and quality of life.
The above can be explained partially by the assertion that “Since economic goals compete with

See The Guardian (April 10; 17, 2016) for the arguments on the differences between the Ibos and the riverine
people’s question, and why the Ibos are viewed as detached from their eastern compatriots. This is important
because of the inconsistencies that inundated the multidimensional framing and reactions to issues relating to
national question and federal character by the ethnic groups in the eastern region.
108 See The Guardian (December 2, 2016) for the Ibos’ views on the Islamists’ ferocious attacks and the
government’s performance on the responsibility to protect.
107

140

other ones like fair distribution or ethnic balance in most … there can be no optimal set of
institutions, but only institutions that tend to favor one set of goods over other” (Fukuyama 2004,
24). Although Fukuyama’s description of African states captures the above phenomena, it seems
to downplay the enormity of the lopsided nature of Nigerian government policies.
The question is, why would a government neglect the plight of some of its citizens? That
question will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this analysis. Nevertheless, it is logical
to assume that the negative views of the eastern region participants about the government are
fraught with historical antecedents of interethnic relationships that are laden with what Kaufman
(2006) describes as symbolic politics. As the interviewees indicated, the asymmetrical treatment
of ethnic groups which affect the eastern region negatively are rooted in the ethno-regional issues
such as the events that shaped the decolonization politics, the coup d’états of January and July
1966, and the civil war (1967-1970) that ended in the defeat of the Biafra Republic.109 Despite
the famous declaration by the military head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, that in the end
‘there was no victor no vanquished,’ the easterners believe that they continue to suffer from the
aggregate of the above events, especially the excruciating defeat (Osaghae 2002). In sum, the
eastern region citizens harbor many grievances against the Nigerian government.

Analysis III: The (South) Western Region
The south-western region consists of several ethnic groups, though most see themselves
as Yorubas or descendants of Oduduwa as there are Yoruba affiliates and non-Yoruba minority
ethnic groups in the region. As for the Yorubas, it is noteworthy that aside from the various
distinguishing tribal marks and localized dialects that delineate them, the Yorubas can be aptly
construed as a monolithic ethnic group, including the Awori, Egba, Ekiti, Ijebu, Remo, Yewa,
See Osaghae (1992) for detail discussion on ethnic domination and challenges of associated dispersal of power
under democratic transition.
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Egbado, Egun, Oyo, Ondo. The affiliated and non-Yoruba ethnic groups are Ijaw, Isoko, Ikwere,
Edo, Esan, Owan, Ebira, Etsako, Ika, Mumuye, Emai and many others. Important to note, these
ethnic groups practice different political systems. When it comes to the variants in the political
systems of Yoruba ethnic groups, Lloyd (1966) writes that, “One could … write a textbook on
comparative political systems, drawing almost all the examples from the Yoruba” (pp. 549).
Moreover, literature of Yoruba development is replete with findings on the ability to separate
economic entrepreneurship and political power in Yoruba land. This reinforces the argument that
wealth and power are not intricately linked in the Yoruba land. For instance, while the cash crop
farmers and traders dominated the economy throughout the Yoruba land, the traditional fraternal
order members including the Ogboni, Osugbo, Oloro, Alawo, Olorisha, and traditional chiefs
were influential in establishing rules for accession to power, checks and balances, and the
judicial system. It is noteworthy that the members of these highly influential secret society
organizations are in most cases relatively poor in the society.

Table 5.30: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents
Western region
Demographic factors
Total
Percent

Gender
Female

Male
3
43

Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
High School Degree
Christianity Islam
Others
4
1
6
4
2
1
7
57
14
86
57
29
14
100

23

According to the demographic distribution of the respondents, participants from the
south-western region constitute only 23 percent of the interviewees for this dissertation research.
Among that group 43 percent are female and 57 percent are male. Moreover, 86 percent hold
college degrees, but the highest educational qualification of the remaining 14 percent is a high
school certificate. The religious background data showed that 57 percent are Christians, 29
percent are Muslims, and 14 percent of people of other faiths or non-faith south westerners
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participated in the interview (See Table-5.29). Apparently, the gender gap among the people of
south-western region is not drastically wide. However, education is a significant determinant of
political participation among the people of the south-west region. The religious backgrounds of
the participants seem to accurately reflect the distribution of the south-western region’s
population.

Table 5.31: Types of Conflicts that Respondents Indicated they Were Most Afraid of an
Outbreak
Types of Violence
Intraethnic conflict
Civil disobedience
Armed robbery and kidnapping
Police and security forces brutality
Violent protests
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen
Ethnic Militants Violence
Civil war

Gender
Education
Religious Affiliation
Total
Female Male H S
Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1 14.286
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
2 28.571
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1 14.286
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
2 28.571
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1 14.286
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
2 28.571

Table 5.31: presents the views of respondents on the types of conflict that citizens are
most afraid of an outbreak and the salient conflict-inducing factors. The interviewees were asked
to point out the types of conflicts which they believed Nigerians were most afraid of an outbreak.
Based on the responses shown above (See Table 5. 30), it is safe to say that the people of southwestern region did not believe that the outbreak of intra-ethnic conflict, civil disobedience, and
even violent protests made them less safe. Perhaps their responses are reflections of the extent to
which the Yoruba-dominated south-western region is largely unaffected by the ramifications of
violent conflict in the country. However, 29 percent indicated they were concerned of an
outbreak of civil war, Islamic fundamentalism, Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen violence, and
police and security force brutality. Moreover, 14 percent of the south-western participants
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indicated they were afraid of the outbreak of armed robbery and kidnapping, ethnic militant
violence, and a military offensive against Boko Haram. It is noteworthy that throughout this
research only Muslim respondents mentioned military offensive against terrorism as
disconcerting, while Christian respondents focused on conflicts they believed had ramifications
for all citizens irrespective of their social, cultural, or religious backgrounds. Also noteworthy,
none of the respondents, irrespective of their religious affiliation, were concerned about violent
protest. Given the above, it seems appropriate to ask why only 25 percent or less were concerned
about virtually each type of conflict among the south-western participants.

Table 5.32: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents
Factors
Democracy
Modernization
Civil society
Governement weakness
Land
Housing
Poor or lack of infrastructure
Climatic issues-Drought
Military rule
Illiteracy
Poverty
Unemployment
Water
Environmental pollution
Fear of Islamization / Jihad
Electoral malpractices
Power Sharing
Corruption
Ethnic discrimination
Resources revenue allocation

Gender
Female Male
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
2
3
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
3
3

0
0
0
2
2
1
1
1
4
3
2
2
1
3
4
4
4
4
4
4

Educational
High School Degree
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
2
1
1
1
1
3
5
2
3
2
4
5
6
5
6
6
6

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
0
0
2
0
1
1
1
3
3
1
2
1
3
4
4
4
5
4
4

Total
Total

Others
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2

0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Percent
0
1
0
3
2
2
2
1
5
6
3
4
3
5
6
7
6
7
7
7

0
14
0
43
29
29
29
14
71
86
43
57
43
71
86
100
86
100
100
100

Albeit the south-western people demonstrated that they were not so passionate about an
outbreak of any particular type of conflict (See Table 5.30), they did have strong opinions about
the salient causes of violence. Interestingly, all of them (100 percent) stated that resources,
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revenue allocation, ethnic discrimination, corruption, and electoral malpractices were the leading
causes of violence in Nigeria. Moreover, 86 percent indicated that power sharing, Islamization or
jihad, and illiteracy posed significant threats for violence. And 71 percent believed that military
rule and environmental pollution caused violent conflict in Nigeria. Further, 57 percent identified
unemployment, while 43 percent indicated that government weakness, poverty, and water were
likely causes of violence in Nigeria. Less than 30 percent agreed that modernization, land,
housing, poor or lack of infrastructure, and climate posed risks to peace and political stability in
Nigeria. However, none of the people in this group identified democracy as a veritable cause of
violence in Nigeria. The above table shows that the south-west may not have been affected by
violence like the other regions. Furthermore, the south-western region participants explained that
while all the factors are observable, some are mild and incapable of triggering nationwide
violence. However, they are concerned about the endless contention between the north and the
south-east because of the potential consequences.

Table 5.33: Government Management of the Economy
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
1
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
0
0
2
1
1
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

Total
Total

Others
1
0
0
1

0
0
1
0

Percent
2
1
2
2

29
14
29
29

As shown in Table 5.33, only 43 percent of the participants were satisfied with how the
government was managing the economy. This number included 29 percent highly satisfied and
14 percent somewhat satisfied. Moreover, 29 percent were not satisfied, and 29 percent were
unsure. In sum, there were more south-western respondents who were satisfied by with the
government’s management of the economy (43) than those who were unsatisfied (29). It is worth
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noting that the variation in the responses reflects the diversity of opinion based on gender,
religious background, and sub-ethnic groups. Furthermore, the participants explained that while
they understand the connection between the regional and national economy, they also understand
that the strength of the south-west region economy does not depend on natural resource revenues
(Post and Vickers 1973). To be sure, they argue that while the impoverished national economy
relies heavily on oil exportation, the southwest economy relies on non-oil sectors.

Table 5.34: Government Management of Corruption in its Institutions and Agencies
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
0
2
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
0

Others
1
1
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
0
2
0
2
0
2
1
1

29
29
29
14

On the government’s management of corruption, I asked the participants to rate their
confidence on government performance. Interestingly, the majority (58 percent) of south-west
respondents showed confidence in the government’s management of corruption. That includes 29
percent who were highly confident and another 29 percent who were somewhat confident, while
only 29 percent had no confidence in the government’s management of corruption. Accordingly,
as the anti-corruption agencies continue in their efforts at dismantling the structure of systemic
corruption, the perpetrators have simply devised more surreptitious tactics that are difficult to
detect. Moreover, the anti-corruption agencies have also come under scrutiny for adopting
double-standard approaches in dealing with loyalists and antagonists of the administration.110

It has been alleged that under the People Democratic Party (PDP) led administrations of presidents Obasanjo,
Yaradua, and Goodluck the anti-corruption selectively agencies targeted all culprits except for the notable members
of PDP. Since, Buhari assumed power in 2015, the tide of discriminatory war on corruption has shifted against
suspects but those that are loyalists of All Progressive Party (APP).
110
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Above all, an irrefutable fact is that despite its deficiencies the government is showing more
political will to combat corruption.

Table 5.35: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
4
1
1
0
5
0
2
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
4
3
1
0
1
1
0
0

Total
Total

Others
1
1
0
0

1
0
0
0

Percent
5
1
1
0

71
14
14
0

As the outcome of elections is pivotal to state-society relationships, I asked the
participants to rate their confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and fair
elections. Table 5.35 shows that most of the south-western participants had significant trust in
the government. Accordingly, 71 percent were highly confident, and 14 percent were somewhat
confident that the government has the ability to conduct free and fair elections. In sum, only 14
percent disagreed. Remarkably, the south-west participants demonstrated their confidence in the
government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections despite challenges with the outcomes of
virtually all the post-independent elections prior to 1999. Historically, the north dominated the
national government for a period spanning 1960-1966, while the south-western and south-eastern
regions were relegated to mere junior partners or insignificant back-benchers. Exacerbating the
relationship further was the Hausa-Fulani cabal efforts at consolidating its monopolization of
power between 1960-1975 and 1983-1999. Thus, it is important to note that out of nearly six
decades of self-rule (1960-2019), the southerners — east and west — have been presidents or
military heads of state for a period of sixteen years and three months (West, General Obasanjo,
1976-1979; Interim National Chairman Ernest Shonekan, August 27-November 17, 1993; and
President Obasanjo, 1999-2007. East, General Aguiyi Ironsi, January-July 1966, and Jonathan
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Goodluck, 2010-2015). However, the northerners have dominated power for over forty-two
years. Paradoxically, while the south-eastern region shows frustration with the electoral system
and processes that often guarantee northern dominance, the south-west seems unconcerned.

Table 5.36: Abilities of Government Institutions to Protect Citizens and Distribute Justice
Equitably
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1

Others
1
1
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
0
1
0
1
1
3
0
2

14
14
43
29

When asked about the confidence of the participants in the ability of the government’s
institutions to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably, their reactions showed that most
south westerners had no confidence in the government on this issue. As illustrated in Table 5.35,
only 28 percent of the interviewees had confidence in the government institutions’ ability to
protect citizens and distribute justice equitably. Among those who trusted the government’s
institutions only 14 percent indicated high trust while the remaining 14 percent somewhat trusted
the government. Similarly, 43 percent did not have confidence in the government’s institutions,
and 29 percent were neutral. Given that the justice system is one of the institutions of
government that remains deeply infested with corruption and favoritism, a vast majority of
citizens do not have confidence in the justice system.
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Table 5.37: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly approve
Somewhat approve
Do not approve
Not sure

Male
1
0
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
1
0
0
3
0
0
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
0
0
4
2
1
1

Total
Total

Others
1
0
1
0

0
0
1
0

Percent
2
0
4
1

29
0
57
14

On the government’s handling of Boko Haram and the Herders violence, a majority of
the participants disapproved. Responding to the question on how they would rate the
government’s handling of the violence, 57 percent signified that they disapproved, 14 percent
were not sure, and only 29 percent approved (See Table 5.37). Despite that both Christianity and
Islam are popular religions among the south-west region population, most citizens wanted
government to curtail the violence. Unfortunately, the problem seems to be growing stronger as
the country endures increased violence. For instance, it has been noted that both Obasanjo’s and
Goodluck’s administrations were able to curtail the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) and the
Niger Delta militants, but it seems as if the Buhari administration has failed in the handling of
the ferocious Herders’ violence that discriminately targets southerners.111 The Buhari
administration’s responses to different crises shows its priorities. For instance, while the
government relocated many military garrisons and anti-riot police battalions to the troubled
north-eastern and north-western zones to combat Boko Haram, its bizarre response to
Fulbe/Miyetti Allah herders’ violence in the south was the introduction of the National Grazing

See The Guardian (March 5, 2006), This Day (May 8, 2001), and Comet (May 20, 2001). Accordingly, Obasanjo
Administration displayed primacy of national interest over regional interests by arresting the southern militant
groups including Fredrik Fasehun and Gani Adams of OPC; Mujaheed Dokubo-Asari of the Niger Delta Peoples’
volunteer Force; and Ralph Uwazurike of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
(MASSOB). Contrarily, when many serving and retired military officers of northern ancestry founded the Arewa
People Congress (APC) as the militant wing of the Northern People Consultative Forum, the southern region was
terrified, but the government has never taken any action against the fear of the south about that powerful ethnoreligious military buildup. Similarly, there was never any attempt to reign in on the Sharia Army. These are some of
the reasons why ethnic groups do not trust the state to act as an impartial coordinator.
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Reserve bill that disposes southerners of their lands and reward the assailants, the Fulani
herdsmen, with fortified and well-equipped grazing reservations and routes exclusively
preserved for them.
The plight of the southerners who have been suffering at the behest of Miyetti Allah has
yet to rise to a national emergency, but the shortage of forage for individual northern Fulani
cattle herders was classified by the government as a national emergency. In sum, the southwestern participants believe that the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups are strategically plotting to
create what has been dubbed Fulani cow colonies in all states of the federation. The implication
is that Hausa-Fulanis will claim hegemony in all states as with the case of the Ilorin Kwara state
where the Hausa-Fulani hired warriors turned sojourners to overthrow Afonja and set up an
emirate system in Ilorin (O’Hear 1997). Considering the Ilorin example, the fear of the citizens
of the southern regions about the likelihood of a violent conquest and annexation of their towns,
cities, and states by the Fulani Herders is legitimate. Furthermore, the mixed messages from the
government seem consistent with an ethnicized or selective approach by the government that
incentivizes a lack of confidence and trust among the people.

Table 5.38: Government’s Management of Natural Resources
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
0
1

1
2
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
1

Total
Total

Others
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

2
2
1
2

Percentage
29
29
14
29

Then I asked the participants to rate their satisfaction with the government’s management
of natural resources. Surprisingly, the south-western participants’ views on the management of
natural resources show that the majority (58 percent) were satisfied. Twenty-nine percent were
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highly satisfied, 29 percent were somewhat satisfied, and 29 percent were neutral. Overall, only
14 percent of the participants were dissatisfied (See Table 5.38). As a follow-up, I asked the
participants to explain the reasons behind their opinions. The respondents explained that
constitutionally, the control and management of natural resources is the exclusive responsibility
of the federal government.
So, in their view the states and regions that challenge the legitimacy of government
control of the natural resources are violating the constitution of the federation. Furthermore, they
asserted that overreliance on resource revenue was the origin of the protracted civil war (19671970) that devastated the south-eastern region. In the opinion of those who responded that they
were unsure, both the north and south-eastern region must look elsewhere for economic
development. The participants who were unsatisfied pointed out that though the dependence on
oil revenue as the only source of sustenance is dangerous for the south-eastern region, the federal
government has been unfair in the way it addresses the grievances of the environmental crises
that are destroying the south-eastern region as a result of oil drilling activities. It is imperative to
note that the south-west regional economy has always been driven by internally generated
revenue (IGR) rather than resource-revenue share.

Table 5.39: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
1
0

0
1
1
2

Educational
High School Degree
0
1
0
0

1
1
2
2

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
1
1

Others
0
1
0
1

0
0
1
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
1
2
2
2

14
29
29
29

Like the question on Boko Haram and herders’ violence, the south-western region
participants were asked to rate their confidence in the ability of government to protect and treat
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all ethnic groups equally. It is striking that only 43 percent of the south-west interviewees were
confident the government had the ability to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally. However,
29 percent said they were not confident, and 29 percent were neutral (See Table 5.39). Follow-up
discussions with these participants showed a nearly-equal split of opinions among them reflects a
deep-rooted division among the people from the south-west that stemmed from the issue of
political alliance with the northern region during the first republic era.112 Those who were
confident that the government could protect and treat ethnic group equally argued that although
each of the successive administrations have demonstrated some level of ethnocentrism, at the
same time they have made concerted efforts to protect all ethnic groups. Those who did not have
confidence argued that a government cannot be ethnocentric and at the same time protect and
treat all ethnic groups equally. Evidently, ethnocentrism is an inherent attribute of every
administration. The question is, can a government be biased and yet protect all ethnic groups
equally? Apparently, more than 40 percent of the participants believe that it is possible.

Table 5.40: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Not sure

Male
2
0
1
0

0
2
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
0
0

1
2
2
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
1
2
0

Total
Total

Others
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

Percent
2
2
2
1

29
29
29
14

One of the leading grievances against the government in multiethnic states is the extent to
which the government includes or excludes different ethnic groups. So, I asked the participants
to rate their levels of satisfaction with the government’s power sharing and inclusion.
See Daily Champion (November 1, 2005) Accordingly, the reason there continues to be an increase in the
number of ethnic militias is that the different ethnic groups have different feelings about the capability and
intentions of the national police force. The ethnic groups of the southern region opted for self-determination and
thus the emergence of OPC, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, and others.
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Surprisingly, 58 percent of the south-west participants responded that they were satisfied.
Twenty-nine percent were not satisfied, and 14 percent were unsure (See Table 5.40).
Considering the favorable views of the majority of the participants, it is important to find out if
the people of the south-western region are satisfied with the proportion of power sharing and
inclusion as it affects them under all post-independence administrations or just the Obasanjo,
Yaradua, and Buhari administrations. What can be gleaned from the above is that the southwestern participants may have been influenced by their experiences under administrations that
are affiliated with pro-southwest political parties.

Table 5.41: Confidence in the Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society
Responses

Gender
Female

Highly confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
1
1
1
0

3
1
0
0

Educational
High School Degree
0
1
0
0

4
1
1
0

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
2
1
1
0

Others
1
1
0
0

1
0
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
4
2
1
0

57
29
14
0

To understand the feelings of the participants on the importance of civil society, I asked
them to rate their confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. The responses to this
question are by far the most outstanding as 86 percent of the participants unequivocally answered
that they had confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. Only 14 percent said they
were not confident and there was no neutral response. The positive feedback on this issue reflects
the experiences of the people of the south-western region stemming from the role that civil
society played in numerous conflicts that have beset the region since 1960. That viewpoint has
been corroborated by the participants’ responses to the follow-up question. It was civil society
that confronted the iron-fist rule of the colonialists. The same civil society pressured the various
military administrations to relinquish power and reinstate democratic rule. Therefore, civil
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society has demonstrated credibility and capability to use both confrontation and facilitate
cooperation among competing or warring factions by holding each party accountable to
negotiated compromises.
However, the success of civil society depends on its ability to extend its purview beyond
the terrain of a section of the political arena. That accounts partially for the relative success of
prodemocracy groups in their efforts at engendering peaceful transition from military
dictatorship to democratic rule in 1999 and many national reconciliation efforts that followed. It
is important to note that most of the associations that eventually formed the civil society
coalition that accomplished the above-mentioned successes evolved from the grassroots
community and voluntary associations from the south-west region. The question that follows is,
does the confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society translate into participation or
support for civil society activities?

Table 5.42: Civil Society Membership
Responses

Gender
Female

Very active
Somewhat active
Not at all
Not sure

Male
1
1
0
1

2
1
1
0

Educational
High School Degree
1
0
0
0

2
2
1
1

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
1
2
1
0

Others
1
0
0
1

1
0
0
0

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
3
2
1
1

43
29
14
14

Table 5.42 reflects the participant responses to the question of civil society membership. I
asked the participants to rate their involvement in any community or voluntary organization’s
activities. The responses of the participants from the south-west corroborate their positive
perception about the conflict-mitigation role of civil society (See Table 5.40). Seventy-two
percent of the participants indicated that they were actively involved in different community
groups’ activities. In contrast, 14 percent did not participate in community or voluntary

154

association’s activities, and 14 percent were neutral (See Table 5.42). Therefore, it is clear that
the confidence the south-west participants have in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society is
corroborated with their level of being engaged in civil society activities. Thus, it is not surprising
that the south-west region is relatively the most peaceful among the three regions in Nigeria,
save for the recent incursion of the Fulani/Fulbe into the southern regions to perpetrate what
many suspected to be an attempt to implement the final phase of Hausa-Fulani domination
through Islamic jihad.

Table 5.43: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration
Responses

Gender
Female

Very confident
Somewhat confident
Not confident
Not sure

Male
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

Educational
High School Degree
0
1
0
0

1
1
2
2

Religious Affiliation
Christianity Islam
0
2
1
1

Others
1
0
1
0

0
0
0
1

Region of Origin
Total
Percent
1
2
2
2

14
29
29
29

The most crucial question the participants were asked centers around the prospects for
interethnic coalition for national integration and preservation of peaceful coexistence. The goal is
to examine the confidence of the south-west region in the willingness and determination of
Nigerians to coalesce toward achieving formidable national integration. Asked to rate their
confidence in interethnic coalition for national integration, the south-west participants were
surprisingly not as optimistic about the prospect for national integration in Nigeria as expected.
Only 43 percent of the participants were confident. Twenty-nine percent lacked confidence, and
29 percent did not indicate whether they had confidence or not (See Table 5.43). Overall, the
participants were not optimally confident that the disparate but composite ethnic groups in
Nigeria are capable of national integration. Remarkably, if more than half of the participants
cannot unequivocally assert their confidence in the prospects for national integration despite their
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moderate support for the government on many other issues, what does that tell us about how the
region might react to another civil war in the country? As evident from Table 5.43, 58 percent
were not confident that the ethnic groups in Nigeria could develop cohesive national integration.
Given this finding it is essential to explore why the participants’ confidence on this issue is low.
Therefore, I asked the respondents to explain why they were not optimistic that the ethnic groups
could coalesce for national integration. The group’s explanations showed that the crux of
interethnic contention in Nigeria is power dominance and resource control. Interestingly, despite
the adoption of a rotational presidency compromise, the contention between Hausa-Fulani and
the ethnic groups from the oil-producing states continues unabated.

Discussion of the Findings of Analysis III-the South (Western) Region
From the above analysis of the western region, certain deductions are conceivable. To
start with, gender and religion have no significant impact one way or the other on the viewpoints
of the participants. The responses and narratives of the south-west participants suggest that the
region is moderate in all its approaches. For instance, their responses to the interview questions
show that they do not take sides with either the Hausa-Fulani dominated government or the
south-east region. This is evident in their expression of confidence and satisfaction for the
government’s performance on some issues and negative feedback on others. The issues on which
they are confident or satisfied with the government’s performance include the management of
the economy, handling of corruption, ability to conduct free and fair elections, management of
natural resources, and power sharing and inclusion (See Tables 5.33; 5.34; 5.37 and 5.39).
Conversely, the participants expressed a lack of confidence or satisfaction with the government
on issues such as ability to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably, protection and
treatment of all ethnic groups equally, and handling of Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen
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violence in the country. Nor are they optimistic about the prospects for interethnic integration
(See Tables 5.32; 5.35; 5.36; 5.38; 5.42). Evidently, these issues are tenacious impediments that
are likely to accelerate any outbreak of violence.
Based on the participants’ narratives, the south-west occupies a middle space in the
Nigerian political arena for two reasons. First, most south-western elites rely on the dictates of
the constitution regarding the pursuance of social, economic, and political equity. Thus, for
south-western citizens, access to resources and power must be based on the working principles of
the union. So, they encourage their fellow citizens to respect the federal principles and laws of
the country. In fact, in many of the instances of dispute with the government the south-west
adopted non-confrontational means of resolving those issues with the federal government. This
accounts partly for the reason the participants showed mixed reactions to the vigilante tactics of
the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), but overwhelmingly showed support for civil society
groups including associations like Campaign for Democracy (CD), the National Democratic
Coalition (NADECO), and other grassroots associations.113
In sum, based on the participants’ explanations, it was the mitigating role of civil society
that has kept the country from descending into another civil war. It is the view of the south-west
participants that the current administration is ineffective in handling the issues that trigger or
accelerate violence, and civil society is the intervening factor that has thus far protected the
country from conflict outbreak.

See Nigerian Tribune (July 13, 2000), Comet (May 20, 2001), and The Guardian (March 5, 2006). Accordingly,
the Oodua People’s Congress was formed on August 29, 1994 as the militant wings of the pan Yoruba to defend,
protect, and promote socio-cultural interest of the Yorubas. The formation came as a reaction to ethnically-inspired
police force brutality perpetrated against the civil society and community groups that were protesting the annulment
of the June 12, 1993 presidential election and Abacha’s fascist rule.
113
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Analysis IV: Bivariate/Descriptive Statistics
In support of the fieldwork interviews, I analyzed twelve questions contained in the
Afrobarometer dataset 2017 on Nigeria. In the analysis I used bivariate statistics (chi-square) to
test the relationships between regions and the responses of participants to the selected questions.
The responses are defined and coded in stata using the exact coding that are available in the
Afrobarometer codebook.114 The purpose of this quantitative analysis is to further examine the
feelings and opinions of Nigerians about their government by region. The goal of this
quantitative analysis is to support or refute the initial findings and narratives derived from the
fieldwork interviews on the relationships between changes in government policies, performance,
and violence.
The Afrobarometer respondents are Nigerians from the three regions — namely the
north, south-east, and south-west — and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Of 1600 total
respondents, 760 are from the north, 472 are from the south-east, 352 are from the south-west
region, and 16 are from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), also known as Abuja.
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See Appendix A, section D for the definition of variables and codes used for the chi-square analysis.
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Table 5.44: Participation in Community Activities
How frequently do citizens participate in community meetings?
Response Options

Regions of Participants' Origin
North
South-East South-West

FCT Total

No, would never do this

108
42.69

53
20.95

87
34.39

5
1.98

253
100.00

No, but would if I had the chance

239
49.28

117
24.12

121
24.95

8
1.65

485
100.00

Yes , once or twice

124
47.33

77
29.39

60
22.9

1
0.38

262
100.00

Yes, several times

153
43.71

145
41.43

50
14.29

2
0.57

350
100.00

Yes, often

134
54.03

80
32.26

34
13.71

0
0.00

248
100.00

Don't know

2
100.00

0
0.00

0
0.00

0
0.00

2
100.00

Total

760
47.50

47
29.50

352
22.00

16
1.00

1,600
100.00

Pearson chi2 (15) = 81.0550

Pr =

0.000

It has been observed that civil society was the vanguard of good governance in Nigeria
(Ihonvebere 2002). Their activities entailed participation in community activities and resistance
against any form of misrule (Mongrue 2016). Table 5.44 above shows the results of the chisquare test for whether there is a statistical relationship between the participants’ region and their
opinion on participation in community activities. Based on this result the association between the
two phenomenon is statistically significant, c2 (15, N = 1600) = 81.05, p < 0.000.115 This
analysis examines the null hypotheses (H0) that there is no association between region and level
of involvement in community meeting. Because the c2 81.05 exceeds critical value (24.996) and
the p value < 0.05 I rejected the HO. This implies that there is an association between region and
opinion of citizens about participation in community meetings, Creamér’s V = 0.129. Looking at
the percentages, the first column shows that 42.69 percent of the northerners surveyed said they
would not participate in community meeting, but only 20.95 percent of the south-easterners and

See Acock (2014, 131) A Gentle Introduction to Stata (Fourth Edition) for detail explanation on percentages and
measure of association.
115

159

36.94 percent of the south westerners shared similar view.

Table 5.45: Participation in Demonstrations and Protests
How frequently do citizens participation in demonstration and protests?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
No, would never do this
No, but would if I had the chance
Yes , once or twice
Yes, several times
Yes, often
Don't know
Total

157
40.57
339
45.50
109
51.90
86
57.33
68
64.15
1
50.00
760
47.50

South-East South-West FCT
111
113
28.68
29.20
235
166
31.54
22.28
59
41
28.10
19.52
42
18
28.00
12.00
24
14
22.64
13.21
1
0
50.00
0.00
472
352
29.50
32.00

Pearson chi2 (15) = 46.5258

Pr =

Total
6
1.55
5
0.67
1
0.48
4
2.67
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

387
100.00
745
100.00
210
100.00
150
100.00
106
100.00
2
100.00
1,600
100.00

0.000

In Table 5.45 I tested the null hypothesis (H0) that there is no association between region
and levels of involvement in demonstrations and protests against the government’s ineptitude.
The table of the chi-square analysis result shows that the c2 (15, N = 1600) = 46.52, p < 0.001 is
statistically significant. The c2 46.52 is greater than the critical value (24.996), so I rejected the
null hypothesis. Given the fact that p value < 0.05, the relationship between region and
participation in demonstrations and protests is statistically significant. 40.57 percent of the
northerners, 28.68 percent of the south-easterners, and 29.20 percent of the south-westerners
indicated that they do not participate in demonstrations and protests. Paradoxically, the
percentages also show that the northern region is more likely to participate in protests and
demonstrations than the south-eastern and the south-western region.
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Table 5.46: How Free and Fair was the Last General (2015) Election
How free and fair was the last general (2015) election
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
38
131
18
Not free and fair
20.21
69.68
9.57
383
283
156
Free and fair with minor problems
45.76
33.81
18.64
331
48
175
Completely free and fair
59.75
8.66
31.59
0
2
0
Do not understand question
0.00
100.00
0.00
8
8
3
Don't know
42.11
42.11
15.79
760
472
352
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
Pearson chi2 (12) =

295.4823

Pr =

Total
1
0.53
15
1.79
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

188
100.00
837
100.00
554
100.00
2
100.00
19
100.00
1,600
100.00

0.000

The opinions of participants about the conduct of the 2015 general election provides a
veritable opportunity for understanding the variations. So, this research examined the null
hypothesis that there is no association between region and perception about the freeness and
fairness of the general election. The results are c2 (12, N = 1600) = 295.48, p < 0.001 (See Table
5.46). Moreover, the c2 295.48 exceeds the critical value (21.026). So, I rejected the null
hypothesis. Interestingly, among those who believed the election was neither free nor fair, 69.68
percent are from south east, 20.21 percent are northerners, and 9.57 percent are south westerners.
However, 59. 75 percent of northerners, 8.66 percent of south easterners, and 31.59 percent of
south westerners believe that the general election of 2015 was completely free and fair.
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Table 5.47: Trust in the President
Ho much do you trust the President ?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
81
268
124
Not at all
16.95
56.07
25.94
160
124
116
Just a little
39.60
30.69
28.71
146
47
53
Somewhat
58.40
18.80
21.20
372
31
54
A lot
80.87
6.74
11.74
1
2
4
Don’t Know
14.29
28.57
57.14
760
472
351
Total
47.53
29.52
21.95
Pearson chi2 (12) =

459.0322

Pr =

Total
5
1.05
4
0.99
4
1.60
3
0.65
0
0.00
16
1.00

478
100.00
404
100.00
250
100.00
460
100.00
7
100.00
1,599
100.00

0.000

Table 5.47 presents the results of the chi-square analysis that tests the association
between the levels of trust in the president and region. The null hypothesis for the test is that
there is no association between region and trust in the president. The results indicate a statistical
significance, c2 (12, N = 1599) = 459.03, p < 0.001. The c2 value exceeds the critical value
(21.02), thus, the null will be rejected. The fourth column of the chi-square results shows that
80.87 percent of northerners, 6.74 percent of south easterners, and 11.74 percent of south
westerners reported that they have a lot of trust in the president. Conversely, the first column
shows that only 16.95 percent of northerners indicated that they have no trust in the president
compared to 56.07 percent of the south easterners and 25.94 percent of south westerners. It
follows from the above chi-square results that the northerners support the president even though
the rest of the country does not. Therefore, it is likely that the northern region’s support is
influenced by ethno-regional preferences.
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Table 5.48: Trust in the National Assembly
How much do you trust the National Assembly
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
209
246
231
Not at all
30.12
35.45
33.29
267
159
74
Just a little
52.98
31.55
14.68
189
42
31
Somewhat
71.32
15.85
11.70
87
23
9
A lot
72.50
19.17
7.50
8
2
6
Don’t Know
50.00
12.50
37.50
760
472
351
Total
47.53
29.52
21.95
Pearson chi2 (12) = 205.6428

8
1.15
4
0.79
3
1.13
1
0.83
0
0.00
16
1.00

Total

694
100.00
504
100.00
265
100.00
120
100.00
16
100.00
1,599
100.00

Pr = 0.000

The chi-square table above (Table 5.48) shows the results of the tests of the relationship
between region of origin and citizens’ views about the national assembly. The null hypothesis
(H0) is that there is no association between region of origin and citizens’ levels of trust in the
national assembly. The c2 (12, N = 1599) = 205.64, p < 0.001 is less than 0.05. The c2 value
exceeds the critical value (21.02), thus, the HO will be rejected. Reviewing the first column for
those who have “no trust at all” in the national assembly it seems that there is no statistical
significance between the regions and participants’ levels of trusts for national assembly (the
south eastern 35.45 percent, northern 30.12 percent, and south western 33.29 percent). However,
based on the fourth column that shows the proportions for “a lot of trust” in national assembly
the comparison of south easterners 19.17 percent, northerners 72.50 percent, and south
westerners 7.50 percent, shows that the northerners have more trust in the national assembly than
the south-eastern and the south-western regions combined, which supports the assumption that
the views of the citizens are influenced by their ethno-regional bias.
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Table 5.49: Trust in the Police
How much do you trust the Nigerian Police?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
197
308
254
Not at all
25.68
40.16
33.12
233
108
55
Just a little
58.40
27.07
13.78
218
23
26
Somewhat
80.15
8.46
9.56
107
30
14
A lot
70.86
19.87
9.27
5
3
3
Don’t Know
45.45
27.27
27.27
760
472
352
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
Pearson chi2 (12) = 330.6458

Total
8
1.04
3
0.75
5
1.84
00
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

767
100.00
399
100.00
272
100.00
151
100.00
11
100.00
1,600
100.00

Pr = 0.000

A chi-square test for the probability of an association between region and citizens’ trust
was found to be statistically significant, c2 (12, N = 1600) =330.64, p < .05 (See Table 5.49).
The c2 =330.64 exceeds the critical value (21.026), so the null hypothesis is rejected. It is
glaring from the first column that among those who have “no trust at all” in the police 40.16
percent are south easterners, 33.12 percent are south westerners, and only 25.68 percent are
northerners. In contrast, the fourth column shows that among those who have “a lot of trust” in
the police, 70.86 percent are northerners compared with 19.87 percent south easterners and 9.27
percent south westerners. The apparent polarization of the northern and southern regions along ‘a
lot of trust’ and ‘no trust’ indicates citizens are indisputably influenced by differences in their
relationships and experiences with the ‘national’ police. Therefore, irrespective of whether the
police performance is efficient or not, it is not arbitrary to infer that the northerners are likely to
trust the police more than the southerners.
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Table 5.50: Trust in the Court
How much trust do you have in the court?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
88
153
157
Not at all
21.84
37.97
38.96
234
190
115
Just a little
42.94
34.86
21.10
278
73
57
Somewhat
67.48
17.72
13.83
149
52
20
A lot
67.12
23.42
9.01 1
0
0
1
Don’t understand
0.00
0.00
100.00
11
4
2
Don’t Know
64.71
23.53
11.76
760
472
352
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
Pearson chi2 (15) =

237.2778

Pr =

Total
5
1.24
6
1.10
4
0.97
0.45
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

403
100.00
545
100.00
412
100.00
222
100.00
1
100.00
17
100.00
1,600
100.00

0.000

To learn whether citizens’ trust in the court is contingent upon region of origin or not, I
applied a chi-square test. The null hypothesis is that there is no association between region of
citizens and how much they trust the courts. The test results as shown in Table 5.50 are c2 (12, N
= 1600) = 237.27, p < 0.05. Furthermore, the c2 =237.27 exceeds the critical value (21.026), so
the null hypothesis is rejected. The first row shows the south-west region has the highest distrust
for the courts at 38.96 percent followed by the south-eastern region with 37.97 percent, and only
21.78 percent for the northern region. Among those that said they trust the court a lot, the
northern region has the highest trust in the courts with 67.12 percent.
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Table 5.51: Government Handling of the Economy
How well or badly is the government handling of the economy?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
191
293
187
Very badly
28.17
43.22
27.58
176
111
97
Fairly badly
45.24
28.53
24.94
299
57
60
Fairly well
79.19
13.57
14.29
84
9
8
Very well
83.17
8.91
7.92
10
1
0
Don’t know
90.91
9.09
0.00
760
471
352
Total
47.53
29.46
22.01
Pearson chi2 (12) = 265.8240

Total
7
1.03
5
1.29
4
0.95
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

678
100.00
389
100.00
420
100.00
101
100.00
11
100.00
1,599
100.00

Pr = 0.000

Management of the economy is one of the most crucial issues in multiethnic states
because of the asymmetrical impact it bears on diverse groups. Because of the prevailing
arguments that economic policies benefit the regions unequally, I used chi-square analysis to test
the null hypothesis that there is no association between region and approval of government
management of the economy. The chi-square test results show that the relationship is statistically
significant, c2 (12, N = 1600) = 265.82, p < 0.001. The c2 = 265.82 exceeds the critical value
(21.026), so the null hypothesis is rejected. The first column of the table shows the proportion of
citizens per region who rate the government performance as ‘very bad.’ The south-east tops the
list with 43.22 percent. However, the fourth column shows that for those who say that
government management of the economy is going ‘very well’ the northern region gives the
highest approval with 83.17 percent. In contrast, only 8.91 percent of south-eastern respondents
and 7.92 percent of south-western respondents believe the same.

166

Table 5.52: Government Management of Corruption
How well or badly is the government managing fighting corruption?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
86
182
75
Very badly
24.93
52.75
21.74
133
93
78
Fairly badly
42.61
30.49
25.57
331
141
143
Fairly well
52.96
22.56
22.88
204
53
56
Very well
64.56
16.77
17.72
6
3
0
Don't know
66.67
33.33
0.00
760
472
352
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
Pearson chi2 (12) =

163.8419

Pr =

Total
2
0.58
1
0.33
10
1.60
3
0.95
0
0.00
16
1.00

348
100.00
305
100.00
625
100.00
316
100.00
9
100.00
1,600
100.00

0.000

In Table 5.52 chi-square statistics were calculated to examine if there is a relationship
between the regions of citizens and their opinion about the government’s management of
corruption in Nigeria. The chi-square statistics test the null hypothesis that there is no association
between region and opinion of citizens about government management of corruption. The test
result shows statistical significance in the association between region and diverse opinions about
government management of corruption, c2 (12, N = 1600) =163.84, p < .05. To be sure, c2 =
163.84 exceeds the critical value (21.026), df = 12, p < .05. Hence, we reject the H0. The results
table (first column) shows that those citizens who view government handling of corruption as
‘very badly’ are 24.93 percent northerners, 52.75 percent south-easterners, and 21.74 percent
south-westerners. However, the fourth column shows that among those who view management
of corruption as going “very well,” 64.56 percent are northerners, 16.77 percent are south
easterners, and 18.75 percent are south westerners.
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Table 5.53: Government Handling of Violence
How well or badly is the government preventing or resolving violent conflicts?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
Total
99
162
68
2
331
Very badly
29.91
48.94
20.54
0.60
100.00
151
137
92
2
382
Fairly badly
39.53
35.86
24.08
0.52
100.00
336
120
158
12
626
Fairly well
53.67
19.17
25.24
1.92
100.00
168
47
32
0
247
Very well
68.02
19.03
12.96
0.00
100.00
6
6
2
0
14
Don't know
42.86
42.86
14.29
00
100.00
760
472
352
16
1,600
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
1.00
100.00
Pearson chi2 (12) =

156.8621

Pr =

0.000

Because of the widespread nature of violence, its ferocious impacts, and implications for
interethnic relationships, I examined the opinions of citizens by region using chi-square statistics.
The null hypothesis for the test is that there is no association between regions of citizens and
their views about the government’s handling of violence in Nigeria. The results show statistical
significance, c2 (12, N = 1600) =156.86, p < .05. Also, the c2 exceeds the critical value
(21.026), so we rejected the null hypothesis. The first column of the chi-square results table
shows the percentages for those who believe that government handling of violence is going “very
badly.” The distributions of this group are 48.94 percent south-eastern, 29.91 percent northern,
and 20.54 percent south-western citizens. That implies that the eastern region disapproves of the
government’s handling of violence much more than the north and south-western regions. On the
other hand, the fourth column provides proportions by region for those who believe that
government is handling prevention and resolution of violent conflicts “very well.” This column
shows that 68.02 percent of northern citizens approve of government handling of conflict
management compared to 19.03 percent of south-eastern citizens and 12.96 percent of southwestern region citizens. The consistent patterns of negative ratings for government by the eastern
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region and positive ratings by the north corroborates the assertion that the ratings of government
by the northern and eastern regions are influenced by regional affinities, ethnic differences, and
disparate experiences.

Table 5.54: Ethnic Discrimination
How frequently have you been disciminated against ?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
520
297
326
Never
45.06
25.74
28.25
109
85
16
Once or twice
51.17
39.91
7.51
93
70
5
Several times
54.71
41.18
2.94
37
19
4
Many times
61.67
31.67
6.67
0
0
1
No response
0.00
0.00
100.00
1
1
0
Don't know
50.00
50.00
0.00
760
472
352
Total
47.50
29.50
22.00
Pearson chi2 (15) =

108.3733

Pr =

Total
11
0.95
3
1.41
2
1.18
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

1154
100.00
213
100.00
170
100.00
60
100.00
1
100.00
2
100.00
1,600
100.00

0.000

Interethnic discrimination is a major bane of violence and constitutes a significant
threat to national unity. Although the nation has made a significant attempt at promoting
equitable access to power and resources, ethnic discrimination is still a dangerous obstacle to
political stability (Bach 1997). So, to examine whether there is any association between region
and citizens’ opinions about interethnic discrimination I tested the null hypothesis that there is no
association between region and opinions of citizens from diverse ethno-regional backgrounds
about discrimination. The results of the test in Table 5.54 shows that there is a statistically
significant relationship between the two variables. Accordingly, c2 (15, N = 1600) =108.37, p <
.05. Likewise, c2 =108.37 exceeds critical value (24.996), so we reject the null hypothesis.
Interestingly, 45.06 percent of northerners indicated that they have never been discriminated
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against compared to 25.74 percent of south easterners and 28.25 percent of south westerners.
Given the above, it can be deduced that the south-easterners and south-westerners experience
discriminations much more than the northerners.

Table 5.55: Citizens’ Views on National Integration
Should Nigeria remain united as on country?
Regions of Participants' Origin
Response Options North
South-East South-West FCT
225
106
58
Agree with statement 1
56.82
26.77
14.65
532
362
283
Agree strongly with statement 2
44.86
30.52
23..86
1
1
11
Agree with neither
7.69
7.69
84.62
0
2
0
Don't know
0.00
100.00
0.00
758
471
352
Total
47.46
29.49
22.04
Pearson chi2 (9) =

59.4802

Total
7
1.77
9
0.76
0
0.00
0
0.00
16
1.00

396
100.00
1,186
100.00
13
100.00
2
100.00
1,597
100.00

Pr = 0.000

Analysts have argued that intergroup conflict is a major threat to the unity of Nigeria
(Olowu, Adebayo, Soremekun 1999). Therefore, I used chi-square statistics in Table 5.55 to
examine the preferences of citizens by region for two statements; the first statement stipulates
that the country should remain united even if the extremists continue to ferment violence. The
second statement specifies that the country should split into two if the problems of violent
conflict cannot be resolved. The null hypothesis for this analysis is: there is no association
between the preferences of the citizens for either statement one or two. Based on the results (See
Table 5.56) the association between regions and citizens’ opinions about the two statements is
statistically significant, c2 (9, N = 1597) =59.48, p < .05. Furthermore, c2 =108.37 exceeds the
critical value (16.919), so we reject the null. According to within-column results, (first column)
56.82 percent northerners, agree with the first statement, compared to 26.77 percent south
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easterners and 14.65 percent south westerners. Paradoxically, the fourth column also shows that
44.86 percent northerners would support the second statement compared to 30.52 percent south
easterners and 23.86 percent south westerners. It is understandable that the northern region,
being pro-government, would support the first statement to preserve unity of the country.
However, it seems irrational that the region that enjoys power dominance would also support the
notion that the country should split into two if the problems associated with violence cannot be
resolved.

Conclusion
In this chapter I tested the two hypotheses using qualitative and quantitative methods of
analysis. First, the results of the analysis support Hypothesis 1 in that ethnic groups whose
regions benefit more from the national government than others are more likely to trust and
support the national government than those whose regions do not.
This finding is important because there is evidence that the differences in the feelings of
citizens from various ethnic groups toward changes in government policies and how it handles a
variety of issues were the triggers of large-scale violence, including the Kano riot in1953, the
pogrom against Ibos in 1966, and the civil war (1967-1970), to mention a few. Some of the
policies of successive administrations in reaction to the grievances of the citizens from the
southern regions against the structural imbalance of the country include the creation of an
additional region and states that further accelerated interethnic antagonism and struggles for
ownership of resources will be addressed.
Moreover, the drastic changes to the revenue allocation formula that eliminated the
derivative principle was received by the northern region as a step in the right direction toward
national integration. In contrast, the eastern region perceived it as a flagrant step by the north to
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dispose the eastern region of its rightful revenue. In sum, mixed perceptions are sufficient factors
that can trigger discontent and ultimately civil war.
According to Hypothesis 2, ethnic groups from regions with high levels of participation
in civil society should be more likely to hold national government accountable than those from
regions with low participation. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of the analysis.
Further, the results of the chi-square analysis indicate that in the south-west region where belief
in civil society is the strongest, violence and conflict have been less prevalent in comparison to
the north, where belief in civil society is the weakest.
In conclusion, the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses support the study
hypotheses that in a resource rich multiethnic state, ethnic tensions have the potential to devolve
into civil war, while the existence of a strong civil society helps mediate ethnic tensions and
decrease this potential for violence.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction
This dissertation set out to answer two questions. First, how do the perceptions of citizens
about government policies influence violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich subSaharan African states? Second, how does a strong civil society influence citizens’ perceptions
of government institutions’ performance in ethnically diverse, resource-rich, sub-Saharan
African states? In chapter one I introduced the background problem of the research and outlined
the structure of the dissertation. In chapter two I examined the extant literature of violent
conflict. In chapter three I presented the theoretical framework for the analysis in which I
explored the role of the relationships between civil society and political trust on citizens’
perceptions about government policy and performances. In chapter four I discussed the method
of analysis and explained the rationale for using bivariate statistics and descriptive statistical
analysis. In chapter five I analyzed the data on the opinions of Nigerian ethno-regional groups’
perceptions about trust and performance of the national government on various issues.116
To examine the perceptions of the people from different ethno-regional groups on
government policies and performances I analyzed the data collected during my fieldwork in
Nigeria, and Afrobarometer survey data (2017, Round 7) on Nigeria. The results were explored
to evaluate the two research hypotheses.

Discussion of Findings
The findings from this research demonstrate that the respondents’ opinions are shaped by

See Udogu (2007) for an in-depth research the impact of ethnicity on socio-economic and political development
of African states. In the analysis Udogu shows that ethnicity is a powerful cause of violence and supports his
analysis with the effects of mitigating role of civil society in ethnically instigated crises.
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their regional relationships, experiences with the federal government, and biases either in favor
of or in opposition to the government. As shown in the results of the bivariate analysis, the
respondents from the northern region trust the government and have favorable opinions about the
policies and performance of government institutions. In contrast, the ethnic groups from south
east and south west regions do not trust the government as the north does and have less favorable
perceptions about the government policies and performance. Furthermore, the presence of civil
society groups—not ethnic militants—play a significant role in the relative peace enjoyed by the
south east and south west regions compared to the northern region. This finding is consistent
with the findings of Kuenzi (2008). The perceptions of respondents from the three regions are
demonstrated the chi-square analysis and the survey interview on the issues examined, including
the handling of the 2015 general election, management of the economy, management of
corruption, handling of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen all of which
indicated that people from the south eastern and south western regions are not satisfied with the
government’s performance on the same issues mentioned above and do not trust government and
its institutions.117
As a result of data analysis, it is logical to infer that perhaps the polarization among
Nigerians along ethno-regional boundaries emanated from ethnicization of government policies.
Therefore, it seems plausible that the northern region benefits more from the federal government
policies on resource allocation and access to power than the south eastern and south western
regions. The inherent asymmetry in access to power and resource allocation probably accounts
for the grievances of the southern.118 Since the 1990s, the active role of a coalition of civil
society network has prevented or at least blurred many instances of impending violence
(Joseph1987; Elaigwu 2002). The literature of ethnicity and violent conflicts (Horowitz 1985;
117
118

See The Guardian (April 10, 2016) for a report on the study of the Igbo question.
See Appendix B, sections A and B to see how each region benefit from state creation and revenue allocation.
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Jesse and Williams 2010) supports the viewpoint that when a region dominates power it is likely
to expropriate resources-wealth for its regional advantage (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).119 Indeed,
archival records and evidence from previous studies on Nigerian politics suggest that the
northern region dominates power and reaps relative benefits as a result, and at the same time the
eastern region faces incessant discrimination (Ukiwo 2005; Easterly 1999; Nnoli 1998; Kuenzi
2008).120 The responses of the participants both in the Afrobarometer survey and my field
interview support that finding.
In the south east and south west regions there is widespread participation in civil society
activities. Similarly, archival record shows that there is low violence in the regions. For instance,
civil society groups such as Ohaneze Ndigbo mediate earnestly between the federal government
and MASSOB to resolve grievances of the south east region against the national government
politically rather than militarily to forestall the repeat of the civil war (1967-1970).121 In fact, if
we compare the south eastern region, where the militant groups are receptive to political
negotiation, with the north eastern region, where Boko Haram henchmen are obdurate about
achieving their anti-modernism goals through violence, and the Fulani herdsmen’s ferocious
violence against farmers in the middle-belt and southern Nigeria unless they are rewarded for
their violence with the establishment of Grazing Reserve, or Ruga settlement, it is possible to
infer the willingness of civil society in south east and south west to hold the government
accountable reduces violent conflict because social capital facilitates political support. This
viewpoint is supported by literature of civic community and state relations (Putnam 1993,
Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, 1997). Indeed, civil society groups such as

Osaghae and Suberu (2005) provided articulate explanations to demonstrate how identity politics exacerbate
violent conflict in a deeply divided society.
120 Information used to construct the states / regions creation and revenue allocation formula were obtained from
Akinsanya and Ayoade (2005) and Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyediran (1997). Also, see Appendix A & B.
121 See Nigerian Tribune (December 10, 2015) for a detailed report on the mitigating efforts of the Ohaneze Ndigbo.
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Afenifere, Democratic Alliance Network, and others, reignited their intermediary role by
presenting a proposal to the federal government on how to mediate between the government and
all the militant groups across the three regions in the country.122 It has been observed that the
efforts of this civic group and others alike mitigate violent conflicts that could have ravaged the
country (Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Adeniran 1997). 123 Evidently, militant ethno-regional
groups in southern Nigeria have all suspended actions on their threats to rebelling against the
country.
In sum, this research supports the idea that the regions whose people feel discriminated
against may rebel if the situations that spur such feelings persist and are subsequently exploited
by political entrepreneurs (Lake and Rothchild 1996 and Kaufman 2006; Ismagilova 1978).

Contribution to Literature
This research contributes to the literature of violent conflict by emphasizing the
significance of the trends in the causal mechanism of violent conflict with ethnic power
dominance as the nucleus. Furthermore, this research suggests that while resource-dependence is
a significant latent risk factor of conflict, it is the discriminatory policies of the dominant ethnic
group(s) that triggers division and grievances which could contribute to an outbreak of violent
conflict. That seems to be the case between the Hausa-Fulani north and the southern Nigeria
(including the Yorubas, Ibos, and the riverine people of Niger-Delta area). Furthermore, the
findings of this research demonstrate that the competition for ethnic dominance and attendant

See The News (June 26, 2019) for the detail of the five-point plan that Afenifere presented to the president for
mitigating the conditions and processes that lead to violent conflict in Nigeria.
123 See The Guardian (June 8, 2016) for summary of the reports on how the absence of mitigation and the
lopsidedness in government policies bolsters the Fulani herdsmen’s violence. In contrast, see Thisday (September
13, 2011) for the mitigating role of civil society that fostered the peace negotiation that was brokered between the
federal government and Niger-Delta militant groups.
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demand for justice in multiethnic resource-rich states can easily metastasize into violent conflict
when the phenomenon is not mitigated by an umpire (civil society).
Moreover, in multiethnic states where the institutions of government are dominated by
one region or some ethnic groups, the marginalized ethnic groups are not likely to trust the
government. And without trust it’s rational that the perceptions of the aggrieved ethnic groups or
region about the government tend to be negative. This is consistent with Putnam’s (1993)
statement that “Trust lubricates cooperation … and cooperation itself breeds trust” implies that
symbiotic relationships exist between trust and cooperation (p.171). Therefore, just as
interpersonal trust can build social trust and then social capital, when intergroup trust is
combined with distrust for other groups and the political institution, the political arena may be
rendered precarious. Subsequently, negative feelings toward the government among the
aggrieved ethnic groups could trigger violence if they are not ameliorated. Therefore, as Kuenzi
(2008) notes, it is logical to infer that the relative peace among the ethnic groups in the south
eastern and western regions can be attributed to the accumulation of social trust, while the
incessant contentions between these two regions and the national government, which is
dominated by the northern region, indicate lack of political trust. Additionally, it may arbitrary to
infer that while interpersonal trust may have developed into social trust among the ethnic groups
in the southern regions, there is no evidence that it translated into social capital that could have
facilitated exogenous political trust.

Limitations and Implications for Future Research
This research consists of two major limitations including the number of cases examined
and the sampling size for the interviews. Interestingly, the three regions seem to have different
policy priorities and show different attitudes toward conflict mitigation role of civil society
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(Ofcansky and Yeager 1997; Kurtz 1978). The result might change, however, if more countries
are examined (Peters 1994). Second is the issue of generalizability of the research findings,
which is related to the first limitation. However, it is important to note that since it is difficult if
not impossible to generalize based on the findings of a single case analysis, future research will
be able to generalize the findings by applying the hypotheses and research questions to examine
multiple case studies. Furthermore, future surveys should include specific questions on relevant
issues such as resources revenue management or revenue allocation formula, and other issues
that are included in the national question, federal character principles, and civil society. It is
assumed that the inclusion of these germane issues and consideration of multiple cases in the
analysis will make the findings robust, and the conclusions generalizable. Hence, this research
only provides a precursor that tends to guide future research on similar topics.124

Conclusion
This research set out to achieve two goals. First, to analyze the causal mechanisms of
violent conflict in resource-rich multiethnic states with the view to explaining the role of
ethnicity (ethnic dominance). Second, to explore the mitigating influence of the civil society in
the conflicts in SSA. At this juncture, it is appropriate to submit that this research achieved the
two goals. First, it finds that factors causing latent disputes are intrinsic attributes of every
multiethnic resource-rich state. Secondly, it asserts that for latent factors to cause violent conflict
they must be triggered by a chain of accelerating issues or events that often emanate from the
lust for ethnic dominance in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.

See Perotti (1993) for a robust explanation on the impact of political equilibrium on political economy. Perotti
described how investment in human capital affects intergroup developments and relationships. In his view, the
externalities of such investment will spur political equilibrium between all groups. So, as I had mentioned in the
findings the nucleus of spatial equilibrium which evolves from broad investment in human capital.
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185

Therefore, based on the findings of this research it is safe to state that no single factor
such as natural resources, environment, state weakness, economic recession, greed, or grievance
can cause war. To be sure, grievances that are concomitants of ethnic dominance are the leading
accelerator of violent conflicts in the Nigerian context. So, it is not arbitrary to submit that in the
sub-Saharan Africa context, the ubiquitous accelerator of latent factors of violent conflict is
ethnicity (Bates 2015; Ismagilova 1978, 80). In connection with the disruptive role of ethnicity is
the absence of a vibrant civil society to mitigate conflict (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2016). As
such, equilibrium theory provides a new approach for analyzing the behaviors of competing
ethnic groups that culminate in violent conflicts (Vickers and Post 1973).
In the final analysis, this research suggests that distrust for political institutions which are
expressed in terms of negative perceptions of government policies and performance is highly
detrimental to national integration. In fact, the rising trends in separatist agitation in the south
eastern region in Nigeria supports the finding that distrust and negative perceptions by aggrieved
ethnic groups or regions can trigger rebellion if not resolved.125

See Appendix B, section A and B for examples of structural imbalances that shaped the trends in disequilibrium
in access to power and distribution of resources-wealth in Nigeria.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Oral Interview Questions
Ethnic Power Dominance in a Resource-Rich Sub Saharan African State
My name is Victor Fakoya. I am a graduate student from the Department of Political Science,
University of Nevada Las Vegas. I am conducting fieldwork for my dissertation on “Ethnic
power dominance in a resource-rich Sub-Saharan African state. An Analysis of Violent Conflict
Accelerators and the Mitigating Influence of Civil Society in Nigeria.”

Demographic Background
1. What region are you from? North _______South East _______South West__________.
2. How do you identify your gender? Female ______Male ______Other _____________.
3. What is your religious background? Christianity ______Islam ____Other_____________.
4. What is your highest educational qualification? Secondary/High _____College________.
I would like to ask you a few questions relating to the onset of violent conflict and resolution
process in Nigeria. Below is a list of the questions. Following your responses, you will have an
opportunity to support your selected options with brief explanations.

PART A: Conflict and causal processes
Question 1
a)
In your view, which of these conflicts are the Nigerians most afraid of an outbreak? Please
answer yes or no to each of the following. Select one response for each type of conflict.
Intraethnic conflict
Yes
No
No Response
Civil Disobedience
Armed robbery and kidnapping
Violent protests
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram/ Herdsmen
Islamic fundamentalism Boko Haram /Herdsmen
Ethnic militants’ violence
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Civil war
b) Can you briefly explain the reasons for your choices?
Question 2
a)
In your opinion, which of the following are the causes of violent conflict in Nigeria?
Please answer yes or no to each of the following. Select one response for each causal factor.
Modernization
Yes
No
No Response
Civil society
Government weakness
Land
Housing
Poor or lack of infrastructure
Climatic issues-drought
Military rule
Illiteracy
Poverty
Water
Environmental pollution
Fear of Islamization / Jihad
Electoral malpractices
Power sharing
Corruption
Ethnic discrimination
Resources revenue allocation
b)

Can you elaborate on the reasons for the factors that you mentioned?

PART B: Government Performance
Question 3
a)
How satisfied are with government’s management of the economy? Which one of the
following options best describe your opinion? Select only one response.
Highly Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Not Satisfied
Not Sure
b)
Can you elaborate on your response?
Question 4
a)
How confident are you in the ability of the government to manage corruption in its
institutions and agencies? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select
only one response.
Highly Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Not Satisfied
Not Sure
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b)

Can you explain the reasons for your view?

Question 5
a)
How would you rate your confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and
fair elections? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one
response.
Highly Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Confident
Not Sure
b)
Can you explain the reasons for your choice of response?
PART C: Ethnic Dominance and Discrimination
Question 6
a)
How confident are you in the ability of the government institutions to protect citizens and
distribute justice equitably? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion?
Select only one response.
Highly Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Confident
Not Sure
b)

Can you tell me more about your view?

Question 7
a)
How would you rate your approval of government’s handling of Boko Haram violence,
and Herders versus Farmers conflict in Nigeria? Which one of the following options best
describe your opinion? Select only one response.
Highly Approved
Somewhat Approved
Not Approve
Not Sure
b)

Can you elaborate on your choice of response?

Question 8
a)
How satisfied are you with government’s management of natural resources as it affects
interethnic relations in the country? Which one of the following options best describe your
opinion?
Highly Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Not Satisfied
Not Sure
b)
Can you briefly explain the reason(s) for your choice of response?
Question 9
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a)
How confident are you that the government have the ability to protect all ethnic groups
equally? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one
response.
Highly Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Confident
Not Sure
b)

Can you please elaborate briefly on your view?

Question 10
a)
How satisfied are you with the composition of government power sharing and inclusion
of different ethnic groups in the country? Which one of the following options best describe your
opinion? Select only one response.
Highly Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Not Satisfied
Not Sure
b)
Can you briefly elaborate on your view?
PART D: Mitigating Influence of civil society and National Integration
Question 11
a)
How confident are you that the conflict-mitigation role of civil society can influence
political stability in Nigeria? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion?
Select only one response.
Highly Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Confident
Not Sure
b)

Can you explain the reason for your opinion?

Question 12
a)
How actively if at all are you involved in any community or voluntary organization’s
activities? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one
response.
Actively Involved
Somewhat Involved
Not Involved
Not Sure
b)

Can you briefly elaborate on your choice of response?

Question 13
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a)
How much confidence do you have interethnic integration and preservation of the unity
of Nigeria? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one
response.
Highly Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Confident
Not Sure
b)

Briefly elaborate on your opinion.

That concludes the interview. Thank you for your time and the information you shared.
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Appendix B. Nigerian States by Region
Northern Region
Adamawa
Bauchi
Benue
Borno
Gombe
Jigawa
Kaduna
Kano
Katsina
Kebbi
Kwara
Kogi
Nassarawa
Niger
Plateau
Sokoto
Taraba
Yobe
Zamfara
19 States

South-Eastern Region
Abia
Akwa Ibom
Anambra
Bayelsa
Cross River
Ebonyi
Enugu
Imo
Rivers

South-Western Region
Delta
Edo
Ekiti
Lagos
Ogun
Ondo
Osun
Oyo

9 States

8 States
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Appendix C. Civil Society Network in Nigeria
CATEGORIES
Activist (ProDemocracy)

Human Rights &
Social Justice
Rights

Humanitarian
Professional
Groups

Educational,
Communication,
and Mass
Mobilization
Associations

SPECIFIC GROUPS
Committee for Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), Campaign for
Democracy (CD), National Democratic Coalition (NADECO),
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Center for Advancement of
Democracy (CAD),League of Democratic Women (LEADS)
Alliance of Nigerian Youth (ANY).
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Union of
Petroleum and Natural Gas (NUPENG), Petroleum and Natural Gas
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), Medical and
Health Workers Union of Nigeria, National Union of Air Transport
Employees, National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial
Institution Employees, National Union of Road Transport Workers
Nigeria Civil Service Union, Nigeria Labour Congress, The
Nigeria Union of Local Government employees, Nigeria Union of
Teachers, Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated
Institutions, Radio, Television and Theatre Workers Union of Nigeria.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Nigeria Network of
NGOs (NNGO), Nigerian Organization for Solidarity & Development
(NOSAD),Voluntary Service Association of Nigeria (VOSAN)
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Union of
Petroleum and Natural Gas (NUPENG), Petroleum and Natural Gas
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), Medical and
Health Workers Union of Nigeria, National Union of Air Transport
Employees, National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial
Institution Employees, National Union of Road Transport Workers
Nigeria Civil Service Union, Nigeria Labour Congress, The
Nigeria Union of Local Government employees, Nigeria Union of
Teachers, Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated
Institutions, Radio, Television and Theatre Workers Union of Nigeria.
The Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), Nigeria Union of Journalists
(NUJ), Communicating for Change (CfC), Human Rights Information
Network (HuRINet).

Issue-Oriented
Associations

Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN)
Justice, Development and Peace Commission / Caritas (JDPC).

Cultural Groups

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Oodua
People Congress (OPC), Arewa People’s Congress
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Transparency International
Nigeria, Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN).

Religious Groups
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Appendix D. Label, Definition, and Coding of Afrobarometer Dataset Questions Indicator
in Stata.
(Question 9) How much, if at all, do you depend on receiving remittances from relatives or
friends living in foreign countries? Label define remittance 0 “Not at all / does not receive
remittances” 1 “A little bit” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t know”
(Question 21 A) How frequently did you attend community meeting during the past year? Label
define commtng 4 “Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “Would if had the chance” 0
“Would never do this” 9 “Don’t Know”
(Question 21 B) How frequently did you get together with others to raise an issue during the past
year? Label define raiseissue 4 “Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “Would if had the
chance” 0 “Would never do this” 9 “Don’t know”
(Q 23) How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election (2015)? Label
define ffelectn 4 “Completely free and fair” 3 “Free and fair, but with minor problems”
2 “Free and fair with major problems” 1 “Not free and fair” 8 “Do not understand” 9 “Don’t
know”
(Question 26) How frequently did you participate in demonstration or protest march to show
dissatisfaction with government performance during the past year? Label define ptdempro 4
“Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “would if had the chance” 0 “Would never do
this” 9 “Don’t know”
(Question 43 A) How much do you trust the president? Label define trust_pr 0 “Not at all” 1
“Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t know / Haven’t heard”
(Question 43 B) How much do you trust the national assembly? Label define trust_nas 0 “Not at
all” 1 “Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don't know / Haven’t heard”
(Question 43 C) How much do you trust the Independent National Electoral Commission-INEC?
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Label define trust_inec 0 “Not at all” 1 “Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t
know/Haven’t heard”
(Question 43 G) How much do you trust the police? Label define trust_pol 0 “Not at all” 1 “Just
a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don't know/ Haven’t heard”
(Question 43 I) How much do you trust the courts of law? Label define trustcourt 0 “Not at all” 1
“Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard”
(Question 51) Do you think the public officials treat you better, the same, or worse than other
people? Label define equa_treat 0 “Much worse” 1 “Worse” 2 “Same” 3 “Better” 4 “Much
better” 9 “Don’t know”
(Question 56 K) How well or badly would you say the current government is fighting corruption
in government? Label define fgtcoruptn 1 “Very Badly” 2 “Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4
“Very Well” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough”
(Question 56 A) How well or badly would you say the current government is managing the
economy? Label define mngeco 1 “Very Badly” 2 “Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4 “Very Well”
9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough”
(Question 56 K) How well or badly would you say the current government is preventing or
resolving violent conflict between communities? Label define fgtviolenc 1 “Very badly” 2
“Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4 “Very Well” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough”
(Question 83 B) How strongly do you agree with the following statements? Statement 1: Nigeria
should remain united as one country even if the extremist groups continue to cause violence.
Statement 2: Nigeria should split into two countries if the problems caused by the extremist
groups cannot be resolved. Label define integration 1 “Agree Very Strongly With Statement 1” 2
“Agree With Statement 1” 3 “Agree With Statement 2” 4 “Agree Very Strongly With Statement
2” 5 “Agree With Neither” 9 “Don’t know”
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(Question 86 C) How frequently if at all, have you been discriminated against based on your
ethnicity in the past year? Label define discriminate 0 “Never” 1 “Once or Twice” 2 “Several
Times” 3 “Many times” 9 “Don’t Know”
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Appendix E. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable

Observation

Mean

S.D

Min

Max

Community

1600

1.918125

1.352799

0

9

Raise issue

1600

1.65875

1.342451

0

9

Election

1600

3.18875

1.11362

1

9

Protest

1600

1.285625

1.159152

0

9

Trust President

1599

1.1467792

1.291663

0

9

Trust Assembly

1599

0.9618512

1.240905

0

9

Equal Treatment

1600

2.118125

1.374901

0

9

Managing Economy

1599

2.013133

1.130066

1

9

Managing Corruption

1600

2.609375

1.140767

1

9

Managing violence

1600

2.554375

1.156667

1

9

National Integration

1597

3.518472

0.8943939

2

9

Trust Police

1600

0.934375

1.209745

0

9

Trust Courts

1600

1.3675

1.269232

0

9

Regions

1600

1.945

0.7431825

1

4

Participate in protest

1600

0.466875

0.8634922

0

9

Discrimination

1600

0.4725

0.8886717

0

9
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Appendix F. Phases of State Creation and Revenue Sharing in Nigeria

i. Region/State Creation, Federal Character, and Inequality in Nigeria

ii. Revenue Allocation Commission, Committee, and Decrees 1946-1958
REVENUE SHARING APPROACHES IN NIGERIA COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION -COLLAPSE OF FIRST REPUBLIC
COMMISSION /
COMMITTEE

DATE

FEDERAL

Philipson Commission

1946

100%

Hicks - Phillipson
Commission

Chick Commission

Raisman Commission

1951

1953

1958

Binns Commission

1964

Dina Committee

1968

50%

50%

REGION /
STATE

N/A

SPENDING FORMULA RECOMMENDATION
Centralized revenue generation and spending by the colonial administration. There was no statutory budget for the
regional government and the local councils. The central colonial administration disbursed residues from its budget to
the regions.

50%

Revenue sharing based on fiscal responsibility, derivation, and special grants (for education and police funding) with
the intention to propagate cooperative federalism by advocating for fiscal authorities and responsibilities for both the
central and the regional governments . Moreover, centrally derived revenue (CDR) was equally between the central
and regional authorities. The 50% allocated to the regional governments was shared to each of the three regions based
on derivation principle.

50%

Revenue allocation based on a pure principle of derivation which allowed revenue sharing to the regions to be based
purely on the percentage of revenue generated from the regions. Reliance on the principle of derivation encouraged
the regional authorities to embark on effective strategies for revenue generation in their respective jurisdictions. The
principle was accepted differently by the different regions. The portion allocated for the regions was shared based on
derivation as follow: North30%; East 30%, West 40%.

Revenue allocation based on the principle of fiscal autonomy and need replaced derivation. The recommendations
were on the elevation of the regions to semi-autonomous government authority status, and the disparities on the
populations of the regions which determine their fiscal need. The central government and regional government are
granted power to generate revenue based on the power stipulated on exclusive, concurrent, and residual lists. The
regional portion of the centrally derived revenue (CDR) otherwise known as distributable pool account (DPA) was
UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED allocated as follow: North 40%; East 18%, West 37%; Southern Cameroon 5% .
Revenue sharing based on fiscal need. Because of the creation of the Mid-West region from the western region, and
the transfer of Southern Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon the regional sharing ratio changed significantly as
UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED follow: North 42%; East 39; Western 20%; Mid-West 8%.
A new sharing formula based on minimum government responsibilities and advocacy for the creation of a permanent
revenue and fiscal planning commission board that was never implemented by the military regime of general Gowon
UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED and the successive administrations
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iii. Revenue Allocation Commission, Committee, and Decrees 1977-2007
REVENUE ALLOCATION IN NIGERIA 1977-2007
DATE

Aboyade

1977

57%

30%

10%

3%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Okigbo

1980-81

53%

30%

10%

7%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

RAD

1984

55%

32%

10%

2.5%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

RMAFC

1989

50%

30%

15%

5%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

DECREE # 3

1991

50%

25%

20%

5%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

REVISED

1992

48%

24%

20%

7.5%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NCCCRA

1999

33%

22.5%

20%

NA

1%

5%

2%

11%

6%

RMAFC

1999-07

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

FEDERAL

STATE

52.68% 26.72%

SPECIAL
GRANT/FUND

LOCAL

20.60%

FEDERAL
CAPITAL T.

ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMEN
T

COMMISSION
/ DECREES

STABILIZATIO
N ACCOUNT

DERIVATION

OMPADEC

Source: Akinsanya, Adeoye A., and John AA Ayoade. Readings in Nigerian government and
politics. Gratia Associates International, 2005.
RAD: Revenue Amendment Decree # 36 of 1984
RAMFC: Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission
NCCCRA: National Constitutional Conference Committee on Revenue Allocation
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